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Abstract 
Abstract (English) 
This thesis is an anthropological tale about how a small group of artificial life 
researchers at the Ikegami Lab - an artificial life laboratory at the University of 
Tokyo, Japan headed by professor Takashi Ikegami – seek to fulfill their self-
described mission to “construct artificial life in the real world”.  
 
“Life” – the primary scientific object of artificial life, and that painfully imprecise 
concept that cuts across all of the living – is at the Ikegami Lab considered to be a 
constructive category, something, Ikegami and the lab members report, which is best 
understood by its material construction in artificial media, such as computer models, 
petri dishes or robots. Thus, it is by constructing new artificial systems, not from bits 
and pieces of biological materials or organic compounds, such as cells and genes, but 
from bits and pieces of silicone, rubber electronic circuitries, information, data, 
algorithms, ones and zeroes, that Ikegami and the lab members may better understand 
what life is. As an anthropologist of science and technology, I have spent about 7 
months talking to and working with them. 
 
Based on ethnographic fieldwork, this ethnography tracks a diverse set of techniques 
at work at the Ikegami Lab and how they seek to realize their aspiration to construct 
artificial life in the real world in order to better understand what life is. On an 
ethnographic journey through the Ikegami Lab, then, I show how these lab members 
think and talk about themselves and their work, but also how the lab is organized 
around Ikegami himself. Ikegami is a charismatic leader, I argue, whose personal 
qualities and style of leadership manifest as a sort of charismatic authority, by which 
he organizes and commands his lab. And as such, the social structure at the lab 
represents an emotional collectivization held together by an emotional bond with 
Ikegami. Thus, Ikegami, as a charismatic leader, offers to lab members his own set of 
worldviews, beliefs, principles, norms and values, which I call Ikegamianism, and to 
which the lab members adhere. And this is precisely, I want to show, what organizes 
and propels the Ikegami Lab into action, into constructing artificial life in the real 
world. To show what they mean by constructing artificial life in the real world, then, I 
introduce the concept of parallax machines to capture how Ikegamianism is given 
material expression through the artificial systems they make at the lab. Moreover, 
parallax machines, I further want to show, both materialize Ikegamianism and reflect 
what I call a parallax view of life that allows the artificial life researchers at the 
Ikegami Lab to straddle any meaningful distinction between “artificial life” and 
“biological life”. Parallax machines, in short, materialize both Ikegamianism, the set 
of values and beliefs springing from Ikegami’s charismatic authority, and a parallax 
view of life that connects, yet without resolving, indexical regimes that are normally 
indexed as separate: life may only be apprehended through a parallax view.  
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Abstract (Dansk/Danish) 
Denne afhandling er et antropologisk indblik i, hvordan en lille gruppe forskere ved 
Ikegami Laboratoriet - et ”kunstigt liv” (artificial life) laboratorium ved universitetet i 
Tokyo, Japan, ledet af professor Takashi Ikegami - søger at realisere deres mission 
om at ”konstruere kunstigt liv i den virkelige verden”.  
 
Begrebet “liv” - det primære videnskabelige objekt for deres forskning og det 
smerteligt upræcise begreb, der skal forestille at være fælles for alle levende ting – 
betragtes blandt disse forskere som en kategori, der kan konstrueres materielt, noget, 
som bedst erkendes gennem dets materielle konstruktion i kunstige medier, såsom i 
computermodeller, petriskåle eller robotter. Det er således ved at konstruere nye 
kunstige systemer, ikke fra stykker af biologisk materiale eller organiske forbindelser, 
såsom celler og gener, men fra stykker af silikone, elektroniske gummikredsløb, 
information, data og algoritmer, at Ikegami og laboratoriemedlemmerne forsøger at 
erhverve sig en bedre erkendelse af, hvad ”liv” er. Som antropolog har jeg brugt tæt 
på 7 måneder på at tale og arbejde med dem.  
 
Baseret på etnografisk feltarbejde undersøger jeg i denne etnografi en mangfoldighed 
af teknikker på Ikegami Laboratoriet og hvordan de søger, at realisere deres ambition 
om, at konstruere kunstigt liv i den virkelige verden for bedre at forstå, hvad ”liv” er. 
På en etnografisk rejse gennem laboratoriet viser jeg, hvordan disse 
laboratoriemedlemmer tænker og taler om sig selv og deres arbejde, men også 
hvordan laboratoriet er socialt organiseret omkring Ikegami. Ikegami er utvivlsomt en 
karismatisk leder, hvis personlige egenskaber og ledelsesstil manifesterer sig som en 
slags karismatisk autoritet, hvormed han organiserer og kommanderer sit 
laboratorium. Og som sådan, hævder jeg, repræsenterer den sociale struktur på 
laboratoriet en følelsesmæssig kollektivisering, som holdes sammen gennem et 
følelsesmæssigt bånd med Ikegami. Ikegami tilbyder, som karismatisk leder, 
medlemmerne af laboratoriet sit eget verdenssyn, sine egne overbevisninger, 
principper, normer og værdier, som jeg kalder Ikegamianisme, og det er netop, jeg vil 
vise, dette karismatiske lederskab, der organiserer og driver medlemmerne til 
handling. For at vise, hvad de mener med at konstruere kunstigt liv i den virkelige 
verden, introducerer jeg begrebet parallax-maskiner for at vise, hvordan 
Ikegamianisme får et materielt udtryk gennem de kunstige systemer, de laver på 
laboratoriet. Parallax-maskiner, vil jeg endvidere vise, både materialiserer 
Ikegamianisme og afspejler det, jeg kalder et parallax-livssyn, der gør det muligt for 
medlemmerne på Ikegami Lab at tøjle enhver meningsfuld forskel mellem "kunstigt 
liv" og "biologisk liv". Parallax-maskiner materialiserer kort sagt både 
Ikegamianisme, dvs. de værdier og overbevisninger, der udspringer af Ikegamis 
karismatiske autoritet, og et parallax-livssyn, der forbinder, men uden at løse, 
indeksregimer, der normalt indekseres som separate: ”liv” kan kun pågribes gennem 
et parallax. 
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Introduction: Larger than Life  
 
Professor Takashi Ikegami is not only the leader, principal investigator and namesake 
of the Ikegami Lab – an artificial life laboratory consisting of about 15 lab members 
at the University of Tokyo - he is also larger than life. A veteran artificial life 
researcher, Ikegami has been in the field of artificial life for over 20 years. Yet, his 
appearance betrays a tension between the rigidity of a hard-nosed scientist and the 
spontaneity of an intuitive artist. His hair is ruffled and his slender body is draped in a 
long trench coat under which he wears a colorful Jackson Pollock-dotted aloha-shirt. 
As a trained physicist, mathematician and professor, he is an accomplished scientist. 
But he also sees himself as an artist with a visionary outlook. Thus, his own universe 
of ideas and beliefs, compliments his looks: to him, it is self-evident that, “artificial 
life is larger than biological life”, that life-organic or what biologists and artificial life 
researchers refer to as, “life-as-we-know-it”, is not the only kind of life existing in this 
world. Artificial life, he asserts, is “larger” than biological life because the universal 
concept of “life” transcends the natural order and it must therefore, he believes, be 
apprehended beyond the conventional logics of biology. “Life”, in other words, is in a 
highly volatile state, both materially, pragmatically and theoretically, and swathed in 
his larger-than-life-attitude, Ikegami believes that “life” may be better understood 
through artificiality, through the active material construction of new artificial systems. 
He is, in a word, on a mission to, “construct artificial life in the real world” by 
“enlarging” artificial life systems in terms of materiality, physicality, size, scale, and 
complexity, so that they become very “real” physical things in the “real world” in 
which we live.   
 
This thesis is an anthropological tale about Ikegami and his team of researchers at the 
Ikegami Lab, exploring how they seek to “construct artificial life in the real world” 
and how Ikegami has managed to organize a new movement in science. Ikegami, 
then, is a central figure in this thesis, both in terms of how scientific change is brought 
about and in terms of how scientific practices are propelled through charismatic 
leadership. The lab members at the Ikegami Lab featured in this thesis have gathered 
around Ikegami and see him as a sort of prophetic figure, whose creed they follow, 
and whose mission they seek to accomplish. Together, their goal is once and for all to 
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better understand the highly elusive concept of “life itself” (cf. Foucault 1971) 
through constructing artificial life in the real world. Thus, this thesis is a story about 
how Ikegami and the lab members at the Ikegami Lab collectively struggle to get at 
the one overarching and fundamental question, “what is life?”, not simply by asking 
about it, but by synthetically constructing it from the “bottom-up”. But it is also a 
story about how a scientific community gathers around a charismatic leader, how 
technologies become objects of knowledge production and how paradigmatic changes 
in science intersect with, and transform through, individual personal qualities, 
emotional postures, affective relationships and charismatic leadership.  
 
For Ikegami and his fellow artificial life researchers, who are featured in this thesis, 
then, “life” is not only an object to be epistemologically reworked and reconstructed. 
It is also an object that can be synthetically and materially constructed from the 
bottom up. What this means is that “life” is constructible category at the Ikegami Lab, 
both literally and metaphorically, something that can be built from scratch and 
something the can be built into technologies. In our present moment, Ikegami and his 
small group of researchers, officially naming themselves “artificial life researchers” - 
or “Alifers” - have clustered at the Ikegami Lab, to rethink and redefine, as they say, 
“what life is”, by, “constructing new life forms from the bottom-up”. Constructing 
new artificial systems, such as computer simulations and robots, they claim, is as a 
way to better understand what “life” is and what it might become, and so, 
constructing life, for them, means understanding life. Together, then, they seek to 
heighten the chances for getting at what life is exactly be constructing new artificial 
systems. However, the lab members have also clustered at the Ikegami Lab for 
another reason: because they have been enamored and captivated with Ikegami 
himself, his own cult of personality. To them, Ikegami is, they say, a “pioneer” and 
“genius”, who is leading a rebellion against what he terms, “normal science” – a 
mode of science bound by convention, tradition and custom, indeed, an enterprise, as 
they see it, which is detrimental to scientific and intellectual progress. As zealots of 
Ikegami, these artificial life researchers see themselves as being on the forefront of an 
insurrection against ways of doing science, against dominant paradigms, and so seek 
to reinvent, redefine and reconstruct how we understand “life” altogether.  
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What I offer in this thesis, then, is an ethnographic journey through the social and 
cultural tapestry of the Ikegami Lab. Here, “life” is nowadays being tweaked, 
amended, constructed, reconstructed and cobbled together, not simply from bits of 
biological materials, such as cells and genes, but from bits and pieces of silicone, 
rubber electronic circuitries, information, data, ones and zeroes, under the charismatic 
and visionary leadership of Ikegami himself. Operating out of one of the most 
prestigious universities in Japan – the University of Tokyo – these artificial life 
researchers have therefore gathered around Ikegami to invent so-called, “lifelike” 
technologies, they say, which are not practical tools for everyday convenience, but 
rather tools with which to theorize “life itself” (cf. Foucault 1971).  
 
While their artificial systems are tools with which to theorize life, they are not 
exclusively scientific objects. As somewhat bizarre and unusual inventions, they also 
feature at art exhibitions and symposia around the world. “Lifelike” machines, such as 
the Taylor-Couette-Flow, circulate the principles of fluid mechanics that realizes the 
principles of the Taylor-Couette-Flow thereby “autonomously” generating enthralling 
sound patterns based on chaos mapping. In museums and concert halls, one may 
encounter human-shaped androids that perform operas and conduct symphonies with 
human orchestras. And in underground music clubs in Tokyo, one may join concerts 
with graphical bit-patterns jumping on large screens synchronized to the tunes of 
glitch, industrial electronic music. What these things share is that they somehow 
allude to viewers that they are somehow “alive”, or “as if” alive, while overtly 
appearing to be wholly synthetic. They are, in other words, vivid, auditory and visual 
technologies that are seemingly imbued with “life” or some living quality. But they 
are also recent materializations of a sort of artificial life. They are, in a word, the 
material results of the sort of work Ikegami and his team of researchers do at the 
Ikegami Lab, and as such, they are scientifically inspired artworks meant to be 
nascent “lifelike” technologies that are made of synthetic materials, which may trick 
us into reflecting on the relationship between life and nonlife, and the potential 
possibility for achieving “life” by technical means.  
 
In the final years of twentieth-century, those who would eventually come to call 
themselves artificial life researchers emigrated from computer science, mathematics, 
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physics, programming, biology, neuroscience, biochemistry, psychology, electrical 
and mechanical engineering (cf. Langton 1989). Collectively, they resolved that if the 
aim of artificial life was to understand life, then constructing it would yield better 
theories than would conventional experimentation. The lab members at the Ikegami 
Lab advocate not simply experimentation but construction, not simply analysis but 
synthesis, not simplicity but complexity, in their quest to explore, as they say, “what 
life is and how it works”. Gathering around Ikegami and arming themselves with a 
range of advanced technologies (computers, robotics, etc.), experimental tactics, and 
programming techniques, they are in the business of reassembling both the object and 
the project of artificial life, that is, to rework artificial life materially, theoretically, 
and socially. As an anthropologist of science and technology, I have spent about 7 
months talking to and working with them. 
 
According to Ikegami – who is himself a trained physicist and complex systems 
scientist from the University of Tokyo, graduating from the Department of Physics in 
1984, finally becoming a Doctor of Science in physics in 1989 - the lab has since its 
establishment progressed through different “eras” leading up to the present moment. 
During the 1990s, around the time the Ikegami Lab was established, Ikegami himself 
garnered interest in realizing his long-standing dream of artificial life: to construct, in 
his words, “artificial life in the real world” upon his self-crafted aphorism and 
assumption that “artificial life is larger than biological life”. Artificial life, Ikegami 
claims, is “larger” than biological life because contemporary biological definitions of 
life are too limited and too narrow in truly capturing the volatility and grandiose 
nature of life itself. In pursuit of his dream, Ikegami officially began his studies in 
artificial life during the early years of the 1990s, which are now formulated on the 
lab’s website, 
 
In this laboratory, we have been working in the field of artificial life for 
more than 15 years. Evolution of genetic codes, mutation rates and 
cooperative relationships were the target of the fist era of this lab. Then 
complexity of coupled cognitive systems were studied using dynamical 
recognizers and other recurrent neural (often embodied) systems. This 
was the second era. Recently, we have entered the third era which is to 
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construct artificial life in the real world. Any basic science can lead to 
innovation applications and Artificial life studies is no exception. In order 
to fruition the concepts developed through the study of artificial life, such 
as ‘autonomy’, ‘enaction’, ‘sustainability’, and ‘evolvability’, we have 
newly started several experimental and conceptual works, using chemical 
experiments, the internet, web, and some artworks. 
 
When I arrived at the Ikegami Lab, as an anthropologist with the ambition to 
undertake ethnographic fieldwork, first in spring 2017 and later in spring 2018, the 
lab members had been pursuing their self-described mission to construct artificial life 
in the “real world” for at least two years. Although the lab members on an everyday 
basis engage in many individual research projects related to the study of (artificial) 
life – ranging from doing research on topics such as “cognition”, “memory”, “genetic 
codes”, “mutation rates”, “swarm intelligence”, “collective intelligence”, 
“perception”, and “agent-based models”, that is, topics they associate with “life” and 
the “living” – their agendas are altogether different in scope and aim, having multiple 
aims, goals and objectives. However, what they all have in common besides their 
official titles as artificial life researchers and their constructive approach to life, I 
found, is a collective fascination and reverence for Ikegami himself, his wit, 
intelligence and charisma.  
 
Thus, what they share is not only belief that “life” is something that can be 
understood through its technical and material construction, but also their social 
commitment to Ikegami, who is arguably the spiritual leader of the lab. That is, what 
they also share is admiration for Ikegami’s visionary and creative prowess and his 
way to offer philosophical, metaphysical, ontological and epistemological guidance. 
Joining Ikegami and the lab members, this thesis embarks on a journey to 1) pick up 
on how “life” is nowadays being understood not simply by studying it at a distance, or 
simply by theorizing it, but by constructing it from bits and pieces of synthetic 
materials and in silico, and 2) to explore how charisma and paradigms intersect, that 
is, how charismatically-certified modes of authority in science may propel scientific 
practice and bring about paradigmatic change.  
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What I seek to address, then, and hopefully to capture in some compelling way, is 
how efforts at the Ikegami Lab to better understand what “life” is by constructing it is 
motivated not by a range of technical and historical possibilities but also largely by 
Ikegami’s charismatic leadership. By being a sort of prophetic leader in science, 
Ikegami is almost single-handedly the one, who organizes both philosophical, 
metaphysical, ontological and epistemological orientation of the lab. In other words, 
he has created his own cult of personality, with his own followers together with whom 
he seeks to articulate and establish his own paradigm. As such, I hope to show how 
some of the most powerful social forces driving these artificial life researchers reside 
in the charismatically-certified set of norms articulated by Ikegami himself, as a 
visionary and prophetic leader, whose charisma and leadership propel scientific 
practice and potentially bring about a paradigm shift. In other words, “what life is”, 
and how these people operate to give assertive or speculative answers to their own 
questions, are simultaneously shaped and reshaped by social commitments and how 
technologies shape and reshape ideas about what life may be said to be in our 
contemporary moment. However, still, such social commitments revolve around 
Ikegami himself, a larger-than-life character who commands his zealots in a struggle 
to assert and prove once and for all that artificial life is “larger” than biological life. 
Joining the Ikegami Lab as an anthropologist, I therefore seek to pick out instances of 
how the lab members collectively work to bring to “fruition”, as they say, to those 
concepts they associate with life and the living, but also how they seek to bring 
fruition to Ikegami’s creed. Artificial life, at the Ikegami Lab, I hope to show, is a 
social formation marked by a certain mode of leadership and followership, where 
Ikegami’s flamboyant personality is pivotal to the creation of a scientific community 
of followers, who work to construct new, as they say, “experimental and conceptual 
works, using chemical experiments, the internet, web, and some artworks”.  
 
My central argument in this thesis is that scientific practices, knowledge production 
and paradigmatic change, may equally be propelled by a specific mode of charismatic 
leadership and authority, which is here embodied by Ikegami. As such, I claim that 
scientific practices and paradigmatic change may equally be rooted in a sort of 
“charismatic authority” (cf. Weber 1954) - a form of authority, governance and 
power, which is exclusively derived from Ikegami’s personal qualities of being a 
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charismatic, charming and seemingly trustworthy leader. More precisely, this means 
that Ikegami is a central actor in shaping affective relationships between lab members 
and in motivating belief them that artificial life is “larger” than biological life. Indeed, 
as I will show, the social structure of the Ikegami Lab organized as an emotional 
collectivization, which is held together by an affective and emotional bond between 
lab members and Ikegami. Ikegami offers to lab members philosophical, 
metaphysical, ontological and epistemological guidance, what may be termed a 
universal, “ontoepistemological” framework (cf. Barad 2007), as a device through 
which to see and attend to the world and that offers for lab members both an ontology 
of the world and an epistemology with which to apprehend this world. And so, I want 
to take this claim a bit further and show how Ikegami’s self-made and 
charismatically-certified ontoepistemological framework that I call Ikegamianism, 
coalesce on the construction of what I call parallax machines, which in in turn also 
reflect what I call a parallax view of life. 
 
The concept of parallax machines, then, refers both to the material construction of 
new, embodied artificial life systems, the materialization of Ikegamianism and the 
social construction of a parallax view of life. Thus, while Ikegami and his style of 
leadership are main components of this thesis in terms of how scientific practice and 
change happen, one of my central claims is also that parallax machines do a lot of 
work for Ikegami and his team of researchers: they are epistemic things that serve to 
destabilize biologically-established understandings of life (cf. Rheinberger 1997); 
machinic objects the materialize social worlds; things with which to build new viable 
instantiations of human-machine interfaces in the sense of creating new modes of 
human-machine relatedness, relations that can be made only by constructing new 
artificial systems in the real world; and social tools for building alternative narratives 
of life, narratives that offer what I call a parallax view of life.  
 
I will unpack these concepts later on in this introduction, but to go quickly, 
Ikegamianism is shorthand for the ontoepistemological framework by which the lab 
members operate, which include a set of beliefs, principles, norms and values to 
which the lab members adhere. A parallax view of life, in the simplest of terms, is a 
culturally specific perspective fostered by the lab members at the Ikegami Lab, which 
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allows them to refrain from relegating their primary scientific object of inquiry, “life”, 
to be a “natural kind” (cf. Strathern 1992). A parallax view of life, in other words, is a 
culturally specific vision of vitality that expands the category of “life” to include both 
the “natural” and the “artificial”, rendering what counts as “life” to a matter of both-
and, that is, and perhaps paradoxically, a matter of being simultaneously artificial and 
biological. Thus, parallax machines both materialize Ikegamianism and offer a 
parallax view of life.  
 
The notion of a “parallax” - parallax machines and parallax views - is inspired by the 
many modes of parallax found elsewhere in modern theory, for example such as the 
wave-particle duality found in quantum mechanics. But the concept of parallax 
machines, to be clear, is of my own invention, an analytic term I develop on the basis 
of my fieldwork to unpack how the artificial life researchers at the Ikegami Lab are 
not only constructing new artificial technologies (i.e. androids, computer programs, 
etc.), but also, while doing so, both materializing and constructing their own views of 
the world. Artificial life at the Ikegami Lab, through the work of constructing parallax 
machines, then, is a social and cultural enterprise that perpetuates in 
ontoepistemological vertigo, in which the material construction of parallax machines 
gets tangled up in the interstices of realms social and cultural, organic and inorganic, 
natural and artificial, living and nonliving, real and simulated. In a word, what will 
hopefully become apparent throughout this thesis is that parallax machines, 
Ikegamianism and a parallax view of life are inextricably interrelated.  
 
Now, in order to arrive at this conclusion, I will take the reader through the social and 
cultural circuitries of the Ikegami Lab to show how the lab members have arrived at 
the conviction that artificial life needs to be constructed in the real world in the first 
place. Thus, to go back to the idea that the field of artificial life, and the Ikegami Lab 
itself, has progressed through a set of different “evolutionary” stages, or “eras” (from 
the “computer era” to the yet-to-be-named “third era”), this thesis is first and foremost 
an anthropological story about how scientists, i.e. lab workers such as the artificial 
life researchers featured in this thesis, become “followers” or “disciples” of 
movement centered on one charismatic figure, how they describe and understand 
“life” and things they make, and how scientific paradigms are simultaneously 
 19 
deconstructed, broken down, reconstructed and reestablished through the work of 
leadership, namely through a very special sort of charismatic leadership.  
 
The research conducted by the lab members at the Ikegami Lab is therefore not for 
serving any discrete pharmaceutical, commercial or agricultural functions. Rather, as 
these researchers have gathered around Ikegami, they have come to insist that their 
commitment to construct new artificial systems in the real world exclusively serves a 
sort of discovery science. Constructing new material things, such as androids, are not, 
for example, about satisfying some commercial need or about improving upon, say, 
healthcare, medical or agricultural systems. Rather, constructing “artificial life in the 
real world”, or better, as I claim in this thesis, the construction of parallax machines, 
is about building social dynamics and scientific arguments into machines. Again, 
parallax machines, in turn, become material and abstract entities that persuade or 
convince audiences, scientists and publics alike, that artificial life is a viable 
possibility, indeed a technical reality, and that artificial life’s vision of the world is 
indeed a credible one. The construction of parallax machines, then, is a way to 
harness, store, and produce a culturally specific world(view), by which I mean that 
parallax machines simultaneously materialize the social dynamics of the Ikegami Lab 
and produce a parallax view of life. Yet, the production of such a world(view), I hope 
to show, is a social practice mobilized through a range of diverse social interactions, 
most prominently the work of charismatic leadership.  
 
Finally, this self-evidently begs a multitude of anthropological questions, which may 
occasionally overlap with those of my interlocutors: What is life? What is natural? 
What is artificial? What is the biological? What is the real world? What is artificial 
life? What does it mean to “construct” (artificial) life? What does it mean to 
“understand” (artificial) life? How did wanting to construct (artificial) “life” in order 
to understand it become paired questions pushed into a relation of equivalence? How 
is the Ikegami Lab organized? How do they understand “life”? How do they really 
construct new systems, and so on? These are questions that may already appear to 
apply pressure to what life is, or what it could be said to be in our present moment. 
But they may also appear to reveal that questions about what life is, and what it may 
someday become, are tethered to a range of social, cultural, material, technological, 
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discursive, conceptual, ontological and epistemological commitments, first and 
foremost human commitments to somehow give form to life, both materially, 
conceptually, rhetorically, discursively, ontologically and epistemologically.  
 
If artificial life, in its most canonical and highly capacious expression, as the field’s 
founder Christopher Langton (1989) notes, is about abstracting “life’s logical form in 
different material forms” (cf. Langton 1989), the notion of constructing artificial life 
in the real world, I think, raises fresh questions about which kinds of materiality may 
harbor life’s logical form, and by what social processes, norms, logics or narrative 
conventions such forms may be captured, harnessed, apprehended, reshaped and 
ultimately made sense of. Why, for example, is one required to construct artificial life 
in the real world in order to understand what life is and how it works? What is the real 
world? Finally, what new meanings or definitions of life may the construction of what 
I call parallax machines potentially bring about? What I will show is that lab members 
at the Ikegami Lab are human beings and social actors, who gather around Ikegami, to 
vividly bring about what I call a parallax view of life - a view both ontologically and 
epistemologically extending “life” into a more capacious and plastic domain beyond 
the logics and modes of biological reasoning - into the conjectural, into thinking about 
life’s future forms.  
 
Artificial Life in the Real World 
 
The field of artificial life has been variously described as a heterogeneous 
technoscientific formation, based, to a large extend, on an interdisciplinary ethos 
(Langton 1989; Whitelaw 2004). Yet, despite the field’s heterogeneous formation in 
terms of disparate epistemological orientations, interests and research programs, some 
scholars have pinpointed the field as a “culture of simulation” (Turkle 2005; Aicardi 
2010) – a culture, or a community of people, held together by a collective aim at 
understanding the characteristics of life by simulating them in silico, particularly by 
people familiar with, and possessing skilled mastery of, informatics (cf. Turkle 2005; 
Helmreich 1998; Aicardi 2010). That is, insofar artificial is a “science of simulation”, 
it is a field premised on a perpetual reevaluation of its founding category, “life”, and 
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of the experimental and theoretical implications of its methodology, computer 
simulation (Helmreich 2001:613).  
 
When the field of artificial life was officially drawn into coherence by the field’s 
founder, Christopher Langton, by the end of the 1980s, practitioners have basically 
been relying on computers for abstracting the logical form of life (cf. Langton 1989), 
which meant for them that “life” could be considered a formal, coherent and unifying 
quality that could exist and take hold in any material substrate, such as machines, 
computational media, or even elsewhere in the universe (Helmreich 2016). While the 
lab members at the Ikegami Lab carry much of this tradition, they are not, however, 
fully convinced that “life” may take hold in any material substrate, especially not in 
computational media. But this is not to say that working with computational media is 
irrelevant for lab members at the Ikegami Lab. Many of the them, I experienced 
during fieldwork, have over years of training in computer science or engineering, 
acquired an impressive skillset that allows them to program in just about any 
programming language. Thus, to this end, many of them still engage in attempting to 
understand some essential characteristics, features or properties of life by seeking to 
simulate them in self-made computer models, for example, such as “evolution” or 
“mutation rates”, categories many of the lab members associate with life.  
 
However, in reaching the so-called “third era” – the contemporary era, in which we 
now find ourselves - the common view among the lab members is that computer 
simulations cannot adequately capture, nor harness or pin down the essential 
characteristics and properties of life. Nor may computer models be marshalled as 
convincing evidence of “real” life; they are, many of the lab members say, simply 
“simulations” not to be mistaken for “real life”. Computer models, however, may still 
effectively, and sometimes evocatively, display somewhat accurate representations of 
some feature of life or some specific features of living activity, for example such as 
“evolutionary processes”, “mutation rates”, or other forms of reproduction. But one of 
the main problems of computer simulations, however, is still that they are not 
“powerful” and “complex enough”, as some of the lab members say, to truly “become 
life”. In other words, running a simulation of some evolutionary process, for example, 
is not adequately “complex” enough to fully convince the lab members at the Ikegami 
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Lab, and their academic adversaries, that this is indeed “real” evolution. This is, 
among other things, partly because computers operate according to binary logics, but 
it is also partly, as Ikegami tells me, because “complexity is something that is higher 
in the real world compared to a computer world.” Computers, then, according to 
Ikegami, may be good at simulating causality, for example, be good at unfolding, in a 
linear fashion, a series of causal events, which in turn allow digital “organisms” to 
“evolve” in chronological lockstep. But the real world, on the contrary, cannot, as 
Ikegami sees it, easily be reproduced and simulated in computational media, nor 
simply be reduced to mechanistic functions. Or, in the words of Ikegami, “computers 
can generate very high levels of complexity, but it is a level of complexity, which is 
different from what you see in the real world.” The complexity of the computer, as it 
were, is only a sort of “controlled complexity”, a sort of complexity too tightly held 
within braces, too constrained, too rule-governed.  
 
Such a belief, needless to say, problematizes Langton’s field-founding assumption 
that life’s logical form – an idea premised on the assumption that life is a formal 
effect - can be abstracted in computational media. But it does not problematize the 
idea that life may take hold in any material substance, computational or otherwise. 
This commitment to the “real world”, nonetheless, reveals that the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab have lost faith in the ability of computers to capture what they anticipate 
or believe to be baseline principles of life: “life” is not something captured within a 
computer, “in there”, as some members say, something to be simulated in the tightly 
controlled domain of software. Rather, “life” is something happening “out here”, in 
the real world, a highly stochastic, erratic, uncontrollable and unpredictable world. 
And so, Ikegami asserts, “life is lived, not simulated,” and it is the “real world”, the 
lab members should be committed. To this end, computer simulations amount to 
nothing more than simulations, and therefore, according to Ikegami, inadequate for 
theorizing the what Langton called the “biology of the possible” (Langton 1989) – 
that is, for theorizing “life-as-it-could-be”, simply because the level of complexity 
they are able to produce do not correspond to the complexity of the real world. What 
is at stake among the lab members at the Ikegami Lab, then, is an ambitious effort to 
overcome the limitations of computational media in order to produce, indeed to 
construct, very real instantiations of life outside the confines of virtual worlds. Thus, 
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if early efforts to simulate some property or process of life relied only on the use of 
computer simulation, the meaning of constructing artificial life in the real world, 
according to Ikegami, is tethered to an aspiration to transcend and overcome the 
limitations of the digital. 
 
Following along the Ikegami Lab’s efforts to overcome the limitations of the digital to 
truly become “life”, constructing artificial life in the real world, as I will show in the 
course of this thesis, is the goal. But the means to get there, however, as I will argue, 
is largely motivated by Ikegami’s style of leadership, his universe of ideas and layouts 
of reality, and as such, their work is motivated by and tethered to a very specific, 
culturally contingent world(view), a view that holds that the real substance of 
“reality” - what Ikegami calls “massive data flows” - “is overflowing with excess data 
flows and information”. More precisely, what counts as the “artificial” and the 
“natural”, the “real” and the “simulated”, and the boundaries between them, is a 
product of dynamic interactions: life is “lived”, as Ikegami notes, it is “real”, 
happening “out here”, in everyday life in a volatile world, whose stochastic dynamics 
cannot be computationally modelled, replicated, or “simulated”. How exactly this 
culturally specific world(view) is produced is a central concern in this thesis, it is 
indeed, I will claim, the work of performing an ontology (cf. Blaser 2009). And 
Ikegami, I will show, is central to the articulation of this ontology.  
 
Thus, one practical solution to overcome the digital is the construction of “larger” 
artificial systems in terms of materiality, physicality, size, scale, and complexity, 
systems, whose dynamics and possibilities of interaction correspond to what Ikegami 
also refer to as “real world dynamics” – i.e. to the forces at work “out here”. The only 
way to heighten our chances to better understand life, then, is constructing new 
physical, embodied machines, such as robots, for example, composed of electronic 
circuitry, or new chemical systems, composed of oil, acid and/or lipids, are ways to 
“enlarge” artificial life systems, so that they gain tactile physicality, which 
corresponds to the complexity of the real world. This, the lab members claim 
following Ikegami, may in turn advance their understanding of what life is, what it 
may become, and how it works on a more fundamental and profound level than 
regular discovery-based experimental science can uncover.  
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Now, while robots, for example, feature among the things they are constructing at the 
lab, for example the android Alter featured in this thesis, Ikegami clarifies to me that 
they are not roboticists and that artificial life is not synonymous with robotics. Rather, 
Ikegami is annoyed by widespread misunderstandings in mass media and even within 
academic circles mistaking artificial life for robotics. And so, Ikegami openly opposes 
a recent tendency to view Japan as a “Robot Kingdom” (Schodt 1988) – a notion of 
Japan as a place more philosophically and culturally attuned to technological 
development. This view has been generously expanded and discerned by many social 
scientists before, and indeed, many social scientists have been captivated with 
questions about the interrelations between, “Japanese robotics”, “technology”, 
“animism” and “culture”. Ikegami makes it clear to me, seemingly very aware of this 
complex being an object of concern for social scientists in particular, that this is not 
how artificial life works.  
In much of the social scientific literature on robotics in Japan, it has variously been 
described as a place where people are, “loving the machine”, a place where robots are, 
“priceless friends” (Hornyak 2006). Moreover, many scholars been preoccupied with 
those specific “cultural” factors, often such as Shinto and animistic belief, as central 
components in how the Japanese, often in contrast to the “West”, craft favorable 
representations and positive images of robots (see Geraci 2010; Kaplan 2011; Kitano 
2006). Others have sought to extend this argument by examining in more detail the 
so-called “co-construction” of “robotics” and “culture” in Japan (Sabanovic 2014) or 
how “sociable robots”, developed in Japan, practically become “warm, caring, 
affective, confessional and social” to people, i.e. human users (Leeson 2017). Such 
accounts predominantly highlight the linkage between seemingly unique “Japanese” 
cultural resources, as foundational for the making and perception of technologies 
inside and outside Japan, especially the perception of humanoid robots. While there 
are links between how robots, or rather how artificial systems, become affective, 
Ikegami insists that artificial life is a field in its own right not to be mistaken for 
robotics. But this, in turn, does not mean that artificial life is not in some way aligned 
to robotics. Indeed, as we shall see, the artificial systems they make at the Ikegami 
Lab, such as the android Alter, embody and elicit many of the same aspirations 
fostered by roboticists.  
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Computer simulations, then, in relation to, say, robots, are, according to Ikegami, 
badly equipped to truly replicate the volatile dynamics of the real world, a world that 
is both ontologically, experientially, and qualitatively different from the dynamics 
replicable in digital simulations. On the contrary, robots offer a physical presence and 
a tactility more in tune with the dynamics of the real world; robots, in short, offer that 
we connect and respond to them in affectively through sensory experience. In turn, if 
this is the case, it requires of Ikegami and his team of researchers to design, develop, 
and construct new artificial systems in the real world.  
Once this has been achieved, Ikegami continues, what is needed is what he calls a 
“new epistemology of artificial life”, an epistemological outlook that is better 
equipped to deal with a complex world. Once again, as Ikegami notes, if “the level of 
complexity in the real world is more complex than the level of complexity one finds 
in a computer”, the “real world”, Ikegami further claims, “provides sufficient 
complexity and large data flows to conduct an effective analysis.” In other words, the 
real world can itself be interpreted as a large-scale experimental site by which to 
conduct an effective analysis of what life is, and therefore, one needs to learn how. 
Hence, their commitment to what they colloquially term the real world, or “real world 
dynamics”, or “massive data flows”, in short, the ontology of the world, is 
simultaneously, I will claim, an epistemological commitment not to mistake the 
complexity of computer simulations (and their visually appealing resemblances to 
“real” life) with the ontological complexity of the real world. Put differently, in their 
words, constructing “larger” artificial systems, in terms of materiality, physicality, 
size, scale, and complexity, is the only way not to “reduce complexity”, and instead to 
harness and understand “complexity as it is”, upon the realization that the world is, 
ontologically speaking, “messy”. Following from this ontological claim, Ikegami sees 
that a “new epistemology” is needed, one by which to better sound out, he says, “new 
meanings of life”.  
Their commitment to what they describe as the real world, as a domain seemingly 
separate from the digital world, I thus want to show in this thesis, is a social and 
epistemological commitment, whose conditions of possibility is tethered to the active 
making of a culturally specific ontology, one that picks out the real world as a 
complex jumble of massive data flows, only to harnessed by 1) constructing artificial 
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life in the real world and 2) by developing a new epistemology of artificial life. The 
“real world”, in which these researchers seek to make new things and new knowledge 
- namely the world in which they seek to make new artificial systems and meanings of 
life - I will therefore argue, is indeed one that is also constructed, both in practice and 
in discourse, both ontologically and epistemologically at the Ikegami Lab. The lab 
members, I claim, do not only construct new technologies, but they also construct 
worlds. Constructing new, embodied artificial things in the real world, then, is 
animated by a collective devotion to detach and decouple, both their faith in 
computational media and the systems they make, from the (limited) virtual realm of 
computer simulation in order to reinsert artificial life into the real.  
 
Context: Calibrating Life’s Form and Matter 
 
If artificial life is amenable for material construction in the real world - indeed a thing 
subject to the same engineering strategies and programming techniques employed for 
making the nonliving world -  then it may automatically entail that “life itself” (cf. 
Foucault 1971) may be apprehended not only in some future perfect tense, but also in 
some constructive sense. This much is clear at the Ikegami Lab. Yet, endeavors to 
understand life’s form by its matter, and vice versa, or more precisely, by constructing 
“life forms”, as those embodied bits of vitality we usually know as “organisms” (cf. 
Helmreich 2009) in order to infer from them how life works on a more profound 
level, have not always been constructive or even projective. To this end, the lab 
members at the Ikegami Lab may be part of a much more recent trend in academic 
research in the life sciences that treat “life” as a constructive category.   
In their investigation of the term “life form”, in their article Life Forms: A Keywords 
Entry, for example, anthropologists Stefan Helmreich and Sophia Roosth (2010) 
write, “’life form’ has, since its earliest nineteenth century enunciations, pointed to a 
space of possibility within which life might take shape. Exactly how that space is 
understood and theorized has transformed as the term has traveled into the present. 
We suggest that ‘life form’ has moved from its origins as a term referring to abstract, 
idealized, aesthetic possibilities through reference to biogeographic and evolutionary 
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possibilities to, today, conjectural and future possibilities.” (Helmreich & Roosth 
2010:27). Here, as Helmreich and Roosth suggest, the form of life has had many 
enunciations through time, which posits that the notion of form may be a sort of 
empty signifier, which can then be furnished with different meanings or possibilities. 
If one looks at biological modes of thinking about life forms, and life’s relation to 
form, for example, as Helmreich and Roosth further show, such thinking has been 
churning life’s form in modes inductive, deductive, and abductive (Helmreich & 
Roosth 2010). But the point I want to make from this in relation to the Ikegami Lab is 
to discern how exactly this space is understood and theorized, that is, how lab 
members themselves seek to imbue life with a specific kind of form.  
Artificial life at the Ikegami Lab is no exception to this history of wriggling life to 
form. However, what they are trying to do at the lab is exactly to understand and 
theorize life’s form by constructing new artificial artifacts, which in turn enable them 
to grapple with how to determine or resolve the relation of form to life. And in doing 
so, the lab members at the Ikegami Lab join a cacophony of scientific obsessions with 
life, which has long been tethered to broader interests in extracting and inferring its 
form from its matter. To this end, the objects and phenomena to which the notion of 
the life form refers are always-already, as Helmreich notes elsewhere, framed by 
conceptual commitments (Helmreich 2016), which adds yet another important point 
to the work of the Ikegami Lab: what counts as “life” is shaped and reshaped by 
conceptual commitments. But, in the context of the Ikegami Lab, I would also like to 
add that such conceptual commitments are here further complimented by material and 
technological commitments in an era when life’s substance is something rendered 
amenable for technical, algorithmic and material (re)construction, commitments, I 
will claim, that offer new conceptual possibilities for understanding it: the very 
practical construction of new artificial systems, I think, allows for furnishing life with 
new forms, not just material forms, but also social forms, meanings, possibilities, even 
ontological and epistemological claims and assertions about the world.   
Now, if, as philosopher Michel Foucault (1971) once claimed, “life itself” is a 
category that “did not exist,” before it manifested in the early nineteenth-century, as 
the organizing object of concern particularly for biology (Foucault 1971), the 
invention of the category of life itself warranted that the living world demanded a 
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science of its own. In other words, as the discipline of biology – the natural science 
that broadly studies life and living organisms, including their physical structure, 
chemical processes, molecular interactions, physiochemical mechanisms, 
development and evolution - itself manifested around the 1800s, it posited “life itself” 
as its animating object exactly upon recognizing the living world (bios) as 
ontologically distinct from the nonliving world (geos) (cf. Povinelli 2016). The 
invention of the notion of “life itself”, according to Foucault, thereby bifurcated and 
carved up the world into the living and the nonliving world. But if biology has always 
been, since its inception, and still is by definition, an inquiry into the living world, the 
question of life – namely the question, “what is life?” – has over the past century or so 
admitted various answers (Helmreich 2016; Praet 2015).  
In the mid- to late nineteenth-century, Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, for 
example, offered an account of how living form materialized out of what is now 
commonly known as environmental or ecological dynamics (evolution). For Darwin, 
the “forms” at stake in his theory of evolution materialized in “species” or 
“organisms”, as durable but changeable genealogical kinds. “Species” and 
“organisms”, Darwin believed, were different, not in variation, but in kind. However, 
if Darwin located his theory of evolution in natural history and biology, the twentieth-
century hatched a variety of theoretical efforts that expanded upon Darwin’s 
biological theory, efforts that sought to amplify explanations of living form, 
especially by locating such accounts in the more universal territories of physics, 
chemistry, and mathematics. For example, before the discovery of the double helix 
structure of the DNA molecule, the physicist Erwin Schrödinger (1944), in his book 
What is Life? offered an account that life might issue from a hereditary “code-script”, 
a form that was in subsequent years enlisted into models of DNA and into informatic 
and cybernetic visions of vitality (Helmreich 2016). Many years later, however, the 
microbiologist Lynn Margulis and writer Dorion Sagan (1995), on the contrary, 
provided a less unitary account in their book, also titled What is Life? in which they 
offered a distinct answer to the question for each of life’s five kingdoms: bacteria, 
protists, animals, fungi, and plants. Not exactly in line with Schrödinger’s idea that 
life could be recognized as a code-script - indeed that life’s form was essentially code 
(cf. Kay 2000) - Margulis and Sagan emphasized that neither some underlying logic, 
nor some overarching metaphysics, were key to explain life’s form. Rather, they 
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argued that the situated specificities of microbial, fungal, plant, and animal 
embodiment were key to understand life, not as compressed into the linear logic of 
code, but as a process ever overcoming itself in an assortment of embodied 
manifestations (Margulis & Sagan 1995).  
Now, needless to say, there is a polyglot of other epistemic lineages and scientific 
accounts that track answers to the question of life. But what most biological accounts 
of life exude is mainly the attempt to somehow distill life’s essential form from its 
matter, where some accounts, like the one offered by Schrödinger, leveraged 
universal explanations of life, while others, like the one offered by Margulis and 
Sagan, leveraged more particular explanations of life. But such forays, whether 
locating their accounts in the universal domain of physics, chemistry, mathematics or 
not, generally fell under what came to be named “theoretical biology”. Theoretical 
biology, in turn, came to thrive in parallel to more conventional approaches in 
biology, a field that is itself understood to have begun with the work of D’arcy 
Wentworth Thompson (1917). Thompson, for example, in On Growth and Form, 
from 1917, argued that the shape of organisms was both constrained and shaped by 
physics, by a sort of mathematics or geometry of nature. Foreshadowing Schrödinger, 
Thompson drew on the language of physics to make sense of life, believing that 
embryology could learn much from studying crystal growth patterns (Thompson 
1917). Yet, the field of theoretical biology never fully reformatted or reconfigured the 
dominant empirical and experimental traditions of biology itself and never really 
broke the dominant paradigm of biology. However, theoretical biologists did 
nevertheless bring into relief how the “form” in “life forms” came to be 
epistemologically extended into domains beyond conventional biological modes of 
reasoning, even into the conjectural, to think about life’s future forms (Helmreich 
2016:30).  
It was not until the 1930s, though, that a dominant – and perhaps even axiomatic - 
biological understanding of life really began to manifest, as molecular biologists 
increasingly came under the sway of the so-called “protein paradigm” - a paradigm 
holding that proteins fundamentally governed heredity and that the fundamental 
building blocks of life was organic molecules: proteins and nucleic acids, lipids and 
carbohydrates (cf. Roosth 2017). Throughout the years of the Cold War, the protein 
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paradigm increasingly came to eclipse Schrödinger’s idea to understand the “physics 
of life”, which had nevertheless made a heavy contribution to how molecular 
biologists began to pose the question of life as a “coding problem” (Keller 2002). The 
protein paradigm became so powerful that in 1954, for example, the biochemist 
Jacques Monod (1961) went as far as to say that, “anything found to be true of E.coli 
must also be true of elephants” (Monod & Jacob 1961:393), a notion that held 
molecules to be the unitary quality common to all living organisms Despite the later 
invention of recombinant DNA technology in 1973, which then allowed scientists to 
“engineer” bits of DNA between and across different species and organic compounds, 
allowing in turn for an unprecedented control over molecular biology, the emergence 
of DNA technology was still held under the sway of the protein paradigm. And in 
subsequent years, the protein paradigm held most biological research under its spell, 
at least up until the discovery of the double helix structure of the DNA molecule 
(Roosth 2017; Praet 2015). 
 
The Emergence of the New Sciences of the Artificial 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, and by the late 2000s, biological obsessions with genetic 
sequencing proliferated and culminated in the “Big Science paradigm” - a paradigm 
still widespread to this day. Perhaps one of the most famous of such obsessions with 
genetic sequencing might be the Human Genome Project (HGP) – a large-scale 
international research effort to determine the sequence of nucleotide base pairs that 
make up human DNA. Thus, by century’s end – concomitantly with the establishment 
of the Ikegami Lab at the University of Tokyo - biology and many other 
technoscientific enterprises, including artificial life and later synthetic biology, had 
once again begun to wager on what might constitute life’s essential form, function 
and even meaning. Such endeavors, once again, began to locate accounts of life not 
only in the universal territories of regent disciplines, such as physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics, but also in the domains of information science, computer science and 
informatics (cf. Keller 2002; Kay 2000; Helmreich 2016). Life, in other words, had 
become target for digital simulation and bioinformatic representation (Helmreich 
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2016:1).  
By this time, the relations between life’s form, materiality, function and meaning 
came not only to be known and determined analytically according to the logic of 
computation and informatics, but also synthetically or constructively by technically 
linking the fundamental mechanisms that joined living structure to living function, 
matter to form (Johnston 2008; Helmreich & Roosth 2010; Helmreich 2016; Roosth 
2017). But while life and its mechanisms became amenable for, and known through, 
synthesis and informatic idioms, and not just analysis, the locus for mid-century and 
millennial biologists was still primarily molecular: proteins, nucleic acids, lipids and 
carbohydrates, to be sure, were still essentially held accountable for all living 
processes, the matter by which to identify life’s essential form. Yet, an off-shoot of 
alternatives, such as artificial life, began to spring from this and began defining itself 
against the protein paradigm, centering attention not on DNA, as the basic building 
block of life, but on information as a primary quality shared by all living things1.  
Newfangled interested in the questions of life, from the inception of biology pacing 
up to our present moment, may now have reached its redux as it comes apparent in the 
scientific journal, Nature, for example, posting an article in 2007 titled Meanings of 
Life, spotlighting the promise of synthetic biology to manufacture new artificial 
organisms from molecular parts (Nature 2007). Such new promises have taken life to 
be understood through its manufacture, a trend also captured in what science scholar 
John Johnston (2008) has called the “new sciences of the artificial” – a new set of 
sciences, such as synthetic biology and artificial life, which promises to deliver fresh 
definitions of life. Scientists, working in what Johnston labels the new sciences of the 
artificial, have thus proceeded to grapple with the question of life between two 
semantic zones of overlapping complexity: the metaphysics of life and the history of 
technical objects (Johnston 2008:3), subsequently bringing with them a slew of 
advanced technologies to synthesize and sequence life and vital processes. To this 
                                                
1 The field of cybernetics, emerging in the 1950s, for example, not only became a strong inspiration to 
the information sciences of the 1980s and 1990s, but also for artificial life itself. Cyberneticists during 
this period began seeing, for example, humans as “systems of communications”, as an adaptive 
cybernetic system of circuits that receive, process and transmit messages with surrounding systems (cf. 
Pickering 2010). Such a view also gave way for thinking about humans, animals and machines as 
complex adaptive systems that may best be defined by their relationships they create between inputs 
and outputs. In short, what came to circulate between human, animals, and machines, as few among 
many systems, was not just energy or particles, but information (Kay 2000; Pickering 2010).  
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end, marshaling and using new types of computational tools and information 
technologies have aided both artificial life researchers and synthetic biologists in 
gradually unwinding the so-called “facts of life”, now crumbling under new research 
paradigms. However, while synthetic biologists nowadays operate to reassemble new 
biological things from bits and pieces of existing biological things, artificial life 
researchers have turned to query life outside its biological moorings, namely in the 
virtual worlds of computer simulation and in the hardware realm of robotics, i.e. in 
the realm of artificiality, data and information.  
Yet, while the protein paradigm to this day still remains intact, live and well, life is 
increasingly being thrown off course, entering a fresh identity crisis when new 
technoscientific formations, such as artificial life and synthetic biology, are rising. 
Such an identity crisis surfaces, I think, in part by the fact that practitioners in the 
sciences of the artificial are beginning to see life as a rather obstinate and persistent 
enigma that keeps evading their attempts to truly understand it. Life, in other words, is 
today once again a thing in transformation, if not outright dissolution, as 
contemporary uncertainties about what life is, for example, is evidently engendered 
not only in artificial life and synthetic biology, but also in the field of astrobiology. 
The field of astrobiology adds yet another branch of research, which is however 
separate from, but still overlapping with, artificial life and synthetic biology (cf. 
Thacker 2010; Praet 2015). But unlike artificial life researchers or synthetic 
biologists, astrobiologists, formerly known as “exobiologists”, look to outer space for 
extraterrestrial life, using advanced acoustic devices to bring “extraterrestrial life” 
within earshot, thereby into human knowability. In the process, they ask themselves 
questions like, “Is there life beyond Earth? What is the future of life in Earth in the 
universe?” (Thacker 2009:31), pondering what life might look like, or rather sound 
like, in such extraterrestrial worlds has today become an enigma. 
But what such curiosities, generally shared by scientists in the new sciences of the 
artificial (and the extraterrestrial), also reveal, I think, are widespread scientific 
concerns about what constitutes life’s form and matter. But such concerns, I ponder, 
may be equally haunted by anxieties about what form theory might take when probing 
life’s limit cases in extreme environments such as outer space (astrobiologists) or 
deep sea (marine biology and oceanography), or fringes of “nature” or the biological 
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(artificial life and synthetic biology) (cf. Helmreich 2016). These days, although in 
very different ways, astrobiologists, marine biologists, synthetic biologists and 
artificial life researches search for new signs, traces, meanings and definitions of life 
that have them stir up new conceptual troubles, asking about the basic building blocks 
of life. But while astrobiologists use acoustic devices to bring “extraterrestrial life” 
within earshot, and while synthetic biologists manipulate the biological “stuff” of life, 
both doing so in seeking fresh answers to old questions about what life is, artificial 
life researchers - those who feature in this thesis - are more inclined to query what 
might be termed a sort of “supra-biological life”, a sort of life located at the fringes of 
biology. That is, a sort of life only knowable through its artificial construction, not in 
the void of the cosmos, or necessarily in the wetness of a petri dish (although they 
do), but exactly by reassembling bits of silicone, rubber, and aluminum with ones and 
zeroes, bits and bytes, energy, data, and information.  
Hence, the context of artificial life at the Ikegami Lab, one must first understand how 
these researchers are part of cultural and historical reverberations, joining a crowd of 
scientists, who have grappled with the relationship of life’s form to matter and vice 
versa. If Ikegami and the lab members are engaged in reengineering and recoding the 
substance of life, so to speak, they are doing so in order to heighten their chances for 
determining its form. And as a very recent addition to the new sciences of the 
artificial, the lab members at the Ikegami Lab are tangled up in a cacophony of 
voices, which attempt to answer fundamental questions about life and the living. 
Joining the cacophony, however, the lab members ask a range overarching questions 
about life, old and new, among them, questions such as, “how did life originate?” 
“What is open-ended evolution?” “How do living things adapt, cognitively, to 
complex environments?”, “How do living things adapt, individually and structurally, 
to complex environments?” “What is intelligence?”, and so on. The many questions 
they ask at the lab, I suggest, gesture toward profound concerns about how life’s 
form, function, materiality, meaning and conceptuality, might hang together, by 
recoding life’s form and matter, by wriggling theory into substance, and substance 
into theory, by engaging in the process of distilling a fundamental belief that artificial 
life is “larger” than biological life.   
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Artificial Life and Anthropology 
 
Since the field of artificial life officially emerged in the late 1980, when Langton 
drew it into coherence, a growing body of literature has emerged in the social sciences 
and the humanities, focusing on artificial life as a new hybrid field of art and 
technoscience (Whitelaw 2004; Johnston 2008; Helmreich 1998; Helmreich 2016; 
Kember 2003; Sengers 1998). Before, and concomitant with, the proliferation of such 
types of technoscience, many scholars of science and technology in the social 
sciences and the humanities have been exploring science as “culture” (Helmreich 
1998; Fischer 2007) and as “technoscience” (Haraway 1991), focusing on the intricate 
and often complex relationships between technology and society, materiality and 
sociality. Many social science scholars, for example, have often worked from science 
and technology studies (STS) as a point of departure, with a particular interest in the 
co-shaping of knowledge, technology, culture, and society. Among such bodies of 
literature are also anthropological accounts, for example, which have taken to an 
understanding of such relations over an axis of duality to support the assumption that 
there are radical differences between worlds material and immaterial (see Chua & 
Salmond 2012; Henare et. al. 2007). Other anthropological accounts, on the contrary, 
have sought to dissolve strict boundaries between people and things (Gell 1998), 
humans and machines (Haraway 1991; Suchman 2007; Rabinow 2011), humans and 
nonhumans (Latour 1993; Latour 2005), things and concepts (Henare et. al. 2007). 
 
But while the relations between people and things, humans and machines, humans 
and nonhumans, things and concepts, and so on, have been variously scrutinized by a 
number of anthropologists and philosophers of science, a range of social science 
researchers have since the 1970s also turned attention to those specific and localized 
knowledge production processes at work inside laboratories (cf. Latour & Woolgar 
1979; Vinck 2007). In this body of work, STS-scholars Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar (1979), for example, shifted ethnographic attention to those social processes, 
acts, and material arrangements that lead up to the ordinary production of scientific 
objects, traces and publications at work within the lab itself. Unlike previous studies, 
Latour and Woolgar were some of the first to conduct ethnographic studies of how 
laboratories, as localized social sites, operate to design and manufacture “facts” 
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(Latour & Woolgar 1979). Notably, they have shown how local conditions and social 
dynamics at the lab, including the production of “facts”, essentially aim to convince 
other researchers in other fields (cf. Vinck 2007:1).  
 
But at the heart of this shift in attention to what Latour and Woolgar term “laboratory 
life” is sensitive attention to the, “social construction of scientific facts”, which are 
constituted at modern laboratories, and so, has to do with everyday practices at the 
lab. Thus, they give priority to those social forces and interactions, including writings, 
instruments and embodied skills, at play within the lab itself (Latour & Woolgar 
1979). So, instead of focusing on knowledge itself, Latour and Woolgar focus on 
what knowledge does and illustrate how everyday life in the laboratory may give way 
for what they call “enrolments” and “actions” that organize and give meaning to their 
activities (Latour & Woolgar 1979). What will hopefully become apparent throughout 
this thesis, then, is that the construction of “facts” is indeed a networked activity since 
“facts” cannot be adequately established, nor legitimated, without a slew of social, 
historical and material possibilities. However, what I specifically hope to show is also 
that “worlds” and “worldviews” are not only products of networked activity – i.e. the 
result of an assemblage of materialities, writings, publications, instruments, embodied 
skills, historical possibilities, and so – but also products of a specific form of 
charismatic leadership. However, I will return to this point later on in this 
introduction.  
 
For now, in relation to the field of artificial life, there has been a range of studies - 
including laboratory studies similar to those of Latour and Woolgar - conducted by 
anthropologists and social science researchers. In much of the literature directly 
related to artificial life, scholars have, for example, examined how new forms of 
nascent “life” emerge through new technical and material-semiotic infrastructures 
within human-constructed environments (Emmeche 1994; Risan 1997; Doyle 1997; 
Helmreich 1998; Sengers 1998; Ward 1999; Lansing 2002; Whitelaw 2004; Johnston 
2008). One notable science scholar, John Johnston (2008), in The Allure of Machinic 
Life: Cybernetics, Artificial Life, and the New AI, have investigated the sciences of 
cybernetics, artificial life and artificial intelligence (AI), suggesting that research 
initiatives, such as the evolution of digital organisms, computer immune systems, 
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artificial protocells, evolutionary robotics and swarm systems have achieved a level of 
complexity and autonomy making such fields worthy of study in their own right 
(Johnston 2008). Focusing on the “objects at hand” – that is, the machines, programs 
and processes that constitute what Johnston calls “machinic life” (Johnston 2008) – he 
has shown how specific forms of nascent life emerge in and through technical 
interactions in human-constructed environments. But to track how such new life 
forms – or, in the words of Johnston, how new forms of “machinic life” - are 
nowadays actively brought forth by fields such as artificial life, he specifically 
proposes the analytic term “computational assemblage” to pinpoint underlying 
differences of form and function, as framework for understanding machines “as a 
material assemblage (a physical device) conjoined with a unique discourse that 
explains and justifies the machine’s operation and purpose” (Johnston 2008:x). 
However, Johnston has not conducted laboratory studies in any strict sense, (as those 
undertaken by Latour and Woolgar) he has nevertheless marked artificial life – 
including other sciences of the artificial – as new forms of technoscience, which may 
equally be items for ethnographic attention, especially in terms of how notions of 
“life” are constructed in discourse and in practice. 
 
A few of those who have actually conducted ethnographic fieldwork at artificial life 
laboratories are anthropologists Lars Risan (1997), Stefan Helmreich (1998), and 
more recently Christine Aicardi (2010). All have published detailed monographs of 
artificial life, based on fieldwork experiences at the University of Sussex and the 
Santa Fe Institute for the Sciences of Complexity (SFI) during the 1990s and the late 
2000s. In the late 1980s, the field of artificial life had just surfaced as a new hybrid 
field of computer science, theoretical biology, and digital gaming, devoted to 
mimicking the logic of biology in the virtual worlds of computer simulation and in the 
hardware realm of robotics. In the early to mid-1990s, Risan, for example, 
commenced his fieldwork among artificial life researchers and evolutionary 
roboticists stationed at the University of Sussex, UK, who then came to feature in his 
work Artificial Life: A Technoscience Leaving Modernity? An Anthropology of 
Subjects and Objects. In this, Risan show how the rhetorics of complexity and 
computational flexibility in artificial life allowed for an ecological and situated sense 
of the observer’s embeddedness in systems (Risan 1997). Following from his 
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observations that artificial life researchers were making “non-linear” computer 
simulations, expecting them to display “agency” in the sense that they hoped their 
simulations would surprise them or escape their control, Risan explicitly singles out a 
very specific cultural trait among them of “letting go of control”, what he sees as a 
defining characteristic of the relationship artificial life researchers have to their 
systems (Risan 1997).  
 
In a similar vein, and roughly about the same time, Helmreich (1998), in his 
monograph Silicon Second Nature: Culturing Artificial Life in a Digital World, based 
on his fieldwork among artificial life researchers clustered at the SFI, argues that 
artificial life models, programmed by his interlocutors at the SFI, reflected the 
unconscious cultural assumptions and social prejudices of their creators (Helmreich 
1998). Helmreich writes, “[…] Because Artificial Life scientists tend to see 
themselves as masculine gods of their cyberspace creations, as digital Darwins 
exploring frontiers filled with primitive creatures, their programs reflect prevalent 
representations of gender, kinship, and race and repeat origin stories most familiar 
from mythical and religious narratives” (Helmreich 1998:95). For Helmreich, the 
computational models and simulations produced by artificial life researchers during 
the 1990s thus revealed their own cultural backgrounds and psychological 
idiosyncrasies. But such are not, according to Helmreich, to be taken as theoretical 
pronouncements or evidence about the workings of the world, but rather to be taken 
as refractions about their creators’ own belief systems and modes of thought. “That 
many Artificial Life practitioners are white men who grew up reading cowboy science 
fiction”, Helmreich continues, “is not trivial” (Helmreich 1998:95).  
 
Finally, many years later, Christine Aicardi (2010), who is trained in applied 
mathematics, argues in her dissertation Harnessing Non-Modernity: A Case Study of 
Artificial Life that, “the Artificial Life research community shares […] a culture of 
‘agency-rich’ simulation,” noting that their, “defining trait, their cultural ‘glue’, is the 
conviction that synthetic systems, which design involves computer simulations, is 
relevant to understanding life and its distinctive characteristics” (Aicardi 2010:15). 
Aicardi offers neither an ethnographic account nor a bird’s-eye view of a highly 
dispersed discipline, but maps and anchors the terrain of artificial life in a sort of 
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macro-study in an ethnographically-oriented portrayal of the Centre for 
Computational Neurosciences and Robotics (CCNR) at the University of Sussex. 
Here, she recognizes the importance of “play” among artificial life researchers, who 
play with their simulations in order to elicit agential interactive responses from their 
machines, “In a culture of simulation,” she writes, “it seems that objects-to-think-with 
are also objects-to-play-with.” (Aicardi 2010:68).  
 
These monographs all take their outset in actual laboratory studies in the sense that 
both Risan, Helmreich and Aicardi have sought to explore the social and cultural 
terrain within the community of artificial life through the labs sites. This thesis is, 
needless to say, indebted to these ethnographies, specifically taking from them the 
approach of looking at how practitioners in the field of artificial life are social actors 
that bundle biological theories, concepts, ideas, and assumptions about life around the 
things they make. Yet, this thesis is also indebted to the work of Latour and Woolgar 
in the sense that such bundling together of words and things, theories and concepts, 
and so on, are not only tied to the materialities they describe, but they are also, as 
already mentioned, inextricably linked to social forces at play, indeed, as I will show 
in this thesis, to a special form of charismatic authority. In attempting to construct 
artificial life in the real world, then, so too are the researchers at the Ikegami Lab in 
the business of constructing and forward-engineering a culturally specific a 
world(view), an ontoepistemological framework that I call Ikegamianism through 
which to see the world and which they are in turn building into their artifacts.  
 
In a historical and cultural moment when artificial life researchers are progressively 
being animated by the specific technological possibilities of their time, a time when 
technologies allow them to retool their commitments to worlds beyond the virtual 
domain of computer simulation, I am therefore curious not only to follow in the 
footsteps of previous anthropological accounts of artificial life, exploring how new 
unique discourses and narratives might emerge from the construction of new artificial 
life systems, but also to highlight some of the many implicit synergies between 
artificial life, cybernetics and anthropology.  
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Theoretical Scheme 
 
Insofar this is an anthropology of artificial life, it is therefore, like its predecessors, a 
culturally and historically contingent account, in which new conceptual, material, and 
technological objects are being made and remade. As such, the new artificial systems 
developed at the Ikegami Lab may today not simply be seen to be tools for human 
convenience in the sense that they are made to serve practical purposes, for example, 
such as provide commercial services or to optimize economic or agricultural 
functions. Rather, the new technologies developed at the Ikegami Lab, I suggest, are 
material technologies with which to rework life’s substance and thereby its conceptual 
definitions. That is, the things they make at the lab, as philosopher of science Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger (1997) notes, are “epistemic things” – things that are situated 
interfaces between the material and conceptual aspects of science (Rheinberger 1997). 
Indeed, by yoking analysis to synthesis, or more practically, by using technologies as 
tools for theorizing life, the artificial life researchers featured in this thesis hope to 
yield a much more capacious sense of the term “life”, not only in terms of what life is, 
but also in in terms of what it might become. Artificial life technologies, in other 
words, are not only good-to-think-with, but also, I want to suggest, epistemic tools 
with which to think about life and revamp its definitions.  
 
Now, if new artificial systems, constructed at the Ikegami Lab, are good-to-think-
with, I am curious how those artificial systems they make at the lab - those developed 
by, emplaced in, and mobilized through, the social and cultural tapestry of the 
Ikegami Lab - come to function as epistemic things. In order to examine how newly-
made artificial systems actually become what Rheinberger calls epistemic things, or 
what I call parallax machines, one must first understand how the Ikegami Lab is 
organized. To this end, I ask about some of the social, cultural, rhetorical, material 
and technological forces at play at the lab, for example, how the lab members make 
sense of their technologies and how they are useful for making sense of life. How, for 
example, do contemporary artificial life researchers - namely those at the Ikegami Lab 
- design, develop, construct, and employ new advanced technologies of various sorts, 
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both as a way to ask new, and yet-unasked, questions about life and as an end it itself? 
Or more precisely, how do the lab members at the Ikegami Lab use their self-made 
artificial systems to generate new or bolster current knowledge about life, voice fresh 
insights about (artificial) life, or articulate new theories of life? How might such new 
artificial systems be related to the lab’s self-described mission to construct artificial 
life in the real world? And how might they ultimately be marshalled in the service of 
discovery science to authorize, legitimize or validate efforts to construct artificial life 
in the real world?  
 
To work out this complex, my analysis is interlaced into two distinct, yet interrelated 
tracks that run in parallel – or, more aptly, in a parallax - throughout the entire thesis. 
On the one side, my interest lies in discerning how the “objects” of artificial life (that 
is, the new artificial systems they are constructing at the lab) become epistemic 
objects, or rather, what I prefer to call parallax machines. On the other side, I am 
equally concerned about what may be called the “project” (that is, the socio-cultural 
formation we know as the Ikegami Lab) in relation to what or whom constitute the 
social and cultural basis for constructing the objects of artificial life. Put differently, 
this means that I ask about how the local discourses, the social interplays between lab 
members, the culturally and historically contingent worldviews, ideas, values, 
motivations, beliefs and norms produced by the lab members and circulated between 
them, things, I believe, that lab propel the lab members into action. Thus, if the 
“objects” of artificial life refer to those specific material things artificial life 
researchers at the Ikegami Lab are building, the “project” of artificial life refers to the 
socio-cultural dynamics and the overall “ontoepistemological” orientation of artificial 
life. The object and the project of artificial life are entangled into one another and are 
therefore inextricably linked. Thus, the object and the project of artificial life must 
therefore, I hold, be examined and understood in relation to one another.  
 
 
Objects and Projects, Ikegamianism and Parallax Machines  
 
Because the objects of artificial life cannot be examined in isolation from the social 
forces underlying their creation, the first analytical track centers on the “project” of 
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artificial life. As noted, the project of artificial life refers to and include those social 
relations, interactions, cumulative micro-transactions, discursive strategies, 
performative and material practices, and forms of expertise that are at play within the 
lab. And so, insofar one regards the Ikegami Lab as an action system, in which lab 
members work individually and collectively to generate new insights about life, their 
efforts are, of course, streamlined and made sense of by a slew of micro-transactions, 
discursive strategies, performative practices, and forms of expertise. Thus, while 
parallax machines may be said to be themselves enthralling (partly because they are 
“real”, physical object that are both animated and lively, and indeed, as such allusive 
to the idea that technologies can be truly alive), they must, following science scholar 
Katherine Hayles (1996), be narrated to make sense, and such storytelling often 
employs themes and topics from researchers’ cultural worlds (Hayles 1996). The lab 
members, then, are variously engaged in making sense of their creations, whether 
these are computer simulations or embodied systems such as robots, and so they draw 
on a range of cultural and epistemic resources in order to explain their inventions.  
  
However, in discerning the project of artificial life, and insofar practices at the lab are 
informed and motivated through social interactions, by a series of micro-transactions, 
discursive strategies, performative practices, forms of expertise, and so on, I 
specifically want to highlight how Ikegami himself is a central component to the 
project of artificial life. Ikegami, I found during fieldwork, is unquestionably an 
undisputed leader at the lab, as he takes the role of a sort of spiritual or religious guide 
among the lab members. Many lab members, for example, often described Ikegami as 
a “genius” and absorbed many of his ideas and concepts into their own work. Ikegami 
is arguably the “gate-keeper” of lab, one, who single-handedly decides who gets 
enrolled in his lab and who does not. And more importantly, he is a charismatic 
leader, who plot the overall philosophical, metaphysical, ontological and 
epistemological bearings of the lab. And so, while Ikegami is not the programmer of 
all the systems built at the lab, nor in direct control of all individual research projects, 
and while all the lab members still sometimes participate in situating their systems 
within their own narrative frames, Ikegami is undeniably a “point of passage” (cf. 
Law & Callon 1994) if one wants to understand the social dynamics at the Ikegami 
Lab. 
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Thus, Ikegami is an authoritative figure not simply because of his title as principal 
investigator and professor at the lab, i.e. by virtue of his title and official position, but 
also, I want to show, because he is a charismatic leader. Ikegami embodies, then, 
what sociologist Max Weber (1954) calls a form of “charismatic authority” (Weber 
1954) - a form of authority and power, which is exclusively derived from Ikegami’s 
personal qualities and emotional posture; he is to the lab members, in other words, a 
creative, charming and seemingly trustworthy leader. Charismatic authority, as Weber 
says, is opposed to other forms of authority, such “traditional” and “legal” authority, 
is substantially unbounded by norms. And thus, unlike the other two forms of 
authority, charismatic authority derives its power and persuasiveness through 
personal qualities, for example, through charm or wit, which in turn generates “sacred 
norms” by word and deed (Weber 1954; Spencer 1970). To the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab, Ikegami is artificial life, the very embodiment of the enterprise itself. 
And as such, he becomes a sort of prophet, who, they say, is a “huge source of 
inspiration” and a “creative genius”, who by his word allows him to, “destroy old 
norms and create new ones” (Spencer 1970:125).  
 
Ikegami’s charismatic authority, then, is both a form of expertise and the primary 
force propelling the project of artificial life, i.e. Ikegami has become the center of his 
own cult of personality generating followers and zealots, who join his cause. To this 
end, I want to suggest that Ikegami, by virtue of his personal qualities, emotional 
posture and style of leadership, socially orchestrates the lab, and by doing so, he seeks 
to outline the contours a new scientific paradigm. By becoming the center of his own 
cult of personality, then, means that he is the author his own “culture” in the sense 
that he offers philosophical, metaphysical, ontological and epistemological guidance 
to his lab members. And as such, he is the author of the what I call Ikegamianism – a 
shorthand for the ontoepistemological framework by which the lab members operate, 
which include a set of beliefs, principles, norms and values to which the lab members 
adhere. My concept of Ikegamianism is largely, although not directly, inspired by 
feminist scholar Karen Barad’s (2007) own “ontoepistemological framework” she 
calls “agential realism” – a new philosophical framework that entails, she argues, a 
rethinking of fundamental concepts” that “provides an understanding of the role of 
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human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural and cultural factors in 
scientific and other social-material practices” (Barad 2007: 26). And so, what will 
hopefully become apparent in this thesis is that Ikegami, like Barad, is the author of 
his own ontoepistemological framework. The social structure at the lab, finally, then 
represents an emotional collectivization centering on Ikegamianism, which is held 
together, I argue, by an emotional bond with Ikegami, not simply by some formal 
chain of command, nor is it rooted in any kind of “traditional” or “legal” authority as 
such.  
 
However, Ikegamianism is not a full-fledged and coherent ontoepistemological 
framework, nor a fully-developed paradigm in its own right. Rather, I want to reserve, 
Ikegamianism may be seen as an expression of Ikegami’s position at the lab and his 
desire to articulate new ways of doing science. In short, Ikegamianism is not only a 
shorthand I use for describing what goes on at the lab, but it is also expressive of 
Ikegami’s idiosyncratic aspiration to establish his own paradigm. And rightly so, 
Ikegami, I experienced during fieldwork, both implicitly and explicitly cast himself as 
a sort of Renaissance man, who feels he is on a mission to create a new mode of 
science, one strongly influenced by an artistic and unorthodox approach. Indeed, 
together, Ikegami and the lab members feel they are pioneers on a mission to change 
science altogether. And as the ganglion of his network of zealots, to use a more 
religiously-inflected language, Ikegami motivates belief not only in the project of 
artificial life at large, but he also becomes a sort of prophetic, spiritual or ethereal 
leader, whose “creed” (Ikegamianism) creates “believers”.  
 
Now, the object of artificial life, I hold, cannot be separated from the project of 
artificial life: Ikegamianism, as a charismatically-certified ontoepistemological 
framework is closely tied to the practices of constructing parallax machines and thus 
cannot be separated from one another. This is exactly because Ikegami defines the 
overall philosophical, metaphysical, ontological and epistemological orientation of 
the lab and thus the one who set the goals. And as a charismatic authority, much of 
the work done at the lab is propelled by a collective belief that they are indeed on a 
collective mission to change science altogether. What I want to show is that parallax 
machines, then, become physical manifestations of Ikegamianism, that is, material 
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residues of the social forces at work at the lab and Ikegami’s self-constructed creed, 
or even, perhaps, material reincarnations of Ikegami himself2. 
 
The concept of parallax machines is of my own invention, indeed an etic term meant 
to capture how Ikegamianism is given material expression through the artificial 
systems they make at the lab. Parallax machines, to this end, denote those physical 
and material things, such as robots, that they construct at the Ikegami Lab. And so, 
parallax machines, I want to show, do a lot of work for Ikegami and the lab members, 
such as, for example, bolstering belief among people, both inside and outside artificial 
life, in the possibility and realization of artificial life, as a special form of life. 
However, more importantly, parallax machines also have parallax capacity by which 
they 1) embody and give material expression to Ikegamianism and, I want to show, 2) 
invite us to see “life” through a parallax view, a view where life is simultaneously 
rendered artificial and biological. Such a view, I hope to show, is first and foremost 
inseparably tied to the material construction of parallax machines, and, as we shall see 
later, these machines allow artificial life researchers to stretch and amplify the gospel 
of Ikegamianism. 
 
Setting: The Ikegami Lab 
 
About 15 researchers constitute the core group of the Ikegami Lab, yet none of them 
are originally trained as artificial life researchers. Rather, all of them are émigrés from 
other fields - computer science, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, machine learning, 
biology, mathematics, physics, complex systems science, psychology, electrical- and 
mechanical engineering – who self-identify as “artificial life researchers”. Officially, 
they call their lab an “artificial life laboratory”, and the lab itself is the base at which 
both national and international lab members, holding different degrees and positions - 
professors, postdocs, PhDs, external members, and graduate students – congregate to 
undertake the work of artificial life. Some of them have migrated to Japan from 
                                                
2 Of course, this is an overstatement, but I want to stress and accentuate how Ikegami becomes a sort of 
demigod to his followers, i.e. the lab members and other curious souls outside the field of artificial life, 
for example, such as external collaborators and artists. The Ikegami Lab is, in some way, Ikegami 
himself, the hotbed of his cult, an enterprise, I believe, which may be read and understood largely as 
analogous to a sort of spiritual or New Age movement.  
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institutions in Europe - particularly from Belgium, France, Germany and the UK – 
while only a few come from other Japanese academic institutions, such as Tsukuba 
University, Kyoto University and Tohoku University. Others have been trained at 
some European university, doing a layover at a Japanese university, before ending up 
at the Ikegami Lab. Unlike myself, most of them are trained as computer scientists, 
who have, after their training, turned their attention to the field of artificial life. After 
graduating, all of them left their native disciplines and clustered at the Ikegami Lab in 
order to pursue their research interests (which mostly differ from those of their native 
disciplines) in exploring a slew of topics and questions related to the study of life. 
 
Although each lab member differs slightly in terms of academic backgrounds, some 
coming from engineering and others from computer science and only a very small 
handful from biology, they have different skillsets, and even different research 
agendas. What is practically common among them despite their educational and 
academic differences, however, is that they all share an interest in discerning, as they 
say, “what life is”. Of course, this somewhat generic question, “what is life” may be a 
sort of working title or universal aspiration among all artificial life researchers, but 
each of them, in getting at this hazy question, are bringing with them their own set of 
expertise: programming techniques and engineering strategies, soldering techniques, 
knowledge on quantum physics, thermodynamics, biology, and so on. 
 
In a word, then, the lab members are therefore of international and interdisciplinary 
mixing, which many of them celebrate as an important key characteristic of the lab. 
This international and interdisciplinary mixing, however, is further complemented by 
a slim intergenerational mixing: the graduate students are in their mid- to late 
twenties, whereas the senior staff, such as assistant professors and professors, are in 
their late thirties or forties. The bulk of the lab members grew up in the 1990s and 
only a handful of them - those in senior positions (such as professor Ikegami, who is, 
in fact, the only professor at the lab) – grew up in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, most of 
the lab members were my age (in their late twenties or early thirties) and we were 
roughly at the same stage of our academic careers. We were more or less dressed the 
same, casual apparel, sneakers and a cuddly sweatshirt, wearing a backpack with a 
laptop inside and growing up playing video games. About half of the lab members are 
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born in Japan, while the other half have come to Japan from other countries. The main 
languages spoken at the lab are Japanese and English.  
 
The organization of the Ikegami Lab, to this end, is not that different from, say, how 
labs are organized at the IT University. And being used to this sort of academic 
environment of international and interdisciplinary mixing, with English as a baseline 
language of communication, my presence among them in terms of appearance and 
social affiliations in academia did not make me stick out. None of the lab members, I 
found during fieldwork, seemed surprised about the fact that an anthropologist had 
suddenly joined their ranks. Rather, they were quite easy-going and felt comfortable 
socializing across our academic and international differences. Indeed, the fact that we 
have our backgrounds in higher education, the fact that we are all pursuing academic 
careers, and finally the fact that we are all part of an international academic 
community (imagined or not), I think, made us closer to be “colleagues”, if not 
“peers”, rather than “strangers”.  
 
Now, however, while the 15-some lab members constitute a mottled crew, who all 
share collective reverence for Ikegami and an interest in putting their knowledge and 
skills to work in the equally mottled field of artificial life, it is also a field dominated 
by men and masculine ideals (cf. Helmreich 1998)3. Indeed, that I am a white, middle-
aged Danish man with an academic background correlates well to the social 
demography of artificial life, and the Ikegami Lab is no different, composed mainly of 
men. This might have impacted my chances of getting access to the lab, seeing that I 
match the profile of an artificial life researchers quite well, assimilating easily into the 
demographic of the field. Lana Sinapayen, a PhD fellow at the lab, and Mizuki Oka, a 
computer scientist from the Tsukuba University and an external member of the lab, 
are the only two women at the lab. We never really addressed issues concerning 
                                                
3 Anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (1998) notes that symbolic associations to masculine creation are 
strong in artificial life and writes that, “Imagery of a masculine monogenetic creation is not only 
present in the texts, programs, and publicity of Artificial Life, it also surfaces in the researchers’ casual 
comments, jokes, and, occasionally, their confessions about why they work in Artificial Life at all” 
(Helmreich 1998:215). According to Helmreich, some artificial life researchers, for example, claim to 
have a certain “grandfatherly pride” in a computer program. Although Helmreich believes it would be a 
stretch to argue that artificial life is ultimately driven by a masculine envy of women’s “ability” to 
birth, artificial life is, “predominantly the work of men [which] is crucial to how frequently and easily 
images of a masculine god are used” (Helmreich 1998:216).  
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gender or the gendered dimensions of their work or artificial life4, and the 
relationships I was able to build with my interlocutors were mostly, if not always, 
grounded first and foremost in our mutual recognition of each other as academics and 
professionals, and so, our shared interests in science, philosophy, literature, music and 
games initial launching pads to establish mutual bonds, but I will get back to this in a 
moment.  
 
The Physical Location of the Ikegami Lab 
 
The Ikegami Lab itself is physically located at Komaba Campus, one of five 
campuses comprising the University of Tokyo. Wedged into building 3 in the 
northwest corner of the campus, the lab is an unassuming single room furnished with 
a whiteboard, bookshelves, sofas, office desks, and computers, resembling any typical 
office space in any modern university. Although unassuming, a small welcoming sign 
next to the doorway reads, “Ikegami Lab: Open Laboratory”, under which someone 
has written in English with a marker pen, “Hello! Come in!!”, reflecting an open 
attitude and a welcoming vibe. Inside the lab, a large window panel pans over the 
baseball fields outside to the north, illuminating the office space, which is itself 
furnished with office desks, sofas, bookshelves and whiteboards. In the center of the 
room is a whiteboard, overwritten with signs and symbols, flow charts, arrows and 
intricate mathematical equations, surrounded by two sofas and a table, where the lab 
members occasionally convene to discuss their research or eat lunch. Squeezed tightly 
along the walls are the office desks - individual workspaces - cluttered with the 
personal belongings of the lab members: opened books, keyboards, cables, gadgets, 
lunch wrap, empty bottles, lighters, cups, mugs, and stacks of paper.  
 
In the lab, the most prominent “scientific tool” in evidence was the computer, or more 
specifically, the lab members’ own laptops. These were, I noticed, their primary work 
tools, although many of them also dabbled with VR-systems and other electronic 
gadgets. However, these were typically unrelated to their research. To this end, there 
                                                
4 See Helmreich (1998) for more about gendered relations in artificial life. This might, of course, also 
have impacted what sort of data I was able to generate. However, at no time during fieldwork did any 
of the lab members address the gendered aspects of artificial life, nor the fact that 90% percent of them 
were men.  
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were no robots, petri dishes, microscopes, chemicals, or anything commonly found in 
a wet lab. On the contrary, the lab itself was as dry as it could be. And so, on an 
everyday basis when I was at the lab, the atmosphere was usually calm and quiet with 
only the sound of the air-condition and the tapping of keyboards humming. 
 
I was at the lab at least three days a week, every week, and most of the time I was 
there only about two or three lab members were in simultaneously. Lana and Julien 
Hubert - a trained computer scientist from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a 
post doc at the lab – had daily routines at the lab. Others, such as Ikegami and 
Yasuhiro Hashimoto – an assistant professor, were not exactly in the lab, but usually 
in their offices nearby. Doi Itsuki, Atsushi Masumori, Norihiro Maruyama and and 
Hiroki Kojima – all PhD fellows at the lab – were rarely in the lab itself, but preferred 
to work from home, from the library or elsewhere, scattered around campus. On any 
given time, Yasuhiro would stop by the lab with cookies, a lab member would go see 
Ikegami in his office, or I would unexpectedly run into, say, Norihiro or Hiroki in the 
hallway. And this pretty much characterizes the dynamics at the lab, lab members 
coming and going on a more or less irregular basis depending on their schedules: 
some, like Yasuhiro, were often teaching classes, others, like Norihiro, were trekking 
in woods outside Tokyo5. In other words, that is to say that the lab members were not 
handcuffed to their office desks, nor had a fixed time at the lab, and so their work 
routine was not necessarily bound to the lab itself. Obviously, this hampered my 
chances of seeing them all, as I would have to make very specific appointments if I 
wanted to, say, do an interview or simply just having a chat.  
 
However, that said, one of the main collective institutions at the lab is the bi-weekly 
lab meeting. Every second week, all the lab members assemble, either at the lab 
(building 3) or on the ground floor of building 16 – a large, 8-story concrete building 
next to building 3 – to collectively keep each other updated on new research, both 
inside and outside artificial life, and to discuss matters related to artificial life. These 
meetings formally consist of three segments and are usually resolved within two 
hours or so. In the first segment, the lab members review and analyze state-of-the-art 
                                                
5 To be fair, this is not to say that Norihiro was not at the lab, nor that he was not an integral part of the 
lab, but only that he spent his free time as an outdoorsman. It will perhaps, then, not come as a surprise 
that his research focuses on in relationship between the “mind” and the “open environment”. 
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and cutting-edge literature, not only the field of artificial life, but also in fields such as 
machine learning, artificial intelligence, philosophy of the mind or biology, to name 
only a few. At each meeting, a single lab member is assigned to do a review and then 
present her own reading of the practical, conceptual or theoretical significance of the 
chosen article to the other attendees. During fieldwork, this segment would be used to 
establish a basis for the following discussion of the paper at hand, where lab members 
exchange perspectives and pitch new ideas in relation to how the articles may or may 
not relate to their own work. For example, one day, a lab member presented an article, 
originally published at a machine learning conference (Proceedings of the 35the 
International Conference on Machine Learning, [ICML2018], in Stockholm Sweden), 
about training plastic neural networks with backpropagation6.  
 
In the second segment, one lab member, chosen by Ikegami, is assigned to update the 
other lab members on their individual research projects. Here, the lab members are 
not necessarily required to relate the preceding review to their own research, but 
rather to provide the other members with an overview of the progress of their own 
research, for example, in order to spark fresh discussions or reactions that may be 
constructive to their further work. Lastly, in the final segment, when the reviews and 
presentations are over, the format of the meeting turns into a loose, informal 
collective discussion about a variety of topics, for example, such as discussing 
questions and problems related to thermodynamics or Black Swan Theory7. As one 
lab member told me, the final segment of the meeting is a forum, where they 
collectively, “toss and throw” different, sometimes unrelated, ideas and concepts “at 
one another” to hatch new ideas in relation to their research. Such “tossing” and 
“throwing”, I learned during fieldwork, was meant to ask open questions on how, for 
example, to train artificial neural networks, how to learn how to learn, or how to 
                                                
6 The specific article in question was published by computer scientists Thomas Miconi, Jeff Clune, and 
Kenneth O. Stanley (the latter, who will also feature later in this thesis), who ask in their article how to 
build “agents” – i.e. virtual agents – that keep learning from experience, quickly and efficiently, after 
their initial “training”. The appearance of articles of similar content were, needless to say, not 
uncommon during lab meetings, as the lab members had a tendency to favor scientific papers from 
conferences and journals in the fields of machine learning, artificial intelligence, physics, mathematics 
and computer science. In fact, most of the articles I encountered during lab meetings were published in 
computer science journals and conferences.  
7 Black Swan Theory is a metaphor that describes an event that emerges as a surprise, and has a major 
effect, but is often (inappropriately) rationalized after the fact with the benefit of hindsight. It is, 
perhaps, not surprising that such a theory is of interest to those who embrace “serendipity” and 
“surprise” as positive qualities to their research, indeed, as favorable outcomes of their work.  
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define “gliders” – those digital patterns that travel across the board in John Conway’s 
famous cellular automaton “Game of Life”, which will also feature later on in this 
thesis. To this end, the bulk of collective and social activities were undertaken during 
the bi-weekly meetings, whereas the lab members’ individual research was 
undertaken only by a few members at the lab on an everyday basis.  
 
A Note on Method 
 
The empirical basis of this thesis is grounded on ethnographic fieldwork first 
conducted from February 2017 to June 2017, and later from February 2018 to May 
2018, a total of 7 months. However, in fact, my fieldwork began much earlier, in 
2016, when I came to the IT University of Copenhagen from the Department of 
Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen. When I arrived at the IT University, I 
had brought with me an interest in “multispecies ethnography” (cf. Helmreich & 
Kirksey 2010), and I had grown increasingly curious about the “multi” in “species” 
and the limits of the notion of “species” itself. What did it really mean to conduct 
“multispecies ethnography”? As a quite recent turn in anthropology, I still had the 
impression that this was merely another intellectual gimmick undergirded by other 
recent anthropological turns to the “nonhuman” and “ontology” (cf. Henare et. al. 
2007). Thus, my initial concerns about the topic was whether this was merely some 
gimmick or whether it was some substantial and radical departure from established 
modes of doing anthropological research. Whatever the case, and more significantly, 
if multispecies ethnography was a call for anthropologists to attend to domains 
beyond the human, what could be included in the term “species” especially in times 
when 21st-century transhumanists have begun proclaiming that they were now seeking 
to radically reengineer the “human species”, or when new constellations of 
technoscience, such as synthetic biology or artificial life, are actively reconfiguring 
the substance of life, putting pressure to the organic world and to its inhabitants? 
Particularly, I thought, what could “species” then mean in times when synthetic 
biologists, for example, engaged in remaking the category itself through the material 
constructing new biological chimeras?  
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I came to the IT University fresh from writing about how oceanographers, biologists 
and fishermen along the Maine coastline, US, sought to steward the sea and its 
inhabitant - or “species”, human and nonhuman - through making models of it. 
However, along the way, after finishing my thesis, it had come to my attention that 
artificial life researchers had spent a good two-decades trying to model something of 
equal, if not surpassing magnitude: life and the living. If oceanographers, biologists 
and fishermen in Maine were engaged in efforts to somehow account for the sea and 
its inhabitants by modeling it, it artificial life researchers were somehow, perhaps in 
similar ways, engaged in efforts to account for life and the living by modeling it. How 
would such efforts, I initially thought, form, reform or deform the notion of “species” 
and ultimately the notion of “life itself”? Moreover, if “species” denote those 
biological and embodied bits of vitality we also know as “organisms”, human and 
nonhuman, how does one model “life”? Indeed, what is “life” – a concept, a thing, a 
word? – and what is “artificial life” to those who believe that life can be materially 
and conceptually reconstructed? 
 
Now, a lot has happened since, and to cut a long story short, I launched into a project 
to study the complex field of artificial life in hopes of learning what kinds of hybrid 
“boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer 1989) would take shape in linking computers 
to biology, computational metaphors, code and information to biotic things? It was 
not the first time I had encountered attempts to use “artificial” means to model 
“nature”, linking “culture” to “nature”, the natural to the artificial. Oceanographers, 
for example, had been doing computational modelling work at least since the 1980s. 
But what did the “artificial” in artificial life even mean, and what is artificial about 
artificial life, using artificial means to create the artificial? That is, off the cuff, for an 
anthropologist, what cultural residues could be read into artificial life, as a sort of 
Promethean aspiration to somehow create “life” artificially, and what could this tell us 
about the notion of “life itself” in our contemporary moment when life is not simply 
believed to be a natural category, something to speculate about, but something to be 
modelled, engineered, and constructed? 
 
After learning about the existence of the Ikegami Lab from doing targeted web 
searches, and later by emailing Ikegami himself, I became curious what Ikegami 
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meant by his self-described mission to, “construct artificial life in the real world”, 
including his claim that, “artificial life is larger than biological life”. Upon this 
concern, as anthropologist Marilyn Strathern (1992) notes, I came to take note that the 
“artificial”, as it pertains to “artificial life”, hints at the undoing of “life” as a “natural 
kind” (Strathern 1992), but what does it mean to construct artificial life in the “real 
world”? To construct new artificial life forms (i.e. robots, machines, or other abiotic 
things composed not of biological materials but of silicon and other synthetic 
materials etc.), to construct the field of artificial life itself (an epistemic community, a 
new social formation of life scientists etc.), or to construct or reconstruct the concept 
of “life” altogether? Furthermore, following Ikegami, what is the “real world”? In the 
meantime, from other anthropologists, I learned that the field of artificial life had a 
strong tendency to favor using computers, as their primary scientific instruments, both 
to “synthesize” and make “simulations” of things they associate with life and the 
living (cf. Risan 1997; Helmreich 1998). Thus, if artificial life centered on an 
exploratory computer-simulation-based way of working, a practice embedding its 
theoretical target, “life”, firmly in a computational and digital realm, what would the 
“real world” then refer to? And in this relation, what did Ikegami mean by his acutely 
direct mission statement to, “construct artificial life in the real world”? 
 
The Zealots of Ikegamianism: A Countercultural Movement 
 
Anthropologists of science and technology have taken note that technoscience - the 
“time-space modality” that exceeds, “the distinction between science and technology, 
as well as those between nature and society, subjects and objects and the natural and 
artifactural that structured the imaginary time called modernity” (Haraway 1997:3) - 
must be examined and known not only in relation to their specific theoretical 
frameworks to which it is tethered, but also as socially located discourses and 
practices, merging into what may be termed as “culture” (see Pfaffenberger 1992; 
Traweek 2000; Fischer 2007). At the Ikegami Lab, a bunch of people with very 
different backgrounds have come together from many different places under the aegis 
of artificial life. However, they do not constitute some homogenous and fixed 
“culture”; they see themselves as a sort of movement, a countercultural movement on 
a mission to change science. But insofar they are all migrants from other disciplines, 
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and while they have many different interests and research agendas, what then might 
constitute their sense of community, their sense of belonging? In other words, what, 
despite their many differences in terms of nationality, academic background, age, 
gender, research agendas, skills, technical abilities, do they actually share, besides the 
fact the that they call themselves artificial life researchers? 
 
What created a structure of feeling among them a sense of unity, I later realized, was 
not simply the fact that they all self-identified as artificial life researchers, but a 
shared admiration of Ikegami himself. Ikegami plays a central role at the lab, taking 
the role as a sort of spiritual leader. During fieldwork, Ikegami, it appeared to me, had 
seemingly orchestrated an entire community around himself, and as such, acted as the 
intellectual beacon and the “face” of the lab, he was, and still is, the spearhead of his 
movement. Overall, Ikegami is the one charting the epistemic bearings of the lab and 
the one attracting both academic, artistic, and public attention to the field of artificial 
life, including anthropologists like me. Not only the principal investigator and head of 
the lab, but also the one who selects and chooses, single-handedly, who becomes 
enrolled or not, Ikegami is the one who “calls the shots”, and as such, this is also part 
of the reason he popped up on my radar. His visibility as a public figure quickly 
captures your attention, and once you get to know him, you realize that he polices the 
disciplinary boundaries of artificial life ferociously and the one, who establishes and 
manages collaborations with other academic institutions and people around the world.  
 
My first impression of Ikegami, roughly by the end of my first field trip in 2017, was 
that he was strict leader, one who demanded a high level of individuality and 
ingenuity from the lab members. I recall one person from a workshop in Osaka8, for 
example, who told me that he had applied to enroll at the lab, but he quickly found, 
during a “job interview”, that, “Ikegami-sensei did not like my ideas”, and he was 
immediately rejected. He later told me that Ikegami was that type of person who 
either likes you or not, depending on how “creative” you are in your thinking. Back at 
the lab a few weeks later, a lab member described his relation to Ikegami, saying that 
social relations at the lab were like, “chemistry,” noting that,  
                                                
8 During fieldwork in 2017 and 2018, I took a few trips down to Osaka from Tokyo to arrange and 
attend anthropological workshops at the Department of Anthropology, Osaka University. Some, but not 
all, of these workshops were based on data and topics from my own fieldwork.  
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The chemistry between people at the lab is very important, but it doesn’t 
work with everyone […] Takashi has a very special personality, he’s not 
very ‘Japanese-like’, and that doesn’t work with everyone. You need to be 
super autonomous and creative on your own, disciplined, because he’s the 
main source of scientific ideas, he’s super creative, but if you’re not able 
to lead a dialogue with him then it’ll be hard to take advantage of and 
build on. He lets you free, and for people who are not very disciplined, it’s 
very hard to get a PhD. So, it didn’t work for everyone. 
 
Many lab members, too, often described Ikegami as demanding much “discipline”, 
with many regarding him as a sort of creative prophet or some inspired teacher, who 
was also a “main source” of scientific ideas. Also, the fact that social relations were 
by lab members described in terms of chemistry meant for them, and other hopeful 
apprentices like the reject I met in Osaka, who aspired to join the lab, that the 
chemical composition (read: the network of social relations) would have to be in 
order. It either works or not, you either fit into a fixed arrangement or not, also 
reflecting, I think, how Ikegami is the one running the show.  
 
During fieldwork, though, it nevertheless became clear that Ikegami was not only 
mediating access to his field, but he was also someone you needed to impress in order 
to grab his attention. For example, I felt this struggle for his attention during some of 
our conversations, where Ikegami would turn almost lethargic if he felt my ideas were 
too banal or clichéd. I often felt that he clearly expected of me to think more radically 
or to be creative, and this is also what he expects from his lab members. To them, he 
is an inspired teacher, and indeed, many of the lab members cherish his visionary 
outlook, his eclectic and multidisciplinary approach to artificial life and the study of 
life. “Takashi,” one lab members tells me, “is a generalist, he does everything Alife. 
He’s really an artist.”  
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But so too is Ikegami the one who establishes collaborative relations outside of his 
own lab. For example, the Earth-Life Science Institute (ELSI)9 at the Tokyo Institute 
of Technology, where some of Ikegami’s former students had also later managed to 
get employed as assistant researchers, have become one of their main collaborators. 
During fieldwork, I got glimpses of how Ikegami also did joint collaborative research 
projects with so-called “external” lab members, for example, at the University of 
Tsukuba. These “external” lab members are not officially part of the lab, but have 
specific interests in the field of artificial life, but are equally fascinated with Ikegami. 
From time to time, Ikegami works closely with artists from Europe – from France and 
Germany – and Japan on “science-art projects” – projects, for example, in which they 
collectively work to express and communicate scientific points by artistic means. 
Ikegami would “hire” artists and collaborate with them to push artificial life into the 
domain of art, mainly the subcategory of New Media Art – a branch of art in which 
artworks are created with new media technologies, including digital art, computer 
graphics, computer animation, virtual art, Internet art, interactive art, sound art, video 
games, robotics, 3D printing, biotechnology, and more. Art, in other words, are an 
integrated part to Ikegami’s vision of artificial life altogether, which I will also 
explore later in this thesis.  
 
As part of the lab’s international outlook, the lab members also attend conferences 
and workshops abroad – usually conferences and workshops on artificial intelligence, 
artificial life, physics, complex systems and computer science10 – at which they also 
sometimes provide keynotes on their own work. This, needless to say, it quickly 
became apparent to me during fieldwork that the Ikegami Lab extended beyond the 
physical boundaries of building 3, and that Ikegami’s network of collaborators was 
vast. However, what was nonetheless clear was that Ikegami had built a community 
                                                
9 The Earth-Life Science Institute is an established independent permanent scientific research institute 
based at the Tokyo Institute of Technology in the Meguro ward of Tokyo. It has more than 70 
international scientists employed from a range of disciplines, ranging from astrophysics, chemistry, to 
synthetic biology and artificial life, who perform collaborative research on the broad connections 
between the origin and evolution of planets and life. The artificial life researchers employed fit well 
into ELSI’s overall way of working, providing computational skills to the work of modelling 
evolutionary processes and more.  
10 For example, the Conference on Collective Behavior in Trieste, Italy, 2018, the Open-Ended 
Evolution Workshop in York, UK, 2016, or the ALIFE 2018 conference in Tokyo, Japan, 2018.  
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around himself, enrolling a movement of zealots around himself. This, in turn, 
prompted me to “make the cut”.  
 
Making the Cut 
 
Anthropologist Matei Candea (2007) has made an appeal to “make the cut” (Candea 
2007:174), by which he encourages fieldworkers to recognize “the value of 
limitation” (Candea 2007:180). Making the cut, in retrospect, became a useful 
methodological tool in defining the contours of the field, which simply meant chose 
to focus on the actual physical location the Ikegami Lab itself. At least to begin with, 
as a hub from where I would attempt to follow their activities outside the field. In 
retrospect, then, the fact that Ikegami is the main character of the lab, if not an 
embodiment of the lab itself, made it somewhat easy to “make the cut”. Of course, 
given the time frame, the focus of my research, and the economic circumstances of 
my research, it made sense to make the cut, since I was not able to travel with my 
interlocutors to international conferences or workshops. But, on the contrary, this in 
turn felt less important insofar my attention had to be directed at Ikegami himself, as a 
charismatic leader. Yet, that said, I did occasionally manage to attend art exhibitions, 
concerts, and public meetings around Tokyo, and attending such events were of 
course also vital to better understand the work of the lab, for example, as conduits for 
communicating their work to wider publics.  
 
Now, “making the cut” is simply a convenient and highly practical tool to curb and 
contain the sprawling network of artificial life. Making the cut during fieldwork, 
though, allowed me to focus on the localized laboratory practices at the Ikegami Lab, 
which included registering the people populating the lab, and how their work was 
informed by a range of epistemic worlds reeled from both inside and outside the field 
of artificial life. This also simply meant to recognize the “value of limitation” in 
attending to how these people were first and foremost social actors, situated in real 
spaces, structured by complex face-to-face interactions and relations, and 
acknowledge that Ikegami constituted the “social glue” of the lab. But as such, it also 
meant that I could attend to how local discourses were established and maintained 
through everyday practice at the lab, namely through the work of leadership.  
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Making the cut, then, became a primary way to limit my scope during fieldwork, but 
also afterwards when writing this thesis, enabling me to follow more closely how 
local laboratory practices, which involve the social dynamics and actual, hands-on 
making of simulations, models, and other forms artificial systems, such as embodied 
robotic systems, would potentially inform, and be informed by, worlds beyond the lab 
itself. But more specifically, in doing so, I latched on to Ikegami and his position at 
the lab and took my outset from him. This took me from the physical location of the 
lab itself to music clubs and concert halls to art exhibitions and experimental sites 
around the city of Tokyo, to worlds to which the Ikegami Lab is tethered. Yet, the 
focus remained on Ikegami and the lab itself, as I followed the daily work at the lab, 
doing participant-observation and interviews with as many lab members as possible.  
 
If making the cut made way for delimiting my field, it transformed my field into what 
anthropologist Ghassan Hage (2005), describes as a, “single geographically 
discontinuous site” (Hage 2005:463), by which the lab members actively assemble a 
unifying “culture” – or movement – not only across a number of global locations and 
across a multitude of epistemic domains, but also around Ikegami himself. All the lab 
members, I experienced when I attended lab meetings and when I did interviews, for 
example, often eclectically drew on epistemic resources from other fields, such as 
biology or computer science, to explain their work. But it was also clear from their 
descriptions and their motivations to join the ranks of artificial life that Ikegami, as a 
“genius” and “main source of inspiration”, had somehow persuaded or convinced 
them to become artificial life researchers. In this sense, many lab members echoed 
Ikegami, for example, by priding themselves on their scientific and epistemic 
eclecticism, seeing their own field of artificial life as able to take on a much broader 
perspective, a more holistic one, having a highly agnostic attitude to various and 
heterogeneous scientific and epistemic traditions. In short, they were trained to see 
themselves as sort of intellectual vanguard, a movement of rebels, who worked 
together against an established order. And this collective identity, I dare say, is one 
fostered and cultivated by Ikegami himself. 
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Thus, to go back to Hage and his own experiences among Lebanese migrants, he boils 
down the problem of doing what anthropologist George Marcus (1995) has called 
“multi-sited” fieldwork – the encouragement of fieldworkers to move beyond the 
bounded field site in order to deal with an interconnected world system (Marcus 
1995) – to a question of choice, or, rather to a matter of making the cut yourself. It is 
necessary, Hage writes on the basis of his own fieldwork, to make a choice between 
emphasizing, “the migrants’ transnational culture at the expense of their settlement 
culture, even if, as is clearly the case, one cannot be understood separately from the 
other” (Hage 2005:467), and so, in relation to my own fieldwork, I chose to focus first 
and foremost on the lab itself. As such, my I was not so much doing what Marcus 
calls “multi-sited” fieldwork - even though lab members at the Ikegami Lab partake in 
activities beyond the lab itself, such as attending international conferences or drawing 
on epistemic resources outside their field - but rather the opposite: I centered my 
attention on one “culture” (cf. Hage 2005), one that bundles up an interconnected 
world system. Or, more precisely, while this is overtly my own construction of the 
“field”, as a single geographically discontinuous site, I chose to focus on Ikegami as 
obligatory point of passage and a seat of connections in discerning the Ikegami Lab 
itself. 
 
Access and Position 
 
At the Ikegami Lab, I had access to all areas of the lab: the office space, the labs, the 
library, and the other single-room offices distributed across campus. Normally, I 
would spend about 3 or 4 days a week at the lab, located in building 3, together with a 
few lab members. Here, I would frequently accompany them to eat lunch at the 
campus cantina, buy stuff at a nearby convenience store, or simply take strolls on 
campus in the fresh spring air. After hours, although less frequently, I would also 
sometimes join some of the lab members at bars, cafeterias or restaurants to have 
dinner or drink beers, or both. During my stay, I had no official status at the lab, no 
formal affiliation, yet my role as a foreign visitor did not really become that of a 
“non-person” (cf. Gammeltoft 2003:277). By “non-person” I specifically refer to the 
position of the researcher, or the ethnographer, as an outsider. So, while I was the first 
anthropologist to actually conduct ethnographic fieldwork at the lab, many of the lab 
 59 
members had worked with anthropologists before in other contexts, and so I was not 
an outsider to them as such. However, not being officially enrolled as a lab member 
might have made me an outsider in terms of not being fully committed to their cause. 
But in spite of this, I was among the lab members, who were largely the same age as 
me, one of their own - a PhD student buried in his own work, just like them, the only 
difference that I was gathering my data among them while they were gathering data 
on their computers.  
 
As already mentioned, my informant group consisted largely of men, something, 
which did not come to me as a surprise (cf. Helmreich 1998). Such gendered relations 
should, I believe, here be acknowledged in terms of access and position, as the lab 
itself consisted mostly of men. I positioned myself among the lab members as a sort 
of friend or colleague, who was genuinely curious about their work (something they 
were happy to share) and who offered professional and academic closeness rather 
than personal intimacy. However, my professional relationship to some lab members 
gradually lapsed into a personal relationship, which resulted in a budding friendship. 
But although being peer in terms of my academic background, my profession as an 
academic, my gender and age, I was never fully assimilated into the lab as such: I was 
still not formally enrolled in any research project and I had no formal obligations to 
fulfill. Yet, still not completely “inside”, I represented for the lab members an open 
and curious person, who was willing to discuss all sorts of questions and problems, 
which I believe made many of them comfortable in my presence. 
 
That said, while fitting into the social demography, I tried to the best of my ability to 
make myself useful, not only as a partner in conversation, but also by helping them do 
proof readings of scientific articles, or simply by helping them move stuff, like cables, 
computers or robot parts for setting up experiments. While being a useful and 
practical asset to their work, as compensation for my incompetence in the art of 
programming and my lacking ability to fully comprehend the technicalities of their 
work, I quickly exposed myself as a novice in the field of artificial life. While fitting 
the profile of a typical artificial life researcher (cf. Helmreich 1998), my ineptitude in 
technical matters and the nomenclature of artificial life and programming languages 
clearly marked me off as a novice in the field of artificial life: I was unable to read 
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and write code, unfamiliar and unaccustomed to intricate biological concepts, to 
ongoing scientific controversies in the field of artificial life, computer science, 
ignorant of sub-fields such as “the origins of life” and “open-ended evolution”, and so 
on.  
 
In the beginning, some lab members thought I had been enrolled at the lab to 
articulate, bolster or enhance new theories or contribute to current debates in the field. 
Others knew from the get-go that I was a visiting scholar and remained aware that I 
was doing ethnographic fieldwork and not necessarily doing studies for artificial life. 
Those who had the impression that I was at the lab to contribute “anthropologically” 
to their work and to the field of artificial life were often happy to discuss how 
anthropology could potentially contribute. They often equated anthropology with 
cultural studies, and sometimes wanted to discuss the concept of “culture”, however, 
not in any sense I had done before, seeing culture as a large “feedback system”, a 
cybernetic system keeping organisms in sync with their environments. Such talking 
across shared concepts meant that we were often able to speak and talk across 
concepts and disciplinary boundaries, which further bolstered a sense of social and 
academic coherence.  
 
From socializing and chatting with lab members on a daily basis spoke, it least with 
those who were in, and by following them around campus and the city of Tokyo, it 
became apparent to me that all of them spoke highly of Ikegami. But my relationship 
to Ikegami, however, was different from my relationship with the lab members: my 
relationship to lab members, as peers, was more leveled, while my relationship to 
Ikegami, on the contrary, was more hierarchical in the sense that he treated me more 
like a neophyte with the potential to be converted. More precisely, while my 
relationship to the lab members remained collegial and somewhat equal, my 
relationship to Ikegami vacillated between us being peers exchanging ideas and 
Ikegami being a missionary trying to convert a heathen. However, while this was the 
case, Ikegami and I also found that we had many mutual interests, among other 
things, in literary preferences, philosophical works, and taste in movies. For example, 
in between interviews, we spent much time discussing the literary works of 
Ryūnosuke Akutagawa, Osamu Dazai, Kenji Miyazawa, the philosophical works of 
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Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson, or film documentaries like Johan Grimonprez’ 
Dial H-I-S-T-O-R-Y (1997). Such mutual interests undeniably created a great sense of 
rapport between us, and made it easier for me to construct a healthy relationship to 
Ikegami, despite the fact that I was sometimes the neophyte apprentice to whom 
Ikegami felt a sort of fatherly or paternal pride in teaching.  
 
Now, however, the internal personal relations between Ikegami and the lab members, 
I experienced, seemed to some extent be an echo of my relationship with Ikegami. 
The lab members, in other words, had were converts turned into followers or zealots. 
This is not to say that they followed Ikegami blindly, but simply that Ikegami’s 
charismatic aura had drawn them into his world. Meanwhile, the lab members’ 
internal relationship to one another seemed relaxed and somewhat informal despite 
the formal hierarchy often found at Japanese universities and Ikegami’s position as a 
sort of paternal figure. Yet, all the lab members were friendly and jovial around 
Ikegami, and any now and then, Ikegami would, for example, either invite us to some 
microbrewery in Shibuya, close to campus, or join us at some izakaya (casual 
tavern/bar) somewhere in Tokyo.  
 
This sort of structured, yet relaxed interpersonal relationship between Ikegami and the 
lab members generally gave me the impression that the Ikegami Lab was a small 
community, tightly knitted together, not simply by professional competences and 
commitments, but first and foremost by close personal and emotional ties. Ikegami 
himself, had, after all, carefully hand-picked this small group people upon their 
personal and ideological qualities. They were, in other words, a tightly-knit group of 
researchers, who had been hand-picked by Ikegami and who now followed him in 
realizing his long-standing dream to “construct artificial life in the real world”. And 
as such, the collectively felt like pioneers and, as one lab member said, like 
“misunderstood geniuses”, who were on a mission to radically change the world of 
science and the course of the world itself, just like Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, 
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or the Wright Brothers had done before them11. They are, to put it simply, zealots of 
Ikegamianism.  
 
Methodology 
 
During fieldwork, I incorporated four techniques: 1) intensive periods of participant 
observation at the Ikegami Lab, 2) brief and targeted visits to institutions 
collaborating with the Ikegami Lab (for example, to ELSI at the Tokyo Institute of 
Technology), 3) long-format semi-structured interviews with both current and former 
members of the Ikegami Lab, and 4) ongoing surveys of peer-reviewed and popular 
science accounts particularly related to the Ikegami Lab and generally related to the 
field of artificial life. Needless to say, ethnographic fieldwork is an eclectic 
undertaking, and my activities in the field included, but were not limited to: chatting, 
conversing, interviewing, drinking beers, holding stuff, taking notes, taking photos, 
filming, smoking cigarettes, eating breakfast, eating lunch, eating dinner, and so on.  
 
When I commenced my fieldwork, Ikegami had kindly offered me a desk in the lab 
and I was given access to the university Wi-Fi. I was usually stationed here about 2 to 
4 days a week, but in any given week, however, only about 3 or 4 lab members would 
be in the lab simultaneously, working on their own individual research project in front 
of their laptops. Whenever lab members were in, they would typically come in at 
noon or late in the afternoon, take off their shoes at the Genkan (the traditional 
Japanese entryway area), open their laptops, and plug in their headphones. 
Subsequently, they would sit for the next 4 to 6 hours tapping on their keyboards, 
listening to a playlist or a podcast, before going out to get dinner somewhere in 
Tokyo. It was usually the same lab members, who frequented the lab, while the rest of 
them were working from home, at some café, or at the university library. To illustrate 
their working routine, one lab member told me, “as long as I have my computer, I can 
work anywhere […] I sometimes work at the library, in coffee shops, or simply at 
home.” And when I asked a lab member about her work routine, she replied, “I don’t 
                                                
11 This feeling of determination and purposefulness was very pronounced among the lab members, who 
not only spoke highly of Ikegami, but also often idolized people like Einstein, Feynman or the Wright 
Brothers during our many conversations, which will also become apparent later on in this thesis. 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that many of them saw in Ikegami a leading star, whose personal qualities 
and intellectual prowess had the potential to radically change the world? 
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really have routine. I’m always working on different things, there are always different 
events to attend to, and both my lab and my part time job have free hours. Not two 
days are the same, so I work as soon as I get some free time.”12 Thus, while I was 
usually at my desk in the lab, I would occasionally have to walk down to the library to 
see if any lab members were in. But when a lab member was in, I would carefully 
make sure I did not disturb or interrupt their work, and approach them in a casual 
way. Whenever they had “free time”, for example, when they would go out to get 
dinner in the evening, I would usually arrange an interview in order to make sure I 
would be able to ask them about their work in a more structured and formal fashion.  
 
However, when I was not at my desk, I attended as many activities as I could, such as 
attending bi-weekly lab meetings and other group meetings, participate in 
experiments and public events, for example, when they conducted experiments on the 
android Alter, which will feature later on, or when Ikegami was invited to do lectures 
or talks at different locations around the city of Tokyo. Other lab members would also 
occasionally do public talks at different bars and venues around the city, for example 
events such as Lonely Planet’s “top choice for cultural events in Tokyo”, “Nerd Nite 
Tokyo, bringing geeks and drinks together in the Kanto region since June 2016”. 
These events were less about research and more about introducing the general public 
to the field of artificial life. Besides attending such events around Tokyo, I was also 
lucky to get invited to participate in one of their main research projects on the android 
named Alter – an “autonomous” robot stationed at The National Museum of 
Emerging Science and Innovation, colloquially known as the “future museum”, 
located on the artificial island of Odaiba in one of Tokyo’s central districts. Here, I 
would do much of my participant-observation, following how the lab members 
conducted their experiments hands-on and up-close.  
 
Now, the fact that the lab members had different and sporadic working routines, 
sometimes working in the lab, sometimes working from home or from some café, I 
was forced to stay in touch with them via social media, email and text messaging. As 
such, I was able to follow them around, make appointments, arrange small meetings, 
                                                
12 Many of the lab members had part time jobs at tech-companies or start-ups on the side to support 
themselves financially. Holding part time jobs, obviously, took a lot of their time, which was also one 
reason for why some of them preferred working close to their jobs or at home after a long day at work.  
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and generally stay updated on their whereabouts. However, not all of the lab members 
were equally good at replying to my text messages and requests, especially Ikegami, 
who always seemed very busy13. This, in turn, compromised my chances of following 
them around and made it difficult to stay in touch, and often, I had to go see them on 
very short notice. Sensing the shortcomings of this strategy, I nevertheless decided to 
set up my “base of operations” at the lab itself, seeing this as a hub, where the lab 
members would show up from time to time. Staying at campus provided the best 
chances for tracking their activities both in terms of their individual research (there 
were almost always at least one lab member in) and in terms of keeping myself 
updated on any upcoming events, for example, such as lab meetings, gatherings, 
symposia, talks, lectures, and so on. My most valuable data, however, was collected 
on the basis of doing interviews at the lab, at bars and venues around Tokyo, and of 
doing participant-observation at public events and experiments.  
 
Interviews 
 
In between passing time at the lab, I frequently found openings to arrange and 
perform semi-structured interviews. Many of the lab members, except Ikegami, 
seemed little accustomed to being questioned in a formal interview-styled manner, but 
they always seemed to enjoy sharing insights of their work. Most of the lab members, 
while being unaccustomed to being interviewed (usually, Ikegami was the one who 
would take inquiries) agreed to do interviews. However, a few of them felt less 
comfortable doing interviews, perhaps because they felt uncomfortable expressing 
themselves in English. When approaching them, I tried to the best of my ability to be 
sensitive to how their felt about the situation and had to give up some interviews in 
order not to seem pushy. Thus, I never managed to interview all the lab members, but 
had to rely on a few of them. Needless to say, this affected the sort of data I was able 
to generate by narrowing the range of perspectives I was able to get.  
 
Now, notably, in relation to my interviews, some of the lab members politely advised 
me to do my “homework”, noting that they would, “rather that we’d discuss 
something interesting and not just the usual basic stuff”, and so advised me to come 
                                                
13 I made several appointments with Ikegami during fieldwork, many of which were cancelled due to 
his inability to reply to my texts or because he had been otherwise prevented. 
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prepared. Coming prepared, for example, meant that I would read up on some of the 
basic concepts and theories in advance so I could heighten my chances of 
understanding what they were actually talking about. However, whether prepared or 
not, they tolerated my ignorance of artificial life and its universe of intricate concepts 
and readily replied to all my questions14.  
 
During interviews, I rarely asked questions about their private life unless they went 
there themselves. Instead, I concentrated my questions directly on their roles as 
professionals. I asked questions, for example, about their individual research projects; 
about their ways of working; about their relationship to other lab members; about 
certain relevant and irrelevant theories and concepts; about other fields and scientists, 
and about how they envisioned the future of artificial life. Often, I would use 
interviews to support the observations I had made at the lab, for example by asking 
them during an interview to guide me through one or more of their self-made 
simulations I had seen them working on during the day. This meant that I would 
sometimes use interviews to engage with their work in more detail by interviewing 
them in a tighter format, a closed format by which I was able to instruct them to walk 
me through their work. Doing so, I combined my interview with a sort of “point-and-
click”-tour of their models, while they were happily naming their “artificial 
organisms” and telling me about these fantastic “digital worlds”. This, in turn, also 
revealed what inspired them and how they thought about their work and their models.  
 
In total, I conducted 25 formal semi-structured interviews15 with 10 different people, 
which lasted between one and two hours each. All my interviews were conducted on 
protocols based on both closed and open-ended questions, which I formulated in 
                                                
14 I would like to add here that many of the lab members were also happily surprised that someone 
outside the field of artificial life, artificial intelligence, machine learning and computer science had 
taken interest in their individual projects. However, some of them remained suspicious about my 
intentions and what I hoped to achieve, sometimes confusing my work as a researcher with that of a 
journalist writing a popular science article about artificial life as a “cutting-edge” pioneering science. 
Of course, this suspicion was in part motivated by my own questions about how they envisioned the 
future of their field. Also, I often had the impression that some of them felt somewhat uneasy about the 
interview-format in terms of its methodological efficiency, but this is not to say that they were feeling 
uneasy during the interviews. Interviews, in other words, were not part of the artificial life 
methodological toolbox, which also exposed our professional differences.  
15 These interviews are recorded interviews, which are supported by unrecorded conversations. I did 
about 10 to 15 smaller “interviews” with people outside the lab – artists, entrepreneurs, scientists, 
anthropologists, philosophers, etc. - which were not recorded, however, still part of my empirical 
material.  
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advance, but adjusted both during and after interviews to allow for improvisational 
and spontaneous turns in our conversations. Thus, depending on whether I conducted 
an interview with a graduate student, a PhD, a postdoc, or with professor Ikegami, I 
tailored my questions to fit with their respective positions. For example, in the case of 
Ikegami, I aimed for an unstructured and loose format by asking a range of open-
ended questions in order to make him offer, say, a general overview of the field of 
artificial life. By this strategy, I wanted to allow Ikegami to steer the course of our 
conversation and thereby allow him to define the content to better identify what he 
believed to be at stake and what he saw as the primary concerns in relation to his 
work as an artificial life researcher. For example, seeing Ikegami as a main 
interlocutor, I would initially ask him very basic, open-ended questions, such as, 
“what is artificial life and how would you, in your own words, describe the field?”; 
“please describe a typical day at the lab?”; “what sort of research projects are you 
doing here and what are they about?”, and “how do see the future of artificial life?”, 
and so on. Such questions gave me with a general sense of the lab and thus helped me 
establish a foundational understanding what was at stake at the lab. Along the way, I 
would tighten the format a bit and tailor follow-up interviews accordingly, so I would 
pick up on the information I had been given and slowly begin to relate and connect 
themes and topics to form a sort of “map of concerns” inherent to the lab16.  
 
Now, consequentially, one of the limitations in keeping a loose format (that is, by 
initially allowing Ikegami to control the content of our conversation), I came to 
notice, was that our conversations turned too abstract and incoherent. Ikegami often 
wanted to discuss “big thoughts” and thereby often steered our conversations into 
deep theoretical, speculative, and philosophical waters. That is, Ikegami and I, unlike 
my conversations with lab members, would often engage in huge philosophical 
debates or theoretical tugs-of-war, for example, on topics such as Cartesian divides, 
posthumanism, postmodernism, Gilles Deleuze, Shusaku Arakawa, or anti-
structuralism. Moreover, this was sometimes peppered with discussions about art, 
music, literature, Osaumu Dazai, Kenji Miyazawa, nature, non-human perspectives 
and where to buy good coffee. Yet, it was exactly in such moments I began to realize 
                                                
16 It was by mapping a “network of concepts”, so to speak, that I became acquainted with Ikegami’s 
self-invented concept of “massive data flows” (MDF, which I will touch upon later), and by which I 
was able to query his world of ideas. I will come back to this concept later on in this thesis.  
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that Ikegami was in command of a rich philosophical vocabulary, but this also 
revealed that he casted himself as an avant-gardist and a sort of “philosopher king” at 
the lab. And this, I later reckoned, resonated soundly with his self-image as an artist-
scientist and his vision of artificial life. Indeed, well-versed in the philosophical 
underpinnings and the artistic potentials of his field, Ikegami was assiduously 
constructing artificial life as a sort of intellectual vanguard and himself as a forward-
looking Renaissance-man. In retrospect, his competence and eloquence in, say, 
postmodernist vocabularies might sometimes have had a mesmerizing effect (or 
perhaps a paralyzing effect?) on our conversations. However, in any case, his larger-
than-life-Renaissance-man-attitude vividly exposed his desire to exhibit intellectual 
prowess and foresight.  
  
On a general level, whenever possible, I recorded the interviews and later transcribed 
them, either fully or partially. If an interviewee preferred not to be recorded, I would 
take notes during or after the interview, usually by hand to include them into my field 
notes. All my interviews were conducted in person, and whenever possible, they were 
held privately, even when interviewees preferred meeting in a public venue, such as a 
café. All interviews, finally, were conducted in English, in which most of the 
interviewees were either proficient or native speakers. Of the 25 interviews, about 
half of them were with Ikegami himself, whenever he had time in his busy schedule, 
the rest were conducted with lab members and collaborators.  
 
Participant Observation 
 
While interviews, informal conversations and chats with Ikegami and lab members 
comprise a good portion of my empirical material, I also recorded about 500 pages of 
field notes based on participant observation. These pages include sober and 
dispassionate field observations, personal reflections, diary-like notes, frustrations, 
angry outbursts, and memos-to-self. The bulk of participant observation have been 
done at The National Museum of Emerging Science and Innovation, colloquially 
known as the “Miraikan”, or literally the “future museum”, and during events around 
Tokyo, for example, such as Nerd Nite. While I did participant observation at the lab 
in the sense that I was talking to, and looking over the shoulders of, the lab members, 
 68 
as I tried absorb the general feel of the place, I sometimes joined some of the lab 
members when they did collective experiments. 
 
At the time of my visit, a few lab members – Doi and Atsushi - were particularly 
engaged in a joint research project on the android named Alter. Alter is one of the 
most prominent examples of one of their many creations at the lab, an upper-body 
robot designed, built and assembled in collaboration with the Intelligent Robotics Lab 
(IRL) at Osaka University. However, while Alter is the result of a joint research 
collaboration, it was at the time when I did my fieldwork stationed at the Miraikan, 
and a few lab members from the Ikegami Lab had taken the responsibility to carry on 
new experiments on it. Whenever possible, I would join them at the Miraikan, where 
they had borrowed a spacious exhibition hall for conducting their experiments. 
However, these experiments, while visually appealing seeing Alter turned on and off 
like a wind-up toy, felt much like the sort individual experiments each lab member 
were engaged in back at the lab. That is, much of the work was still done on 
computers, writing code, adjusting values. Yet, contrary to much of the simulation 
work done at the lab, this sort of computational fidgeting materialized in the body of 
Alter, making its arms, torso and head move spasmodically. In other words, tracking 
what to me was intangible and intricate code materialize in physical movement 
exposed a more practical side of their work, which in turn added a new dimension that 
required me to do participant observation.  
 
However, I did more observation than participation, but this is not to say that I did not 
participate at all. For example, while Ikegami was not usually present at during 
experiments, he would sometimes show up to keep track of the progress and to 
discuss new ideas, further developments or initiatives in relation to Alter17. In these 
moments, Ikegami often included me into such discussions, but he also sometimes 
used me as a sort of test subject, asking me to assess, evaluate and communicate my 
experience of Alter. At one point, for example, he asked me to rate Alter’s “presence” 
on a scale from, “very human-like” to, “very robot-like” with reference to Masahiro 
Mori’s concept of the “uncanny valley” – a hypothesized relationship between the 
degree of an object’s resemblance to a human being and the emotional response to 
                                                
17 Later in this thesis, I will account for such experiments in more detail.  
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such an object. Being included in such experiments, needless to say, also made me 
feel included their work, particularly the “Alter project”, and my role as a test subject 
(while perhaps not always desirable) made me feel like a valuable part of the process 
to refine and attune the “feel” of Alter. To this end, while my ineptitude in the 
language of programming barred me from close to the internal logics of their work as 
such, my aptitude as a test subject and critic made me a useful asset to their work.  
 
Sequence Map 
 
Chapter 2, The Evolution of Artificial Life, is an introductory chapter taking a tour 
through the history of artificial life, or what Ikegami calls the “evolution of artificial 
life”. In this chapter, I unpack the historical “evolution” of artificial life, seen from the 
perspective of the lab members, seeking to reveal how they arrived at the conviction 
that “life” is better “understood” by it “construction”. As we shall see here, their 
enterprise is not ahistorical, nor uncultured, but rather enabled by slew social, 
scientific, intellectual, technical, and historical possibilities. The so-called evolution 
of artificial life, as narrated by the lab members, is thus segmented into three distinct, 
although overlapping, “eras”, or “evolutionary stages”, beginning with the “computer 
era”, mutating into “chemical era”, which thread their way into to “third” and the 
current era, which is marked by the lab members’ self-described mission to “construct 
artificial life in the real world”. The purpose of this first introductory chapter, in short, 
is to provide a clearer sense of the social, cultural and historical contexts in which 
these researchers at the Ikegami Lab are embedded.  
 
Chapter 3, Maker’s Knowledge, takes us from the history of artificial life into the lab 
itself to take a closer look at what the lab members mean by “construction”. 
“Construction”, they say, is as a way, in fact the only viable way, to better 
“understand” what life is, and so, in this chapter, I reveal that their approach to better 
understand what life is, and what it can become, is essentially underwritten by a 
constructive approach to vitality. Using a few examples of models constructed at the 
lab, I show how the lab members basically treat “life”, including the theories and 
concepts they associate with it, as conceptual categories that may be explored and 
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understood via their de novo construction in the lab. That is, constructing computer 
models, for example, is a way to explore and materialize what they understand, and 
seek to understand, about life and the living. Along the way, then, I thereby 
demonstrate how construction either precedes or is simultaneous with understanding, 
a confluence I call makers’ knowledge. The main purpose here is to unpack the lab 
members construe the relationship between “construction” and “understanding” in 
order for me to establish the basis for what I mean by parallax machines. 
 
Chapter 4, The Word for World is Massive Data Flows, however, is not about parallax 
machines, but takes us from maker’s knowledge – i.e. how the lab members construe 
the relationship between “construction” and “understanding” - to the question of what 
they mean by the “real world”. Namely, in this chapter, I show how Ikegami 
“performs” an ontology, indeed how he articulates the principles of reality, by which 
the lab members are invited to see the world. The “real world”, according to Ikegami, 
is a media-specific reality of data and information, swirling in space-time, flooded by 
what he calls “massive data flows”. The real world, then, is at once erratic, stochastic, 
unpredictable, and is therefore also ontologically out of sync with the sort of digital 
worlds conjured in chapter 3. This ontology, finally, is one of the central components 
to ontoepistemological framework I call Ikegamianism. 
 
Chapter 5, Attuning to the Emergent, constitutes the second central component of the 
ontoepistemological framework I call Ikegamianism. Here, I continue my discussion 
from chapter 4 to explore in more detail how Ikegami pushes for a paradigm shift in 
science. That is, in order to attune to and apprehend “massive data flows”, as we saw 
in chapter 4, Ikegami also seeks to outline the contours of what he calls a “new 
epistemology of artificial life” - a new critical framework with which to apprehend, 
and potentially create new meanings of life. This new epistemology, I show, is 
another central part of Ikegamianism. This epistemology relies not on strict scientific 
formalism, but rather on the presence of what Ikegami calls an “internal observer”, 
who, as the subtitle of this chapter suggests, must learn how to “attune to the 
emergent by cultivating a certain kind of embodied, phenomenological sensitivity to 
the yet-to-come, to surprising events, to the emergent. Thus, this epistemology, I want 
to assert in this chapter is not only inextricably tied to the ontology of MDF identified 
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in chapter 4, but it is also a central part of Ikegamianism. What life is, its form and 
meaning, according to Ikegamianism, must be based on the aesthetic judgement of the 
internal observer not on rational judgement.  
 
Chapter 6, Parallax Machines, is the culmination of chapter 4 and 5, centering on 
how Ikegamianism is put to work in practice and in discourse. To illustrate how 
Ikegamianism materializes in what I call parallax machines, I unpack a specific 
cultural event: the anthropoid opera Scary Beauty - the world’s first “android opera” 
featuring Alter, an upper-body android, which is the first “real-world” android to 
“autonomously” conduct a human orchestra. In this final chapter, then, I explore how 
artificial life is by Ikegami considered “larger” than biological life through examining 
the anthropoid Scary Beauty, seeing in this an instance of “collaborative sensing 
practices”. As such, Scary Beauty may be seen as a collaborative human-machine 
sensing practice, by which Alter comes to function as a parallax machine, embodying 
Ikegamianism and inviting the audience of Scary Beauty to adopt what I claim is a 
parallax view of life - a view which is made possible exactly because Alter is 
deliberately constructed to be real and unreal, indeterminate and incomplete. Yet, 
while this is so, I stress that Ikegamianism is simultaneously built into Alter, and as 
such Alter becomes a materialization of Ikegamianism, while also reflecting a 
parallax view of life by synthesizing two seemingly incompatible notions of life, one 
artificial, one biological, without fully resolving them. As such, parallax machines, I 
argue, are both embodiments, materializations and prisms of Ikegamianism by which 
“life” can only be grasped by a kind of parallax view.  
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THE EVOLUTION OF ARTIFICIAL LIFE 
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A silhouette of professor Takashi Ikegami in his office at Komaba Campus, 
University of Tokyo. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Takashi Ikegami on the “evolution of artificial life”. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Introduction: The Evolution of Artificial Life 
 
In a dimly lit conference room at the 7th ELSI International Symposium Public 
Lectures at the Tokyo Institute of Technology (Tokodai), held in November 2018, 
Ikegami opens his lecture with a diagram titled the, “evolution of artificial life”. On a 
timeline spanning from the 1950s to the 2000s, aligned vertically from the top-down, 
forking and curving lines of descent cut down from four seminal “roots”. The 
diagram, subtitled, “four seminal paths to create life”, Ikegami tells the audience, is 
supposed to visually track, in taxonomic fashion, the intellectual lineages of artificial 
life. The “roots” at the top refer to the four “founding fathers”: Grey Walter, Gregory 
Bateson, Alan Turing, and John von Neumann18, each of which have, in their own 
way, highlighted what Ikegami sees as some essential feature or property of life and 
the living. At a glance, the viewer is presented to a diagrammatic branching structure 
that supposedly maps common ancestry of related figures. Bateson’s lineage, for 
example, draws lines of descent down to Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana, 
to Michael Conrad and Evan Thompson, while von Neumann’s lineage cuts down to 
John Conway and Christopher Langton. Shorter branches identify more evolutionarily 
recent convergences, while some stippled horizontal branches display “lateral 
transfers” between the lineages. A couple of months prior to this event, I encountered 
the exact same diagram at another symposium. Ikegami, I discovered during 
fieldwork, often used this diagram to explain to “outsiders” the intellectual roots of 
artificial life, emphasizing that he and his team of researchers were not only working 
in continuation of the four “founding fathers” but they were also on a mission to 
“merge” them.  
 
Notably, Ikegami’s diagram displays lineages of intellectual relatedness, even 
descent, between the “founding fathers” and artificial life’s own path to “create life”. 
As such, it becomes a sort of phylogenetic “model” of the field’s past, threading its 
way into the present. His four-fold, and to me rather intricate, diagram neatly follows 
the logic of taxonomy as if Ikegami was somehow trying to “evolutionize” the history 
                                                
18 Grey Walter (1910-1977), a neurophysiologist, cybernetician and robotician, Gregory Bateson 
(1904-1980), an anthropologist, semiotician and linguist, Alan Turing (1912-1954), a mathematician 
and computer scientist, and finally John von Neumann (1903-1957), also a mathematician and 
computer scientist. 
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of artificial life by mapping ancestry in a phylogenetic idiom in a somewhat Linnaean 
fashion19. Yet, what is “transferred” along these evolutionary lineages is not genes, 
but rather ideas, concepts and possibilities that are meant to reveal artificial life’s 
common ancestry to be somewhat predetermined and codified into a system of 
intellectual genealogy. Still, the lineages do not converge, but rather pan out along 
separate lines of descent, leaving space open for further evolutionary developments, 
ending somewhere on the vertical timeline around 2000. The fact that these lineages 
do not merge or resolve into one another, however, is not a mistake. Rather, I learned, 
it is a deliberate trick to suggest that artificial life’s evolutionary “development” is 
still an ongoing process, and the task at hand for Ikegami and his team of researchers 
is to consolidate all the previous attempts to “create life”.  
 
 
 
When Ikegami explained his diagram to me during fieldwork, he told me that 
artificial life had entered its “third era” – the most recent era and the contemporary 
outgrowth of a longer genealogy of the field. Following along, then, this chapter takes 
its outset from Ikegami’s diagram, and its accompanying discourse, to explore what 
                                                
19 The Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus, sometimes noted to be the “father of taxonomy”, was the one 
who differentiated Plantae and Animalia in 1735, like Ernst Haeckel, who later, in 1866, added Protista 
to Linnaeus’ diagram.  
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Ikegami means by this “third era”. Thus, in this chapter, I deliberately use Ikegami’s 
diagram as a launching pad for unpacking the history of artificial life in order to frame 
how the lab members at the Ikegami Lab are embedded in a longer history of social, 
scientific, intellectual, technical, and historical possibilities. Ikegami’s diagram, then, 
is not only a visual device with which to sketch the genealogy of artificial life, but 
here also an outset to explore, in the words of Ikegami, the “evolution of artificial 
life”.  
 
If Ikegami’s diagram materializes the evolutionary development of a cultural history 
of people and ideas, it does so by explicitly using tropes otherwise found in 
taxonomic practices, such as evolutionary taxonomy, to classify organisms by shared 
and serial descent and degrees of evolutionary change. As such, I want to follow this 
logic to unpack this evolution of artificial life, using Ikegami’s diagram as a sort of 
cursor through which to tell the history of artificial life as going through a series of 
changes. Yet, while the diagram does not explicitly show these changes, it 
nonetheless contributes here to provide an overview of how Ikegami arrived at the 
conclusion that one needs to “construct artificial life in the real world”, a conviction, 
the diagram reveals, which is paved with a slew social, scientific, intellectual, 
technical, and historical possibilities. 
 
In what follows, then, I want to do two things: first, following Ikegami’s own 
narrative, exemplified in his diagram, I want to sketch what constitutes the “first” and 
“second” “eras” in order to establish a backdrop on which to better understand what 
Ikegami means by the “third era”, the era in which they seek to construct artificial life 
in the real world. What I want to argue is that imagining the evolution of artificial life 
in evolutionary terms streamlines the history of artificial life into an unbroken 
continuity between past, present and future (cf. Ssorin-Chaikov 2017). Ikegami’s 
diagram, and its associated discourse, then, is hereby not only exemplary of how the 
lab members ground their claims for the field in a venerable intellectual lineage, but 
also in a genealogy, even an explicitly evolutionary one leading up to the third era. 
Along the way, as I pace through the first, second and third era, I will lay out some of 
essential milestones in the history of artificial life, which are also inherent to the 
enterprise at large. So, while unpacking this narrative, I want to take this opportunity 
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to offer a broader overview of some of the rhetorical, technical and scientific imports 
that have been brought into the Ikegami Lab, imports that underlie much of the 
current work, which I will explore in the following chapters.  
 
Thus, the purpose of this first introductory chapter is two-fold: first, to show how they 
situate their enterprise in an explicitly evolutionary trajectory by which they imagine 
themselves and their work as the outgrowth of this evolution and from where they 
further seek to articulate their own “merged” version of artificial life. Second, I hope 
this will provide a clearer sense of what is at stake among the researchers at the 
Ikegami, who believe that the only way to truly understand what life is and how it 
works is by constructing it in the real world. Now, before unpacking the evolution of 
artificial life, allow me to begin by outlining, from the “bottom-up”, a brief overview 
of the artificial life’s beginnings.  
 
In the Beginning, From the Bottom-Up 
 
The just-so story of artificial life goes, according to the field’s founder, Christopher 
Langton (1989) - a computer scientist holding an undergraduate degree in 
anthropology from the University of Arizona – that the field is a hybrid of computer 
science, theoretical biology and digital gaming devoted to mimicking the logic of 
biology in the virtual worlds of computer simulation and in the hardware realm of 
robotics (Langton 1989; Helmreich 2016). Officially emerging in the late 1980s, 
specifically in 1987, the field was drawn into coherence, by most canonical accounts, 
by Langton himself following a workshop at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
New Mexico, US. In subsequent years, during the 1990s, interest in the field grew 
steadily, attracting scientists of all stripes - from computer science, engineering, 
mathematics, physics, psychology, anthropology, linguistics, etc. – who clustered at 
the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), an institute dedicated to the multidisciplinary study of the 
fundamental principles underlying complex adaptive systems, including physical, 
computational, biological and social systems.  
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This new breed of researchers, naming themselves in analogy to artificial intelligence 
(AI) as “artificial life researchers”, or “Alifers”, began organizing workshops, which 
in turn transformed into an ongoing international series. And with the proliferation of 
artificial life, the practitioners in the field have at least since the late 1980s been 
organizing dozens of international conferences, culminating in 1993 when they made 
their first journal publication dedicated to the work of mimicking the logic of biology 
in the virtual worlds of computer simulation and in the hardware realm of robotics. To 
this day, the small handful of scientists, who originally congregated at the SFI, have 
slowly grown into a small international community with researchers from all over the 
world, based in countries such as the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Belgium etc.  
 
Most prominently, as it began back in the late 1980s, what united this niche 
community of researchers were collective efforts to somehow “simulate” or 
“synthesize”20 the logic of biology in computational media in an attempt to expand 
biology’s purview to include not just “life-as-we-know-it” but also “life-as-it-could-
be” – life is might exist in other materials or elsewhere in the universe (cf. Langton 
1989; Helmreich 2016:4). Artificial life, then, was not built on a curiosity to discern 
the workings of “living organisms” by studying them directly, like biologists usually 
do, but rather, as Langton further assumed, to get at “the dynamic processes that 
constitute life – in whatever material bases they might occur”, upon the belief that 
life, “must share certain universal features – features that will allow us to recognize 
life by it dynamic form alone, without reference to its matter” (Langton 1989:1 my 
emphasis). Thus, as Langton further noted, “life” is no special substance, but rather, 
as he claimed, “a property of the organization of matter, rather than a property of 
matter itself” (Langton 1989:2 my emphasis), a position that offered, anthropologist 
Stefan Helmreich (2016) notes, an extreme Platonism, by which life’s form could be 
completely pried apart from its matter (Helmreich 2016:6). This Platonism, in turn, 
has since become the implicit hallmark of artificial life’s epistemological scaffolding: 
that “life” is less likely, many artificial life researchers claimed, and still claim, a 
                                                
20 The designations “simulation” and “synthesis” have been circulating in epistemological debates 
among artificial life researchers since its beginning, debates revolving around the relation between the 
world and the agent that knows. Such debates have often been encapsulated in the vacillation between 
“strong” and “weak” claims in artificial life, between the idea that artificial life practice “simulates” or 
actually “synthesizes” vitality (cf. Helmreich 2016) 
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property of its matter, but rather the “organization” of matter itself. As we shall also 
see later, this view is shared by the lab members at the Ikegami Lab too.  
 
Now, such efforts may immediately resound Promethean aspirations to create “life” in 
non-organic substrates. And indeed, there are countless of attempts to do so, which 
may be said to precede the field of artificial life itself, for example, as some 
technological experiments in medieval, Renaissance, and Early Modern automata may 
to some degree constitute early examples of “artificial life”. Early attempts to make 
novel life forms, for example, as historian of science Jessica Riskin (2003) notes, may 
be located among figures such as the eighteenth-century French watchmaker, Pierre 
Jacquet-Droz and his sons, who used, “lifelike materials such as leather, cork, and 
papier-mâché to give their machines the softness, lightness, and pliancy of living 
things.” (Riskin 2003:606). Similarly, one may equally locate efforts to make new life 
forms in many literary sources that highlight some of the consequences of such 
Promethean aspirations, for example in stories such as Rabbi Löw’s Golem – an 
assortment of stories about how the golem was brought to life and afterwards 
controlled – Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein; or, the Modern Prometheus - famously 
featuring a jigsaw creature jolted to life with electricity – or the homunculi of the 
medieval alchemist Paracelsus – a story that have given rise to imaginative 
speculations on the quest for artificial life. Such efforts, in a Japanese context, may 
also be traced back to Makoto Nishimura’s “Gakutensoku”, allegedly Japan’s first 
robot built in Osaka in 1928. The name of Nishimura’s newly built robot, made as a 
tribute to Emperor Hirohito’s ascension to the Chrysanthemum Throne, means 
“learning from the laws of nature”, a machine capable of changing its facial 
expressions via springs and gears in its head, puffing its cheeks as if breathing, 
through pneumatically inflatable rubber tubes. 
 
However, while there are plenty of sources that center on humanity’s purported 
cravings to create new life forms, in turn arousing equal measures of skepticism and 
fascination (cf. Whitelaw 2004:2), the field of artificial life may not necessarily be 
directly linked to such stories, wherever one may find it. As anthropologist Stefan 
Helmreich (2016) reminds us, “a search for ancestors carries acute historiographical 
and epistemological dangers,” (Helmreich 2016:36), so that if one simply claims that 
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the notion of synthesizing life can be traced back to stories, such as the Jacquet-Droz 
family, Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein”, or Nishimura’s “Gakutensoku”, one may 
overlook quite recent origins of the very idea of a field of “biology” as such, a field 
that has “life” as its animating object (Helmreich 2016:36). Instead, as Helmreich 
notes, artificial life has many histories, “not all of which are about vitality, or even 
machines” (Helmreich 2016:37). At the Ikegami Lab, though, many of the lab 
members follow the official canon of artificial life.   
 
So, to go back to the just-so story of artificial life, artificial life is basically animated 
by positing that “life” is fully materialistic, involving no “soul” or “vital force”, for 
example, as akin to what philosopher Henri Bergson (1911) called “elán vital”21 
(Bergson 1911). Rather, as Langton claimed, “living organisms are nothing more than 
complex biochemical machines” (Langton 1989:2). Ideas such as these have in large 
parts been inspired by theoretical biologists of different stripes, who, in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s, struggled to offer universal accounts of life and living systems. In 
1974, for example, biologists Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana (1974) 
offered the theory of “autopoiesis”, which posed that organismic integrity and form 
could be understood in and through the dynamics of self-organization (Varela et. al. 
1974). Biological life and living organisms, what they called “living systems”, were 
self-organizing, biochemical machines that dynamically reproduce and sustain their 
internal regulation and boundaries to the external world (Varela et. al. 1974). In other 
words, they offered an account – and a hugely popular one – based most prominently 
on living systems as self-organized form.  
 
                                                
21 Elán vital is a term coined by philosopher Henri Bergson in his book Creative Evolution from 1911, 
in which he addresses the question of self-organization and spontaneous morphogenesis of things. 
While such issues are also highly pertinent to artifiical life researchers, who also concern themselves 
with questions about self-organization and morphogenesis, elán vital is a hypothetical explantion for 
how evolution and the development of organisms are closely linked to conscinouness, which Bergson 
defines as the initutive perception of experience and the flow of inner time (Bergson 1911). 
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Others, for example, such as the biologist Brian Goodwin (1994), in his book How the 
Leopard Changed Its Spots, attempted to tackle similar questions about life’s form 
asking, “why life is capable of such diversity and beauty of forms while at the same 
time revealing an underlying unity” (Goodwin 1994:31-32). To this question, 
Goodwin answered that, “organisms can take any form, have any color, and eat any 
food, subject only to very broad constraints that are basically due to physical and 
chemical laws” (Goodwin 1994:87). Goodwin thus maintained, analogous to Varela 
and Maturana, that living systems, or living form, are basically entities that are 
continuously engaged in the process of generating forms and transforming them by 
means of their particular qualities of action and agency in time and space (cf. 
Goodwin 1994; Varela et. al. 1974).  
 
However, what Langton meant by the idea that living organisms were nothing more 
than complex biochemical machines, following theorists such as Maturana, Varela 
and Goodwin, to name only a few, was that “life” was not simply a formal complex 
structure, but rather a dynamic structure, active in time and space. For the artificial 
life researchers during the 1980s and the 1990s, then, the “universal features” of life 
were to be found in its abstract dynamic processes as occurring in any “material 
bases”, in turn offering fidelity to the idea that “life” is that which cuts across any 
given material substrate, biological, computational, artificial. But this also came to 
mean for many artificial life researchers that “life” would most strongly manifest in 
“behaviors”, “actions”, and “performances” (cf. Helmreich 2016), rather than in static 
material objects. In turn, this gave way for the possibility for creating such dynamic 
structures, often involving flexible, dynamic, and tightly controllable artificial 
mediums, in the virtual domains of computational media. That is, in the simplest of 
terms, that the structures and patterns of life, as dynamically active in time and space, 
came to be replicable and reproducible in software, in silico (Helmreich 1998).  
 
In this sense, living things, according to the claims made by artificial life researchers 
at the time, were thought of as complex dynamic systems that in turn came to inform 
the methodologies of artificial life. The field’s focus on the “simulation” or 
“synthesis” of such dynamic systems, in part, lead them to adopt a so-called “bottom-
up” approach, an approach that assumes that higher-order entities, ranging from 
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molecules to biospheres, arise from, and are the results of, the dynamic interactions of 
lower-order entities (Lansing 2002; Lansing 2003). For example, if a human being is 
considered to be complex dynamic system, it may well be higher-order entity, as the 
aggregate sum of its parts, with its body the culmination of molecules and tissues. The 
bottom-up approach, then, is thereby strongly aligned to theories often formulated and 
found in fields such as complex systems science, a kind of science that regards the 
complex dynamics of living things, including nonliving things, across all scales and 
sizes, as phenomena that basically arise from the interaction of multitudes of smaller 
components (cf. Johnston 2008). Complex systems science, slipping into the domain 
of artificial life, is readily apparent, for example, when Langton asserts that, “natural 
life emerges out of the organized interactions of a greater number of nonliving 
molecules, with no global controller responsible for the behavior of every part” 
(Langton 1989:2). Now, allow me to briefly take a detour through artificial life’s 
strong alignments to the sciences of complexity, to better pin down the 
epistemological scaffolding of the field itself.  
 
Complex Dynamic Systems 
 
Anthropologist Stephen J. Lansing (2003), who has written extensively on complex 
systems, notes that, “the study of complex adaptive systems, a subset of nonlinear 
dynamical systems, has recently become a major focus of interdisciplinary research in 
the social and natural sciences” (Lansing 2003:183). Artificial life is no exception, as 
a field whose basic approach in thinking about living systems, as Lansing further 
points out, is strongly aligned to complex systems science (Lansing 2002). 
Furthermore, Lansing adds, the nonlinear thinking of complex systems science has 
not only slipped into the field of artificial life, but also begun to slip into other fields, 
for example, such as economy or neuroscience. Concomitantly with artificial life 
researchers starting to think about living systems as complex dynamic systems, i.e. as 
higher-order composites of low-level interactions, Lansing also describes how 
researchers in other fields, who have become inspired by the theories of complex 
systems science, have begun to realize that economies, for example, like ecosystems, 
operate largely according to the same principles. Thus, as Lansing sees, complex 
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systems scientists may well assert that ecosystems and economies function analogous 
to, say, biological ecosystems in the way they “evolve” according to nonlinear 
principles (Lansing 2002; Lansing 2003). 
 
Such kind of thinking provides ways to draw parallels and fresh analogies between 
domains otherwise thought to function according to incommensurable logics and/or 
principles. For example, the theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman (1995), who has 
also been attracted to the work of artificial life, has drawn an explicit parallel between 
biological and economic systems, writing that, “the modern corporation is a 
collectively self-sustaining structure of roles and obligations that ‘lives’ in an 
economic world, exchanges signals and stuffs, and survives or dies in ways at least 
loosely analogous to those of E. coli […] Both E. coli and IBM coevolve in their 
respective worlds (Kauffman 1995:300)22. What Kauffman’s example highlights is the 
focus on complex dynamic systems of various types arising from the “bottom-up”, an 
understanding the sees the private corporation IBM, the bacteria Escherichia coli, and 
living systems, whether biological or artificial, as results of low-level interactions and 
dynamics. Yet, such complex dynamic systems are not reducible to their parts, nor are 
they, as Langton suggests, governed by a “global controller”, thus they are non-linear. 
In turning to this nomenclature, artificial life founded much of its reputation on a 
bottom-up approach that begins at the bottom, viewing an organism, for example, as a 
large population of simple machines, and from there works upwards, in a synthetic 
way, which means to construct large aggregates of simple, rule-governed objects 
which interact with one another non-linearly in the support of “lifelike”, global 
dynamics (cf. Langton 1989). 
 
Meanwhile, though, as artificial life researchers claimed to replicate the logic of 
biology on artificial media, working upward from the bottom-up, many of 
                                                
22 I want to add an anecdote from my fieldwork here, as many of the lab members were reading 
popular science books to make claims, for example, for the ways social networks on social media 
platforms tend to mimic the rules and functions of biological life. The Social Organism – a book by 
entrepreneurs Oliver Luckett and Michael J. Casey (2016), makes the claim that in sharing and 
replicating packets of information known as memes, the world’s social media users are facilitating 
evolutionary process just like the transfer of genetic information in living things. They argue that 
memes are the basic building blocks of our culture, “our social DNA”, they write (Luckett & Casey 
2016). Many of the lab members were enamored by such analogies.  
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practitioners became enamored by the notion of “emergence” 23, a concept holding 
many, sometimes mutually exclusive meanings, but often meant to explain, in 
artificial life circles at least, the crucial leap complex dynamic systems make from 
nonlife to life (cf. Whitelaw 2004). As such, emergence is what happens by way of 
simple components interacting to produce complex “lifelike” behaviors. In turning to 
emergence, then, some artificial life researchers began seeing complex dynamic 
systems as “emergent phenomena”, which denotes phenomena capable of displaying 
unexpected and surprising properties that cannot easily be predicted in advance of its 
own unfolding. For example, in some accounts of artificial life, emergence has been 
said to be found in multicellular organisms (Furusawa & Kaneko 1998), in the 
surprising appearance of small-scale societies (Read 2003), in the formal features of 
complex systems theories (Kubik 2003), and even from simulation results (Ronald et. 
al. 1999). Still, to this day, some of the most popular examples emergence in artificial 
life systems can be found in John Conway’s “gliders”, in his model Game of Life, or 
the flocking behaviors of Craig Reynold’s boid-model, which have been said to 
display emergent behaviors (Johnston 2008). In short, just as artificial life researchers 
began to claim that the behaviors of complex dynamic systems “emerge” in surprising 
ways from the interactions of nonliving parts and circumstances, they simultaneously 
began recreating such processes in artificial media, most commonly in computational 
media, so that an assemblage of simple computational parts interact to spontaneously 
produce “lifelike” dynamic structures.  
 
Much of this thinking, I want to make clear by now, is being recycled at the Ikegami 
Lab, notably apparent in their claim that, “life is an emergent phenomenon”. Yet, to 
further exemplify this field-founding “bottom-up” approach, as it also pertains to 
emergence, and the claim that “life is an emergent phenomenon”, which are central 
                                                
23 Much of artificial life’s reputation was founded on the idea of emergence, as the field’s founder 
Christopher Langton (1989) noted in the late 1980s, “The key concept in Artificial Life is emergent 
behavior”, seeing that, “natural life emerges out of the organized interactions of a great number of 
nonliving molecules, with no global controller responsible for the behavior of every part. Rather, every 
part is a behavor itself, and life is the behavior that emerges from out of all the local interactions among 
individual behavors.” (Langton 1989:2-3, my emphasis). However, while the notion of emergence is 
appealing, at least to artificial life researchers, it is also extremely tricky, as cultural theorist Mitchell 
Whitelaw sees, “part of the appeal of emergence as a concept is that it defies clear definition. Its 
function in a-life discourse often seems to be a form of antiexplanation, a vague answer blocking off 
further investigation.” (Whitelaw 2004:217).  
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concepts to artificial life and to the Ikegami Lab itself, it might serve to show how the 
methodologies and approaches within the field of artificial life differentiate from, say, 
methodologies and approaches in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). While 
artificial life is named in analogy to artificial intelligence, it does not, unlike AI, 
promise to provide a fully formalized account of “intelligence”, but rather promises to 
articulate a fully formalized account of “life” (cf. Helmreich 2016). As such, artificial 
life, even to this day, frequently tends to define and present itself against the failures 
of AI. For example, as Langton explains, in focusing on “intelligence”, the underlying 
mechanisms of which are poorly understood, according to Langton, AI is left without 
a “model” to follow, thus resorting to “serial computer programming” that carries, 
“no demonstrable relationship to the method by which intelligence is generated in 
natural systems” (Langton 1989). In other words, AI, unlike artificial life, fails at 
pointing out its referent, as AI-systems are not, Langton contends, based on or related 
to any referent in the biological domain.  
 
Moreover, a more distinctive marker of difference between the two fields is found, 
perhaps, by AI’s drive to make computer programs or “expert systems” that can 
“think” from the “top-down”, which is often conflated with the ability to solve very 
complex tasks. That is, if artificial life’s “bottom-up” approach deals with “behaviors” 
and “structures” that “emerge” from the “bottom-up”, which, as Langton claims, 
makes them stay “true to natural life,” following key insights that “nature is 
fundamentally parallel”, AI does the opposite. If natural systems are complex 
aggregates of parts, each of which has its own behavioral repertoire, behavior arises 
out of parallel operation of these parts. Or, as science studies scholar John Johnston 
(2008) puts it, “the real questions”, for artificial life researchers, “are how global 
properties and behaviors emerge in a system from the interactions of computational 
‘primitives’ that behave according to simple rules and how these systems are 
enchained in dynamic hierarchies that allow complexity to build on complexity.” 
(Johnston 2008:13 my emphasis). In contrast, then, the top-down approach pursued 
by AI, following the logics of artificial life, does not allow complexity to be built 
from simplicity, nor does it allow complexity to build upon complexity; AI, in other 
words, tries to make complexity simple, working from the top-down.  
Now, much of this sort of thinking, including those formal methodologies, strategies 
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and techniques, I want to foreshadow here, have also slipped into how the lab 
members at the Ikegami Lab think and talk about their work and their object of 
inquiry, “life”. This should also become readily apparent throughout this thesis, but 
for now, however, since artificial life has many histories, to go back to Helmreich, I 
simply want to outline how Ikegami and the lab members tell their own history of 
their field, a story, in which artificial life is neatly segmented into three so-called 
“eras”: the computer era, the chemical era, and the current “third era. 
 
The Computer Era 
 
When artificial life first “emerged”, one might say, largely concomitantly with the 
mass-distribution of the personal computer (PC), practitioners in the field began 
developing, adopting and implementing a slew of formal methodologies, strategies 
and techniques that apply to their thinking about life and living systems as complex 
dynamic systems. This repertoire of tools, perhaps needless to say, is not fixed or 
static, as we shall also see in this thesis, but rather dynamic and changeable. But 
according to Ikegami, the first set of formal methodologies, strategies and techniques 
were developed during what he refers to is the “computer era”, an era, he says, “when 
artificial life began working with computer simulations”. In order to sketch what this 
first era entails, I here want to sketch three essential techniques that are endemic to 
the computer era, techniques that have been applied to simulate and/or synthesize 
aspects or properties of life, such as homeostasis or evolution. Central to these 
techniques are, of course, computational media as the era’s name also entails, as a 
core component for either simulating or synthesizing some feature or property of life 
and the living.  
 
The first technique is known as genetic algorithms (GA), a central technique to 
simulate biological genetics on digital computation, commonly associated with 
computer scientist John Holland (1992), who, in 1960, based GA’s on the concept of 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. Basically, a GA involves a “genotype” – the 
genetic constitution of an individual organism – which is a string of code specifying a 
“phenotype” – a set of observable characteristics of an individual resulting from the 
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interaction of its genotype with the environment. The phenotype can be any digital 
artifact or thing, for example such as an artificial organism, a three-dimensional form, 
or simply a piece of software. By simulating the genetic variations caused, say, by 
sexual reproduction and mutation, a GA changes the genotype and the phenotype, but 
since this process is computationally and algorithmically specified, rather than 
biological as such, breeding happens at an accelerated rate. Thus, with GA’s, wide 
ranges of possible phenotypes can be generated, which are typically evaluated for 
their “fitness”, based on some formal criteria. In functional applications of GA’s, 
which are capable of accelerating processes of evolution, they are applied, for 
example, to find solutions to complex problems by searching within a wide range of 
possible outcomes.  
 
For a concrete example of GA’s, Holland developed Echo – a simulation tool to 
investigate mechanisms, which regulate diversity and information-processing in 
systems comprised of many interacting “adaptive” agents. Echo-agents, according to 
Holland, interact via combat, trade and mating, and in doing so, develop strategies to 
ensure survival in resource-limited environments. Thus, Echo basically consists of a 
flat spatial expanse on which a number of simple agents – “Echo-agents” – are 
distributed across specific sites, like pieces on a game board, with each agent 
possessing certain attributes defined by “tags” and “conditions” inscribed in its 
“chromosomes”. This, in turn, enables it to interact in the ways described above: 
fight, trade or mate. These simple rules of interaction, Holland proposes, give rise to 
complex behaviors among the agents, including, ecological phenomena (e.g. mimicry 
and biological arms race), immune system responses (e.g. interactions conditioned on 
identification), evolution of metazoans (e.g. emergent hierarchical organization), and 
economic phenomena (e.g. trading complexes and the evolution of ‘money’) (Holland 
1992)24.  
 
                                                
24 Holland’s Echo-platform has been variously described and discussed by many authors in science 
studies, such as Stefan Helmreich (1998) and John Johnston (2008). Helmreich, for example, shows 
how Holland’s agent-based system, Echo, reinscribes or materializes a particular culturally specific 
model of the subject, namely the self-determining, competitive, “formally equal” individual formed by 
Western liberal political theory (Helmreich 1998:166). Moreover, since the only interactions between 
agents in Echo are trading, combat and mating, Helmreich concludes that Echo is “extraordinarily 
gendered,” and the Echo-agent as resembling, “a masculine individual that masquerades as a universal 
organism” (Helmreich 1998:168).  
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The second technique, following, in part, from the first, is agent-based systems, which 
often also apply to GA’s. Agent-based systems model individuals interacting in a 
digital world with behaviors that may be as “basic” as “eating” or “breeding”, or as 
“sophisticated” as “communicating” or “cooperating”. What some artificial life call 
“population dynamics” may thereby emerge, such as fluctuating predator-prey 
balances or, as Holland also suggests, trading complexes. But what is significant 
about agent-based systems, which is a core component to much of the work of 
artificial life, is that the “agents” in these digital worlds may “evolve”, so that 
phenomena such as “speciation” – that is, the formation of new and distinct species in 
course evolution – or “interbreeding” – breeding between different “species” – may 
occur. Agent-based systems, then, do not necessarily involve GA’s, yet they exhibit 
some of artificial life’s basic tendencies to view things from the bottom-up.  
  
Craig Reynold’s boid model from 1986 - an artificial life simulation used as an 
example of emergent behaviors, in which the complexity of “boids” arise from the 
interactions of individual agents adhering to a set of simple rules – is an example of 
an agent-based system. Simply put, in Reynold’s model, “flocking” agents, called 
boids in analogy to birds, follow simple rules for moving through space with each 
boid seeking to maintain a certain distance from the others while still moving 
forward. The result is the spontaneous formation of a flock of boids, with a supple 
coherence, yet chaotic dynamics, resembling that of “real life” flocks or shoals. The 
point is that such an architecture has no central controller, with the kind of behavior, 
such as flocking, “emerging” in interaction with the absence of some governing 
entity. Such kinds of agent-based systems, like Reynold’s flocking algorithm, has, for 
example, allowed Langton to make an essential point about the “ontological status of 
various levels of behavior in such systems,” namely, that even though boids are not 
real birds, “flocking Boids and flocking birds are two instances of the same 
phenomenon: flocking.” (Langton in Johnston 2008:179).  
 
The third and final technique that I want to include here is cellular automata (CA), 
which ties up the local-global transitions (that is, the bottom-up approach) of the two 
previous examples into a purely formal domain. A CA is a model that consists of a 
regular lattice-grid of “cells”, each one of a finite number of “states”, such as “on” or 
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“off”, while the grid itself can be in any finite number of dimensions. For each cell, a 
set of cells called its “neighborhood” is defined relative to the specified cell. In such a 
model, an array of logical cells, then, is computed with a set of simple rules for how 
each cell’s future state is affected by the current states of its neighbors. Or, put 
differently, CA’s allow for making “self-reproducing” loops, as each cell in the CA’s 
lattice-grid is a finite automaton whose state-transition table is defined by a single set 
of rules applied homogenously across the lattice itself. In this sense, the rules 
constitute, artificial life researchers say, the “physics” of a discrete, purely formal, 
space/time universe.  
 
The best known, and most studied, CA is perhaps mathematician John Horton 
Conway’s Game of Life – a zero-player game, in which its “evolution” is determined 
by its initial state, and not by the “player” or its “creator”, requiring no further input 
from this state. In other words, The Game of Life is “reproducing” itself, not 
depending on some “outside” perturbation or force once it has been initiated from its 
initial state. The universe of the Game of Life is an infinite two-dimensional 
orthogonal grid of square cells, each of which is in one or two possible states: “dead” 
or “alive”, or, “populated” and “unpopulated”, respectively. Thus, cell formations 
emerge and disintegrate, oscillate and disperse across the two-dimensional orthogonal 
grid, as every cell interacts with its neighbors, as cells travel horizontally, vertically or 
diagonally adjacent to one another. Conway’s Game of Life, for example, has often 
been marshalled to offer visual evidence of how simple rules can generate complex 
patterns, that is, to show how the “emergence” of complexity arises from simplicity, 
or how lifelike dynamics arise from formal rules. As such, the Game of Life has been 
frequently invoked in arguments for the merits of the artificial life, especially in 
advocating for its bottom-up approach. Indeed, certain of its configurations have 
proven to some to be computationally universal (equivalent of Turing machines25), 
meaning that they can be used to implement any finite algorithm and evaluate any 
computable function (Johnston 2008:10).  
                                                
25 A Turing Machine, named after the famous mathematician Alan Turing, is a mathematical model of 
computation that defines an, “abstract machine”, which manipulates symbols on a strip of tape 
according to a table of rules. It was, in part, used to demonstrate that despite the model’s simplicity, 
given any computer algorithm, that Turing machines are capable of simulating that the logic of 
algorithms can be constructed, and thus a conceptual forerunner to the modern computer. (Johnston 
2008:8) 
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Now, while this first era, the “computer era”, brought significant technical and 
conceptual resources to the field of artificial life, including to lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab, who recycle many of these techniques, it “did not really,” Ikegami 
notes, “capture the essential part of what life is because even though you can mimic 
something: the forms, the appearance, and so on, on a computer, you still cannot 
make it in the real world. The real world is more complex than the level of complexity 
one finds in a computer, so complexity is something that is higher in the real world 
compared to a computer world. And while a computer can generate very high levels 
of complexity, the complexity is different from what you see in the real world.” Thus, 
in the course of the evolutionary trajectory of artificial life, the “computer era,” 
according to Ikegami, has mutated into the “second era”, an era he calls the “chemical 
era”. In this era, artificial life researchers, and synthetic biologists, alike began to play 
around with test tubes, petri dishes, microscopes and soldering techniques.  
 
The Chemical Era 
 
In the “chemical era”, many of the formal methodologies, strategies and techniques 
developed during the “computer era”, are recycled and slightly rearranged. However, 
what has changed is the “body”, or the “medium”, by which, and through which, 
artificial life researchers have tried to harness some formal property of life. In other 
words, the repertoire of logics used to think about life and the living, as those we saw 
in the computer era, remain somewhat intact, whereas the material mediums, by 
which practitioners have been trying to simulate or synthesize whatever aspect these 
they associate with life, have been replaced. Rather than using computational media, 
artificial life researchers here use carbon-based lipids or amino acids, to name only a 
few, that is, “wetware” materials that are put together in diverse configurations in 
order to further investigations of issues relating to the topics such as the “origins of 
life”, “autonomy”, “reproduction” and “evolution”, and more. It was at that time, as 
Ikegami says, “synthetic biology became less costly, and it was at that time we began 
playing around with chemical droplets that could move autonomously,” to which he 
concludes, “this became the second era.” The second era, or the “chemical era,” as 
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Ikegami names it, heralded fresh attempts not only at simulating, but at actually 
synthetizing (that is here providing a physical “body” to), artificial “living” cells, 
which also became known as the “wetlife approach” (Johnston 2008:270).  
 
This shift in orientation, nonetheless, builds on an extensive body of research, in part 
from research conducted during the computer era, that has sought to understand the 
transition from nonliving states to living states, or how living matter “emerges” or 
comes-into-being from nonliving matter. Such a process, many artificial life 
researchers wonder, may potentially explain the “origins of life”, which also means 
that much of the research in the chemical era has been geared towards questions 
concerning how life basically took hold on the planet we often call “Earth”. But what 
makes such “wetlife approaches”, and associated research agendas, differ from 
computational experimentation - specifically of the sort pursued in the computer era - 
is the aim to synthesize, i.e. construct, artificial cells in laboratory experiments, 
despite the fact that these are different from any known form of life and therefore 
might not even recapitulate life’s actual origins (Rasmussen et.al. 2004:85). Such yet-
to-be-constructed artificial life forms, or cells, have sometimes been referred to as 
“protocells” or “protobionts” – self-organized, endogenously ordered, spherical 
collections of lipids26.  
 
For example, the bacterium Mycoplasme genitalium is believed to contain the 
smallest genome for a self-replicating organism, and has thereby become a candidate 
for exploring a minimal gene set. Moreover, it has been estimated that the bacterium 
requires only about 300 of its 517 genes to function properly, which means that it can 
remain “alive” even after much of its genome has been eliminated. For 
biotechnologist and geneticist John Craig Venter and microbiologist Hamilton O. 
Smith, for example, this exact feature of the Mycoplasme genitalium has made it an 
especially enticing object of protocell research (cf. Gillis 2012). In their own research 
                                                
26 It is generally agreed-upon, however, still shrouded in controversy, that in order for a cell to be 
“living” it must be capable of regenerating itself, replicating and evolving, and that the processes by 
which this accomplished are located together within a single membrane, which thus constitutes a single 
entity: a cell. This consensus rests, in turn, on the further hypothesis that “natural” living cells are the 
smallest unit of “unquestionable” life, so that it constitutes a distinct threshold. More precisely, and to 
the point, a natural living cell is composed of separable molecular processes that are not in themselves 
alive, or at least not considered to be, yet when these processes come together they result in what we 
might call a living cell (cf. Johnston 2008). I also want to add here how such assumptions, although 
controversial, implicitly builds on ideas otherwise found in complex systems science.  
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on protocells, Venter and Smith have tried to remove the genome from a bacterium 
and then injecting into its nucleus an artificial string of genes, which resembles a 
naturally occurring chromosome. Doing so, Venter and Smith are hoping that the cell 
will not only survive, but also evolve into a new kind of cell equipped with new 
capabilities. Such a project may be said to be lodged somewhere between a top-down 
and a bottom-up approach in using “living” cells to make new, if not artificial, then 
quasi-living cells of sorts. This is, in effect, not a sort of reverse engineering, since it 
Mycoplasme genitalium is not “man-made”, yet it may count as a mode of “stripping” 
down natural compounds to their simplest elements to potentially reveal new 
functions.  
 
In one, albeit more ambitious project concerning protocells, Ikegami himself, and his 
friend chemist Martin Hanczyc, have developed what they call a first cell as opposed 
to a minimal cell27. While there is no solid consensus about what a protocell really is, 
and whether or not protocells really exist, some claim that a protocell must constitute 
a minimal form of life and/or meet some generally recognized biological life criteria. 
If these requirements are not met, protocells simply do not exist. Meanwhile, one 
might say, such disagreements themselves suggest that debates about protocells are 
definitional and conceptual tugs-of-war, since life scientists do not even agree on 
what the criteria should be to begin with. However, Ikegami and Hanczyc (who both 
call themselves artificial life researchers), perhaps needless to say, are not beholden to 
any biological definition of a protocell. In bypassing biological criteria, they suggest 
protocells already exist, and that they exist as primordial molecular globules formed 
from both organic and inorganic compounds, which are capable of self-organization 
and dynamic behavior. Protocells, according to Ikegami and Hanczyc, then, do not 
simply reproduce minimal, biological life, but are self-organizing processes subject to 
the laws of physics and chemistry. They are, in other words, terrestrial agents that 
possess some, but not all, of the properties of biological life, but that does not mean 
they do not exist. Nor does it mean that protocells should be evaluated according to 
the logics and criteria of biology. Their first cell, they argue, is the first “true 
                                                
27 A minimal cell is also called an “artificial cell”, which is an engineered particle that mimics one or 
several functions of a biological cell. However, the term does not really refer to a physical entity, but 
rather to the idea that certain functions or structures of biological cells can be replaced and/or 
supplemented with a synthetic entity. The first cell, developed by Ikegami and Hanczyc, by contrast, is 
a physical entity as well as an idea.  
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embodiment of artificial life” – a sort of artificial or synthetic life form built from the 
bottom-up, unlike the Mycoplasme genitalium of Venter and Smith – “that is an 
orthologous departure from the one familiar type of biological life” (Hanczyc 
2014:1038).  
 
What is at stake in this latter example, in contrast to the former, is precisely the issue 
of constructing artificial cells from scratch, out of nonliving organic and inorganic 
materials. Or, put differently, whereas Venter and Smith are removing some of the 
genome from a pathogenic bacterium, although with the aim of producing something 
new, Ikegami and Hanczyc attempt to construct the newly new from the very 
beginning, out of nonliving materials. This distinction is important, as I hope will also 
become apparent throughout this thesis, since it marks one of the central aims of the 
Ikegami Lab: to build new “living” things from scratch, from the bottom-up.  
 
However, in the case of the first cell, one of the main problems in doing so, for 
example, is that the mechanisms of cellular metabolism and replication, with ensuing 
heritable variation, including self-organization and dynamic behavior, must somehow 
be made to self-assemble in the same confined space, so that such processes remain 
stored in the same physical container. Besides the experiment conducted by Ikegami 
and Hanczyc, however, there are several research programs afoot that are attempting 
to create a fully functional protocell, attempts that are characteristic of what Ikegami 
means by the chemical era.  
 
The Third Era 
 
Ikegami summarizes the third era as such, “first it was all about computer 
programming. Then it became about chemical experiments, but now, in the third era, 
artificial life has become a new technology. Developing this new kind of technology 
is not about optimization in the sense that it is about making everyday life easier, 
neither is about automatization of human activities, such as cleaning or office work, 
but about autonomy, and about creating things that can interact with the world in new 
ways.” This is essential to the third era, according to Ikegami, and not only that, it is 
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essential to the work of the Ikegami Lab, work that pushes the inventions of artificial 
life out of their digital prisons, into the “real world”, which is, as Ikegami asserts, “not 
just about words and theory, but about making hands-on experimentation. If 
programming affords you to understand what life is from actually programming it, the 
same goes for working with test tubes, microscopes, chemicals and robots.”   
 
The third era, according to Ikegami, was primarily set in motion through what he calls 
a series of “technological revolutions”, starting in 2008 and picking up pace from 
2010. In contrast to the futurist Ray Kurzweil, who spelled out the date of 
“Singularity” (or technological singularity) to the year 2045 - a revolutionary moment 
signaling a time when “machine intelligence” becomes irreversibly more powerful 
than “all human intelligence” combined - Ikegami rather sees these technological 
revolutions to be a series of events sparking, in more or less accidental succession of 
one another, the moment of Singularity. As Ikegami clarifies, “the past decade or so 
has seen a revolution in terms of the amounts of data that can be handled 
computationally, and the effects this has on science. This revolution began to gather 
speed around 2010 or so, and is ongoing now.” According to one of the most popular 
accounts of Singularity hypothesis, the so-called “intelligence explosion”, an 
“intelligent agent” will eventually enter a “runaway reaction” of self-improvement 
cycles that ultimately result in the agent’s own self-reproduction. And this “runaway 
reaction”, is implicitly embedded in what Ikegami associates with the third era, and 
era, when technologies that are constructed in the real world may potentially, Ikegami 
says, “try to escape us”. I will return to how this shapes up in practice later on in this 
thesis. 
 
But for now, it serves to say that the third era has brought with it a proliferation of 
new technologies, Ikegami believes, which are fundamentally and necessarily 
provoking scientists to develop new ways to see the world. But new technologies, 
Ikegami thinks, also provide new opportunities and possibilities for experimentation, 
which are to Ikegami summarized in physicist and network scientist Albert-László 
Barabási’s (2011) book with the bombastic title Bursts: The Hidden Pattern Behind 
Everything We Do. To Barabási, the digital reality of our world, from mobile phones 
to the Internet and email, has turned society into a huge research laboratory. 
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Electronic trails of time stamped texts, voicemails, Internet searches, and more, 
Barabási observes, add up to a previously unavailable massive data set of statistics 
that track our movement, out decisions, and our lives (Barabási 2011). Thus, new 
technologies and our new digital reality reveal to us, Barabási writes, “how our 
nakedness in the face of increasingly penetrating digital technologies creates an 
immense research laboratory that, in size, complexity, and detail, surpasses 
everything that science has encountered before.” (Barabási 2011:10). And so, to keep 
with the language of taxonomy, Ikegami takes note that a series of “transmutations” 
have increasingly been turning our world into a massive, large-scale laboratory in the 
period between 2008 and 2012, transmutations that have fundamentally changed and 
altered our possibilities for conducting new research.  
The ideas of both Kurzweil and Barabási, then, illustrate perfectly how Ikegami 
imagines the third era, in which new technologies may 1) “try to escape us” in the 
sense that they gain the capacity for self-reproduction and reach a level of intelligence 
surpassing humans, and 2) fundamentally change how we do science altogether. And 
so, Ikegami further segments this series of technological revolutions or transmutations 
into three classes.  
The first class of events is the so-called, “Big Data Revolution”, Ikegami tells me, 
which essentially sprung from when an algorithm, made by the tech-company Google, 
solved the Rubik’s Cube in 20 moves. This opened many discussions between 
scientists about “God’s Algorithm” - the idea that algorithms may function as 
omniscient things that would know an optimal step from any given configuration. For 
30 years or so, mathematicians had been grappling to solve the famous cube puzzle, 
concluding that the minimum number of moves required to complete the task was 22. 
While a popular mind-boggling pastime for some, for example Ikegami himself, the 
mystery of the Rubik’s cube had for long undergone sustained mathematical analysis. 
But nevertheless, God’s Algorithm is indicative to Ikegami that we entered a new era. 
Then, in 2010, when a team of computer scientists and mathematicians gained access 
to Google’s supercomputers, they found that the minimum number of moves for any 
of the 43 quadrillion Rubik’s position was really a surprising 20. This result, Ikegami 
argues, is a reflection of the, “emergence of new technological capabilities in the last 
decade that are changing the world”. “I was knocked out by this Rubik’s Cube”, he 
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continues, “you don’t need group theory or any beautiful mathematical equation, but 
just a big table to solve it”. What God’s Algorithm specially reveals to Ikegami is that 
machines are not restricted to the same physical constraints and thus do not need to 
solve, say, a Rubik’s Cube, according to the same scheme as human beings. 
Machines, then, may be made to operate somehow like God’s Algorithm in the sense 
that they are directly socialized, communicating without the mediation of language or 
even sensorial experience. And this is also related to Ikegami’s notion of technologies 
“escaping us”, which leads him to propose, “So, I think humans are the bottleneck. In 
science, we don’t necessarily need human beings for understanding things. Humans 
need equations to understand what goes on, right? But computers do not. Big data to 
big data. Computers don’t need to be visual either, they don’t have eyes, but humans 
have to visualize the data. So, visualization and writing down equations is always the 
bottleneck, but after 2008, we really need to rethink about how we understand such 
phenomena.” What Ikegami is after is that we reconsider how to understand our world 
once more, especially when new technologies change the dynamics of our world.   
Now, included in his first-class series of revolutionary events, Ikegami also points to 
Deb Roy’s “SpeecHome” project - a project involving the creation of an algorithm 
capable of tracking the development and context of words and phrases across time. 
Deb Roy, a computer scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media 
Lab (MIT), had just prior to his son’s birth in 2009 installed eleven video cameras and 
fourteen microphones in his own home. The recordings were streamed to his 
basement and stored on a terabyte capacity disc array. With this system installed in 
his own home for over 3 years, every cry and giggle, diaper change, each chat or spat 
between Deb and his wife, were recorded and stored in more than 250,000 hours of 
video. The aim: Roy wanted to capture the whole process of his son’s language 
acquisition. But while there had been previous studies, based on anecdotal theory, 
about the developmental processes of children, none had involved, like Roy’s project, 
a longitudinal study with systematic recordings of a child’s everyday life.  
Roy’s SpeecHome project offers to Ikegami similar evidence that algorithms can 
indeed operate to solve complex problems on their own. Furthermore, SpeecHome 
also echoes Barabási’s idea of turning the world into one big laboratory, as electronic 
trails, tracks and recordings provide us with a previously unavailable massive data set 
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of statistics by which we may track and analyze our movement, our decisions, and our 
lives, including how children learn, as in the case of Roy. Indeed, to the complexity-
minded Ikegami, the results of the SpeecHome project reinforces his conviction that, 
“language acquisition does not only happen in one’s brain, but it is distributed in the 
space-time dynamics of a baby, care takers and the house layout. And this study [Deb 
Roy] also suggests that enormous datasets, including non-typical and those used 
anecdotally, are needed for unraveling complex phenomena.” 
Lastly, still in the first-class, in the “Big Data Revolution”, Ikegami looks to 
biophysicist Philipp Keller’s lab, the European Molecular Biology Laboratory 
(EMBL), in which Keller and his colleagues have combined a technique called “light-
sheet microscopy” with novel computational strategies to record early cell division, 
cell migration, and the emergence of early structures in embryos. In somewhat similar 
ways to Roy’s self-recording SpeecHome, Keller’s new laser monitoring system 
visually tracks and records the actual development process, not of a human child, but 
of a zebra fish, from the 64-cell stage to the 16,384-cell stage. And so, the actual 
cellular development of living things may be recorded and tracked in microscopic 
detail just like anything else in a global laboratory.  
Now, to go a little fast, the second class of revolutions, according to Ikegami, refers to 
the “Software Revolution”, which he associates with Geoffrey Hinton’s “deep belief 
network”, a generative graphical model with which to train a neural network to 
probabilistically reconstruct inputs to perform indexing tasks such as classification. In 
other words, deep belief networks can be “trained” to perform certain tasks to become 
a sort of unsupervised machine learning model, which can assemble results based on 
more or less random inputs and iterative processes. Included in this second class is 
also Sakamoto’s blockchain technology, a recording technology chaining blocks 
through using cryptography. Blockchain technology, in its simplest of terms, is a 
time-stamped series of immutable record of data that is managed by a cluster of 
computers not owned by any single person or enitity. Each “block” of data is secured 
and bound to each other using cryptographic principles (i.e. “chain”), which allows 
for digital information not to be copied but distributed.  
These two examples of the second class of the so-called “Software Revolution” 
culminate in the third and final revolution, which is, according to Ikegami, the 
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combined “Software and Hardware Revolution”. To this final class, Ikegami adds the 
proliferation of technologies such as the iPhone 3G and Ross King’s “robot scientist” 
called “Adam”. The latter, “Adam”, is a system designed to “automate science” by 
condensing and automating complex laboratory research through automatically 
testing biological and chemical hypotheses. Motivated, according to Ross King, to 
increase the productivity of science, Adam can work cheaper, faster, more accurately, 
and longer than humans, and can be easily multiplied. And, to go back to Ikegami’s 
notion of the Rubik’s cube, Adam is another example of how humans are 
“bottlenecks”, since this sort of system, as King argues, may even allow for the 
improvement of science by enabling the description of experiments in greater detail 
and semantic clarity.  
Common to all these examples, it should also be apparent by now, is that they 
somehow offer a sort of “proof” or “evidence” to Ikegami that new technological 
developments are fundamentally changing the material, ontological and 
epistemological conditions for how we conduct research and how we do science. 
Furthermore, the advent of new technologies, as Ikegami sees it, opens new fresh 
apertures for scientific inquiries about the world that force us to ask new questions. 
Thus, as Ikegami notes in relation to artificial life, if these new technologies make 
new conditions of possibility for doing scientific research, indeed allow for new ways 
to see the world, artificial life is not exempt from partaking in the construction of such 
new technologies. Artificial life, Ikegami believes, is equally in the business of 
changing the world by developing new technologies, such as robots, as we shall also 
see later on in this thesis, and by developing new theories and concepts, by which to 
apprehend our reality.   
In this way, Ikegami’s series of technological revolutions are enmeshed in what 
anthropologists Margaret Lock and Vinh-Kim Nguyen (2010) see as a sort of techno-
utopianism on behalf of science. As Lock and Nguyen note, technologies have 
historically been embroiled in various techno-utopian fantasies about the freedom, 
progress, prosperity or betterment of individual and collective life. And so, 
technologies, they further note, have in various ways been tethered to social, cultural, 
economic and political agendas summoning future dystopias replete with warnings 
about the detrimental consequences, as well as future utopias replete with promises 
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about the advantageous consequences to both individual and collective life (Lock & 
Nguyen 2010). To Ikegami, though, technologies are not necessarily tied to any 
economic agenda, nor necessarily a political agenda, but they are clearly tied to a 
utopian vision of science. They are, in other words, enmeshed in Ikegami’s own 
scientific agenda about improving upon scientific possibilities for acquiring new 
knowledge about the world.  
To this end, I want to suggest, the construction of new technologies is therefore, in 
Ikegami’s imaginary, tethered to a utopian dream of amplifying the modes by which 
science is conducted. As such, the construction of new technologies is not, at least 
according to Ikegami, tethered to some commercial agenda, for example such as the 
extracting any commercial value. Nor is it connected to some ethical agenda in the 
sense of making public life better, whatever the word, “better”, might here entail. The 
point is that the development of new technologies, to Ikegami, is for science of 
science, which means that construction and use of new technologies should be 
mobilized to ask new, fundamental “scientific questions”. As Ikegami summarizes, 
“the impact of the ‘Big Data Revolution’ is spreading through more and more fields 
and is gradually changing the conventional natural sciences. Alife is not exceptional. 
In the field of Alife, we have developed several methods for optimization, such as ant 
colony optimization, particle swarm optimization and evolutionary computation, 
including genetic algorithms. But the data revolution presents new challenges.” Such 
new challenges, in part, are about forcing upon that we ask new questions, and 
Ikegami seeks to integrate these ideas into the Ikegami Lab.  
 
The Evolution of Artificial Life  
 
What Ikegami’s narrative of artificial life reveals, harking back to his diagram, is how 
the field’s history may be considered in in terms of evolutionary time by mapping the 
field’s ancestry in a phylogenetic idiom. In this sense, insofar one plays on the logic 
of emergence once again, one might say that the Ikegami Lab itself “emerges” as a of 
complex dynamic system through an evolutionary path of social, scientific, and 
historical possibilities. That is, in an attempt to trace the intellectual lineages of their 
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field, the artificial life researchers are in the process of retelling the story of artificial 
life, which simultaneously allows them to ground their claims for the field not only in 
a venerable intellectual lineage, but also in a genealogy, even an explicitly 
evolutionary one leading up to the “third era”. 
 
In telling their own story, then, a story I heard over and over again during my 
fieldwork, these artificial life researchers, unlike other scientists like synthetic 
biologists or high-energy physicists - scientists who tend to see themselves as 
ahistorical and uncultured - do not see themselves as either ahistorical or uncultured 
(Traweek 1988; Helmreich 2017; Roosth 2017). Rather, their lab is the result of a 
number of “transmutations” occurring through a longer history, and through a 
different set of “cultural” eras, which situates their enterprise not necessarily as 
different in kind, but as different in variation, as they insert themselves along an 
evolutionary path, or rather along several evolutionary paths in an effort to propel 
their field in forward-motion towards the newly new: to construct artificial life in the 
real world.  
 
In narrating the “evolution of artificial life”, Ikegami exposes their enterprise is also 
tied prior approaches to the synthesis of life, not only from the “founding fathers”, but 
also to the principal avenues that have often been distinguished by the means 
employed: hardware (robotics), software (replicating and evolving computer 
programs), and wetware (replicating and evolving protocells) (Johnston 2008:3). In 
this way, I suggest, they simultaneously cast themselves to be the outgrowth of 
history and in the process of advancing their field in a forward motion that gestures 
towards the newly new and the yet-to-be-discovered. But key to this is the 
formulation of a desire to construct new technologies, which may aid them in the 
quest to better understand what life is and how it works. In other words, I want to 
maintain, their way of telling their own story of their field allows them to imagine that 
they stand on the cusp of a new accouchement built on, and indeed indebted to, a 
longer history of technoscientific discoveries and possibilities. Proceeding through 
Ikegami’s narrative, one notices that he seeks to capture some of artificial life’s many 
mutations, from the “computer era” to the “chemical era” to the yet-to-be-named 
“third era”.  
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Yet, each era is not replacing one another, but rather adds on to one another, which, in 
the language of complexity, means that the lab members allow complexity to build on 
complexity. Artificial life, according to this narrative then, has undergone shifts from 
seeing computers in networks as a form of artificial life to the laboratory creation of 
so-called “wetlife” as a form of artificial life. Thus, if the first era is characterized by 
efforts to simulate living processes in computational media, the second era is 
characterized by synthesizing living processes in chemical media28, now leaving space 
for the third era, which is, according to Ikegami, to “construct artificial life in the real 
world.”  
 
Finally, in their effort to gather up, or indeed add on, the many intellectual lineages 
and approaches of the “founding fathers”, through the many era, the lab members at 
the Ikegami Lab are somehow, I want to propose, evolutionizing their field, but they 
are doing so in order to set up the conditions of possibility of revolutionizing it: 
constructing new artificial life technologies from scratch, as we saw for example in 
the first cell experiment conducted by Ikegami and Hanczyc, is key to formulate 
radically new understandings of life, understandings that seek to shatter biological 
modes of reasoning. For example, as Ikegami and Hanczyc argue, “life” is perhaps 
better defined with respect to a certain physics, Or, put differently, if what 
characterizes agent-based models, biological ecosystems, economies and complex 
dynamic systems is that they “evolve”, that is, that they are systems active in time and 
space, so too may the stories Ikegami and the lab members tell forward-engineer a 
social version of their enterprise that has them scouting for new horizons of 
possibility.  
 
Now, if this chapter addresses what they mean by the “third era”, and more 
specifically if this thesis addresses what they mean by their self-described mission to 
construct “artificial life in the real world,” the following chapters pursue some of the 
                                                
28 Along the way, however, two things drop out and remain unresolved: first, the issue of “simulation” 
in terms of questions concerning where simulation ends, that is, what are the limits of simulation 
insofar chemical experiments also serve as “simulations” of living processes that artificial life 
researchers associate with living activity? And second, the question of which particular material 
objects, with which living processes are harnessed, are best suited to demonstrate the viability of 
artificial life? Or, as philosopher Jean Baudrillard would have it, do simulations reveal that there was 
never an original, with simulations circulating without any reference to the “real”? 
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many meanings and entangled relationships of “construction”, “understanding” and 
the “real world”. In the following chapter, then, I first want to zero in on the Ikegami 
Lab itself to describe in more detail how some of the formal methodologies, strategies 
and techniques, including their associated discourses, which have been presented in 
this chapter, are being imported into the lab by the lab members. In other words, 
chapter 3 will take a closer look at the lab itself and introduce some of the lab 
members and their work. Here, I will examine in more detail how they construe the 
relationship between “construction” and “understanding”, a confluence I call maker’s 
knowledge. 
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Above: Julien Hubert, a postdoc at the Ikegami Lab, dabbling with a model. Below: 
The Ikegami Lab office space. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Introduction: Constructing an Understanding 
 
“You cannot understand the things you cannot build by yourself” Lana Sinapayen, a 
PhD fellow at the lab, tells me one afternoon. Lana, wearing a cuddly sweatshirt and 
jeans, adjusts the frame of her glasses and continues, “ALife is not just about defining 
stuff. It’s also about finding out what’s going on by building it.” Trained across the 
fields of engineering, computer science and artificial intelligence, Lana describes 
herself as, “a programmer by heart”, who have become an artificial life researcher at 
the Ikegami Lab to pursue her goal, she says, of “understanding things like 
intelligence and life by building them.” Prior to becoming a PhD fellow at the lab, 
Lana had accumulated an impressive skillset which had enabled her to program in just 
about any programming language: Java, C++, R, C, Objective C, PHP, JavaScript, 
Python, Swift, Lua, Ruby. She is, however, “an Alifer”, who is now putting her skills 
to use in an effort to better understand some of the fundamental workings of 
intelligence and cognitive complexity, as pertaining to how living systems learn to 
adapt to complex environments.  
Outside her PhD research, Lana has, “a million of research interests”, and therefore 
engaged in “a million projects” some of which, she tells me, are about building, “cute 
amphibious robots to track river fish,” and about doing “experiments on bonsai trees 
and petri dishes with tardigrades or mold colonies”. Lana’s pastime activities, it 
occurred to me during fieldwork, fused well with how she conducted her research, 
where she was dabbling with ways to explore and develop new neural architectures 
for adaptation to complex worlds29. Her “artisan” identity, handy profile, coupled with 
her descriptions, hobbies and spare-time activities, became to me emblematic of how 
many of how many of the lab members at the Ikegami Lab preferred to approach their 
research questions: building things, such as amphibious robots, computer models, 
androids, and so on, is a way to ask questions about other things, such as life, 
intelligence, cognitive complexity, and the relations between them that would not 
                                                
29 In her PhD project, for example, Lana asks the question on how to program a machine to “adjust its 
cognitive complexity to the environment so that prediction emerges from action and classification 
emerges from prediction?”, by which she explores, through her work on artificial neural architectures 
(based on biological neural architectures), how to make algorithms to help machines learn from 
complex input to produce “appropriate” outputs while optimizing the computational cost.  
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previously available to them.  
What Lana taught me during fieldwork was that constructing stuff, that is, by building 
new computer models or amphibious robots, was not simply an end in itself, but 
rather a way to explore things and ask questions about them. Building models and 
amphibious robots is a way to explore issues and questions about intelligence or 
cognition, categories I otherwise think of as somewhat intangible and abstract, not 
something that can be materially constructed. However, for the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab, such categories of “intelligence” or “cognition”, which they often 
associated with “life” and the “living”, I reckoned during fieldwork, were seemingly 
constructible categories knowable through the material construction of models and 
systems.  
Now, if the ethos behind artificial life is animated by the attempt to abstract the 
logical form of life in different material forms, particularly in computational media, 
then this definition holds that formal and material properties can be pried apart and 
what matters is form (cf. Helmreich 2016). And if, as Lana suggests, construction 
precedes or is simultaneous with understanding, then it is readily apparent that the 
question about what gets made, needless to say, is tethered to the what kind of 
questions they are asking. That is, the things they associate with life and living, or 
more specifically with life’s form - such as information, intelligence, evolution, 
homeostasis, adaptability, cognitive complexity, memory, self-organization, etc - are 
here not simply abstract categories that are good-to-think-with (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1995; 
Haraway 2003). Rather, such categories can be built, materially, technically and 
algorithmically, which means that such abstractions, for example like homeostasis (a 
concept that explains how living systems sustain themselves through physiological 
processes), are at the Ikegami Lab rendered empirical in order to be materially 
constructed, investigated, reengineered, and rechanneled (cf. Helmreich 2016:xx). It 
is through construction, then, that the lab members seek to understand certain aspects 
of what they associate with life and this is a central element in their practice, as Lana 
herself notes, “you can only know what is really significant to life by building it 
yourself.”  
In this chapter, I want to take a closer look at what the lab members mean by this 
confluence of “construction” and “understanding”, of making and knowing. More 
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generally, I seek to unpack how some of the elements explored in the previous chapter 
are disseminated in practice and in discourse at the lab by specifically showing how 
the lab members at the Ikegami Lab seek to approximate a better understanding of life 
by constructing new models or by revamping older ones. Making models, as Lana and 
others claim, is a way to query what they call the, “information layer of life” – an 
underlying domain, in which they hope to make visible some fundamental principle of 
life, which may only “emerge”, they say, through constructive experimentation. As 
Lana also exemplifies in this introduction, the lab members generally believe that the 
best way to understand something about life is by constructing it, which means, for 
example, that the best way to understand how homeostasis works is by constructing it, 
exactly by building a model or some artificial system of it.  
Thus, if the core idea of making or constructing, as philosopher Ian Hacking (1999) 
puts it, “is that of building, or putting together” (Hacking 1999:49 my emphasis), this 
chapter focuses on how the lab members are putting together new models. In this 
putting together, they are also remaking older models or revamping them to ask new 
questions about life and the living. In practice, this means that the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab either construct new models or revamp older ones either in order to 
refine current knowledge about life or to make new claims about it, which would 
otherwise be impossible without the work of construction in the first place. And by 
doing so, it is readily apparent that construction, or the actual putting together of stuff 
– the putting together of algorithms, information and material substrates - is the royal 
road to understand how life works on a more profound level. 
The confluence of making and knowing, or between “constructing” and 
“understanding”, then, here constitutes what I call maker’s knowledge: the powerful 
knowledge that can be forged only be constructing (rather than finding) something 
new. Maker’s knowledge is thus an analytic term I use to unpack the relationship 
between construction and understanding, which are two elements that cannot be 
separated when it comes to how the lab members work. As such, maker’s knowledge 
also offers an intriguing resonance with science studies literature on the what might 
be called the “social construction of x”30, proliferating through the so-called “science 
                                                
30 Where “x” may equal, for example, “technological systems” (Bijker et. al. 1989), “scientific facts” 
(Latour & Woolgar 1986), or “validity” (Bowden 1985), and so on. 
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wars”, which has been waged over the contested construction of scientific facts 
(Hacking 1999; Traweek 1996). But here, however, maker’s knowledge takes the idea 
of construction to another register. As Lana and the other lab members reveal, they do 
not seek to hide the fact that things are constructed, indeed, they are very explicit 
about how things are constructed, and whether their constructed objects are pushed to 
be “facts” or not, they are nevertheless thoroughly constructed. More precisely, the 
lab members are overtly explicit about their desire to construct life, or at least some 
aspect or feature of it, both materially and conceptually, and in their efforts to do so, 
plainly admit that they are indeed constructing it. This essentially underwrites, I think, 
that their constructive approach to vitality, by which I also mean that ideas, or “facts” 
of life, are indeed constructive categories, both materially and socially. But to better 
understand how maker’s knowledge comes about, one must first understand what the 
lab members mean by the so-called “information layer of life”, which may be 
“accessed”, they say, by making models. 
 
The Immortality of Information 
 
The “information layer of life”, or what Olaf Witkowski - a former PhD fellow at the 
lab, now working as an affiliated scientist at ELSI – also refers to as the “info-
dynamics of life”, is a special, underlying domain, which may be said to be prior to, 
and the basis for, all modes of interaction. “So, making computer models”, Olaf 
further reports, is a way to query and study this “layer”, in which, “information” is the 
common substance or thing animating all living and nonliving things. As such, 
“information” is the common currency, a sort of “meta-value”31 that underlies and 
cuts across all instances we might terms “bodies” or “organisms” occupying the 
material world. At least, this is what many lab members at the Ikegami Lab believe.  
Thus, to better understand how construction precedes, or is simultaneous with, 
understanding at the lab, it is also crucial to remember how artificial life is commonly 
                                                
31 By meta-value, I here mean those values and foundations upon which people recognize and accept 
their obligations to one another, and understand themselves and their positions in the cosmos 
(Rappaport 1999). 
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focused on the “organization” of matter, and not necessarily matter itself. As such, it 
also makes sense for many artificial life researches, including the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab, to say that they study how matter is organized and not vice versa. As 
Olaf notes, “we do not study life directly,” but rather, he continues, how the 
informational patterns and structures of life are “organized”, both within and in 
between what many of the lab members gloss “complex dynamic systems”. Olaf 
summarizes his point, “rather than studying life directly, we’re studying the info-
dynamics of life, you know, how life is organized informationally.”  
In their commitment to the so-called “information layer”, then, many of the lab 
members are often hesitant to define living systems in any absolute sense. That is, as I 
experienced during fieldwork, many the lab member seemed to care less about 
spending time on vacillating on questions about whether this or that is in fact alive. 
Whether rocks, volcanoes, toasters or butterflies are alive or not is not really the 
question (while most of the lab members would most likely agree that butterflies are 
“more” alive than toasters). But what is of importance, however, is what these 
“complex dynamic systems” share, namely information. Information, I found during 
fieldwork, is the single, unique substance or entity that governs and directs interaction 
and that by which relations are forged. For example, as Lana explains, “everything 
has information in it, but we don’t necessarily consider it as life,” a statement which is 
further bolstered by Nathaniel Virgo – a trained chemist, former member of the 
Ikegami Lab, and now Olaf’s friend and colleague at ELSE - who on many occasions 
during my fieldwork attempted to elaborate on this point made by Lana. Nathaniel, 
who had migrated to the Ikegami Lab, and later to ELSI, from the University Sussex, 
tells me, for example, that Prigogine’s hexagon or Karman’s vortexes, are complex 
and emergent phenomena that may appear as both as examples of what the lab 
members call “emergent phenomena” and of “dissipative structures”, which are 
basically entities that not only display behaviors that may seem “lifelike”, but whose 
structure and behavior is organized by information.  
Of course, as Nathaniel further reassures me, such types of phenomena, like Karman’s 
vortexes, are not really alive, but nor are they completely “dead” or entirely calculable 
or predictable in how they emerge and/or dissipate. Yet, still, whether they are really 
alive or not is still not really the question. What matters to Nathaniel is really how 
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they emerge or how they dissipate, that is, how they are informationally organized. 
And this is what is of primary significance to the lab members. Specifically, what 
characterizes both types of phenomena, living or nonliving, and besides being 
emergent phenomena and dissipative structures, is that they may also be defined as 
dynamic informational patterns that are active in time and in space. Thus, information 
is what both living and nonliving things share, and as such, it is by this very virtue 
itself that they may at times, assume qualities that may appear “lifelike”, despite the 
fact that they may initially be “nonliving”. Still, this does not necessarily mean that 
they are truly alive, and neither do any of the lab members claim them to be.  
Their focus on emergent phenomena and dissipative structures, then, or more broadly 
the “info-dynamics of life”, is perhaps best exemplified by the words of Nathaniel, 
who exemplifies how to construe the boundaries between the “living” and the 
“nonliving”, 
So, in the case of a hurricane, for example, it only forms under certain 
conditions: low wind, large collections of thunder storms in the same 
space, the wind has to be sort of swirling a bit, and once you have those 
sorts of conditions you get a sort of proto-hurricane that becomes a fully 
developed hurricane. And that fully developed hurricane can then move 
around and persist in areas of the sea where hurricanes would never form. 
Similarly, a human being can be formed only in very specific 
circumstances if having a fertilized human egg in a human womb, and 
then a family to feed it, and once this has happened the human being can 
then go on to survive on its own, in a forest if it needs to, or it can get a 
job and live in the city, or whatever, there are many other places you can 
survive than places you can be formed. And that’s something that can be 
true to degrees, but it’s a quite common property. 
 
Now, of course, neither Prigogine’s hexagon, Karman’s vortexes or Nathaniel’s 
hurricanes, are normally considered to be “living”, nor are they synonymous with 
Nathaniel’s “humans” or “fertilized eggs” (although it may seem so from Nathaniel’s 
description). Rather, what Nathaniel wants to point out is that what matters here is to 
mark the specific conditions of possibility for a hurricane and a human being to 
 112 
emerge, exist, and disintegrate in the first place, despite the fact that their conditions 
of possibility may, however, be both radically and qualitatively different from one 
another. And, still, what humans and hurricanes share, or have in common, Nathaniel 
seems to suggest, is that they may both be seen as complex dynamic systems, as 
bundles of informational or codified entities fundamentally sharing some core 
affinities due to the fact that they are both organized informationally. 
Nathaniel’s analogy between the living and the nonliving, I think, is based on the 
axiomatic existence of information, as the basis for any interaction or any emergence. 
And this way of talking about the life, the living and the nonliving is common to how 
the lab members generally think and talk about their work, about complex dynamic 
systems and so on. A hurricane, for example, cannot itself maintain its own 
equilibrium, but dissipates as soon as the “external” forces upholding it are removed. 
Similarly, humans, or at least human bodies, maintain their own equilibrium in 
relation to a number of “external”, or “environmental” conditions and variables upon 
which it is contingent, however, in extreme environments, outer space or deep sea, 
human bodies would easily “dissipate”. And as such, as Nathaniel concludes, both 
types of phenomena, hurricanes and humans, are fundamentally “precarious, spatially 
individuated dissipative structures,” that “may remain constant over time due to a 
precarious balance between reaction and diffusion processes.” The point being here 
that virtually everything, if one asks a lab member at the Ikegami Lab, may be 
considered to be a complex dynamic system regardless of ontological and qualitative 
differences; what they share, living or nonliving, is that they are organized, 
maintained or broken down informationally.  
Hence, what the abovementioned phenomena share, regardless of whether they are 
defined as living or not, is that they are organized and/or maintained in a delicate and 
highly precarious series of processes, which make up the conditions of possibility for 
their respective “individuation”: they persist, in other words, by consuming, as Olaf 
would have it, “free energy” from their environment (producing entropy) and thus 
they have a sort of, “Ship of Theseus”-property that have them persist despite every 
atom being replaced. Yet, as dissipative structures, they are always-already 
precarious, always-already at risk of dissolving or disintegrating insofar they are no 
longer able to keep in sync with the environment (or to use a biological phrasing: to 
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“metabolize”). All the lab members, I found, describe different types of phenomena in 
this way, indeed, all them believe that information is the basis for all forms of 
organization. But this is not to say that they do so without claiming that all 
phenomena are the same. Rather, on the contrary, various phenomena are, of course, 
different from one another (hurricanes are not humans), so the key is to locate and 
identify the local differences to how things emerge, the particular circumstances by 
which phenomena are sustained32.  
Such ideas, render meaningless any absolute definition of a living system, since many 
“nonliving” systems, according to this logic, may equally share features or 
characteristics of living things. And as such, it makes no sense, as Lana explains, 
trying to make any absolute definition of “life”. She reports, 
Trying to define life using science is a waste of time because life is a 
subjective concept rather than a scientific one. We call some things ‘alive’ 
that we do not understand, but when we gain enough insight about how it 
works, we stop believing it’s alive. We used to think volcanoes were alive 
because we could not explain their behavior. We personified gods, things 
we could not comprehend, like seasons and stars. Then science came 
along and most of these gods are dead. Nowadays science doesn’t believe 
that there is a clear-cut frontier between alive and not alive. Are viruses 
alive? Are computer viruses alive? I think that the day we produce 
convincing artificial life, the last gods will die. Personally, I don’t bother 
too much about classifying things as alive or not; I’m more interested in 
questions like ‘can it learn?’ How?’, ‘Does it do interesting stuff?’, and so 
on. I’m very interested in virtual organisms, not so much viruses. 
Lana reflects here a vision shared by many of the other lab members, who are 
largely uninterested in defining life as such, not necessarily because it is a waste 
of time, as Lana opines, but rather because they want to make what Olaf calls 
“qualified guesses” about what life is and what it could be. To Olaf, then, 
                                                
32 In fact, I believe this is the crux of how artificial life researchers tend to think about the phenomena: 
all things are ontologically different, but they may be epistemologically imagined or thought of in 
roughly the same way, according to the same framework or logic. However, I will not go further into 
this in this thesis, but would nevertheless be curious to learn about more critical accounts of the 
epistemological orientations of artificial life and complex systems science (?). 
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making qualified “guesses” means to approximate more accurate assumptions 
about life, that is, to make more probable exactly how life, or some feature of it, 
emerges.  
In order to make qualified guesses, then, they turn to modelling. By making a 
model of some phenomena, Olaf tells me, they may then come closer to discern 
some feature of life. A model, Olaf says, is a “box” (i.e. a computer model) that 
can be manipulated and opened and there a way to make qualified guesses about 
very complex phenomena. He reports,  
All kinds of processes in nature are well understood because we could 
model them. Self-replication and so on. And it’s so fascinating that you 
can do this in a ‘box’, in a computer, with all the parameters. It’s much 
better than guessing what happens in nature. For very complex 
evolutionary processes, we’re still guessing though, but it’s better that you 
do this guessing in a box. 
Historian of science Peter Galison (1996) has noted in his discussion of nuclear 
weapons research at Los Alamos, that computer simulations proved crucial to study 
problems too complex to solve analytically and impossible to investigate 
experimentally (Galison 1996). This situates, Galison notes, computer modeling work 
somewhere between theory and experiment, since models, on the one hand, resemble 
theory because they could animate processes of symbolic manipulation, and on the 
other hand, experiments because they could display stable results, replicability and 
amenability prone to error analysis procedures. For Olaf, who expresses that 
evolutionary processes are too complex to make unsupported guesses about, yet while 
also still too complex for simulation work, such a process is nevertheless still better 
understood in a “box”.  
Galison further notes in his account of nuclear weapons research, that “computers 
began as a ‘tool’ – an object for the manipulation of machines, objects and equations. 
But bit by bit (byte by byte), computer designers deconstructed the notion of tool 
itself as the computer came to stand not for a tool, but for nature itself” (Galison 
1996:156-157). On this view, theories, for example, can be tested with reference to an 
artificial reality conjured within the computer to the point of being just as good as the 
 115 
real deal. However, on the contrary though, just as the lab members at the Ikegami 
Lab are reluctant to define living systems in any absolute sense, none of them ever 
claimed during my fieldwork that computers were anything other than tools or 
instruments.  
Among the lab members, rather, computers are not considered substitutes for “nature” 
or “reality” per se, (which is also readily apparent from their self-described mission to 
construct artificial life in the real world) (cf. Helmreich 1998). Quite the opposite, 
computers at the Ikegami Lab are “tools”, indeed highly effective and propitious 
tools, with which to make better “qualified guesses” about some “external” nature or 
reality, or some kind of “natural” process, but they are not to be mistaken for the real 
deal. In other words, computers are tools with which to “access” and “query” the 
“information layer of life”, as Olaf tells me,  
It is obvious for Alife that there’s a layer of information. So, you study the 
information dynamics, and not real life directly. You know the slogan, 
‘artificial life is not studying life, but life-as-it-could-be’, it’s a bit like 
this. In the information layer, everything is information, and you can 
measure that. So, you have this layer of information and you study this 
layer of information instead of studying whatever processes are active in 
biology, and so you model those instead! 
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The way you “measure things in the information layer,” Olaf continues, is done by 
making simulations, which are supposed to somehow capture some informational 
dynamic or pattern of life, which can in turn be used to infer more qualified guesses 
about how it actually works. Olaf makes this view vividly clear when he specifies 
what he means by how models can “access” and “query” the information layer, of 
life, saying, “making simulations is really like you put on your glasses and you see 
flows of information, like you see this information layer, you see the Matrix!” Here, 
Olaf alludes to the Hollywood-blockbuster movie, The Matrix, from 1999, invoking a 
scene in which Neo, the film’s protagonist, is told by his mentor, Morpheus, that, “the 
world you see is the world that has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the 
truth […] Unfortunately, no one can be told what the Matrix is. You have to see it for 
yourself” (The Matrix 1999). When Neo “sees” the Matrix, a stringy code pattern that 
makes up the really real, the film plays on the idea that the “real world” is simply a 
simulation, a massive hologram, in which those living in it are unaware that it is, in 
fact, a simulation, i.e. that their reality is governed by some underlying algorithm.  
 
While Olaf’s allusion to the Matrix is, of course, a metaphor, it is also meant as a 
joke. But tied into his ocular metaphor, nonetheless, is the fact that the lab members 
do not study “the nature of life itself”, as Olaf tells me, “but rather the info-dynamics 
of life, from one step away.” This “one step away”, which may give the impression 
that artificial life’s “counterparts”, biologists, those who study “the nature of life 
itself”, are somehow lost in Plato’s cave in looking for small inconsistencies in the 
shadows that they take for reality. For the biologist, to put it crudely, things are how 
they appear, which is to the artificial life researcher in fact a superficial spectacle, as a 
scene in The Matrix where a cat runs across a threshold twice, suggesting a glitch in 
functioning of the matrix itself. Again, while Olaf self-consciously uses The Matrix as 
a metaphor, I think it reveals, albeit in a metaphorical way, something about the way 
they “see” the work they do, digging into the “information layer of life”.  
 
From this metaphor, too, one may mediate on the whether these artificial life 
researchers believe to have arrived at some idea of an “obvious true reality”, which 
not only grounds the epiphenomenal interactions outside the cave, the sort of 
interactions we, as humans are engaged in, but also levels how one may think and talk 
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about the living and the nonliving, as instances of the same process of information 
exchanges? Or, rather, to follow Olaf a bit further, it seems that this underlying, and 
seemingly axiomatic layer, undergirding any form of interaction between entities, is 
not really a hidden at all. The existence of a “layer of information”, as Olaf asserts, is 
“obvious” to an artificial life researcher. But what makes this obvious and self-
evident, I want to contend, is exactly the construction of computational simulations 
and models.  
 
Such informatic visions of vitality are prevalent among the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab, even to such a degree that it underwrites a structure of feeling among 
them, a sense that the informational dynamics of life are truly immortal. Hurricanes 
and humans, to take just two types of phenomena, are fragile and precarious instances 
of informational dynamics, or as Olaf puts it, they are systems that exemplify the 
inherent logic of artificial life, “you give and take information, and you can apply this 
view to every kind of interaction, between humans or between humans and robots, or 
between machines, too. In a theoretical way, you can channel information through a 
noisy channel and you can receive and understand what it means.” All things, in other 
words, participate in a massive, large-scale economy of information. Now, to better 
highlight how this “applies”, following Olaf, to “every kind of interaction”, I now 
want to turn to how the lab members apply and build this logic into their own models.  
 
The Map is the Territory 
 
In chapter 2, we encountered computer scientist and artificial life researcher Craig 
Reynold’s so-called boid model from 1986, a model used as an example of emergent 
behaviors, in which the complexity of “boids”, analogous to “birds”, arise from the 
interactions of individual agents adhering to a set of simple rules. Reynold’s boid-
model has gained much traction at the Ikegami Lab, both for its relative simplicity 
and as an appropriate testing ground for up-scaling and amplifying it in terms of size 
and complexity. Among the many projects ongoing at the lab, Ikegami and Olaf had 
prior to my arrival done a research project using Reynold’s model, where they had set 
about to amplify the model, both in terms of complexity, size and scale, in order to 
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explore the possibilities for new discovering the emergence of new patterns of self-
organization and structures.  
 
More specifically, by tweaking and remaking the boid-model, Ikegami and Olaf 
increased the size of the “flocks”, which in turn revealed to them that, “flocks are 
intrinsically unstable, and they will spontaneously collapse and reorganize, 
repeatedly. The sizes, forms and dynamics differ from one flock to another. When we 
increase the number of agents, new flocks emerge. Assuming that many agents live in 
a large space, different flock forms will spontaneously organize in different spatial 
locations.” In short, by simply increasing the complexity, size and scale of Reynold’s 
model, which is here a template for the model made by Ikegami and Olaf, equals, they 
suggest, the emergence of new patterns and structures. From this, Ikegami and Olaf 
further analogize that, “flocking is collective behavior of active agents, which is often 
observed in the real world, for example, swarm starling birds. In nature, swarms 
possess remarkable properties, which allow many organisms, from swarming bacteria 
to ants and flocking birds, to form higher-order structures that enhance their behavior 
as a group.” And, because such “remarkable properties” can be simulated, Ikegami 
and Olaf reckon, they may in turn help to make more refined claims possible, that is, 
enable them to articulate and define flocks and their boundaries in a more rigorous 
way.  
 
Now, harking back to Olaf’s notion of “guesswork”, or the making of qualified 
guesses, the kind of “guesswork” done here, one might say, is extracted from 
revamping older models in order to discover something new. That is, without 
revamping the boid-model, Ikegami and Olaf simply could not, I will claim, have 
arrived at the conclusion that new emergent patterns and structures arise. On the one 
side, their revamped boid-model materialize the logic of artificial life in the sense that 
what matters is how informational dynamics organize collective behaviors, and as 
such, the logic shared among the lab members is put into practice. But on the other 
side, the sort of “guesswork”, if we stick to Olaf’s terminology, admitted by the boid-
model, is authorized, I further to claim, by an argument of isomorphism (cf. Laqueur 
2008).  
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Isomorphism, as historian Thomas Laqueur (2008) has noted, “comes from chemistry 
and geology”, where different isomorphic substances crystallize in the same “form”, 
or from mathematics, where isomorphism denotes the identity “of form ... between 
two or more groups” thereby authorizing certain operations (Laqueur 2008:51). On 
Laqueur’s account, to exemplify what counts as an isomorphic relation, he refers to 
Max Weber’s claim of an elective affinity between Calvinist Protestantism and 
capitalism, which may be said to be an operation animated and authorized by an 
argument of isomorphism. Likewise, as Laqueur demonstrates in the anthropological 
tradition, Clifford Geertz’s claim to read the most salient features of Balinese society 
in the niceties of a cock fight might also count as an isomorphic relation (Laqueur 
2008:52; Geertz 1971). Or, as I will claim here, Olaf and Ikegami here read the most 
salient features of informational dynamics in the flocking patterns of digital birds. 
 
Yet, this is not to say the boid-model made by Ikegami and Olaf is automatically 
isomorphic with what it purports to represent, i.e. flocking patterns or flocking 
behaviors. Rather, I maintain, it is actively made to be isomorphic in the sense that it 
crystallizes the phenomenon called “flocking” in the same form: the flocking of boids 
and of real birds, as Ikegami and Olaf would have it, are two instances of the same 
phenomenon, namely flocking. On this account, then, the map becomes identical with 
the territory insofar the map is flocking behavior, but it becomes identical exactly 
because Olaf and Ikegami make it so. Again, if one keeps in mind that the lab 
members are largely uninterested in whether toasters or birds are living or not, what 
matters here is not how accurately boids mimic birds, but how well boids exhibit the 
same forms of behaviors as birds, namely flocking. In short, the boid-model is 
authorized, following Laqueur, by an argument of isomorphism. 
 
As such, Ikegami and Olaf do not consider their revamped flocking simulation as 
“proof” or “evidence” of some real instantiation of life or the living, or, for example, 
claiming that artificial life is possible in non-biotic substrates, i.e. computer models. 
Rather, as historians, philosophers, and anthropologists of science have also 
recognized, they are using their boid-model to materialize theories and concepts that 
they associate with living activity (i.e. information), which in this case is the form of 
flocking behavior, which makes their model function as both a representation of 
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scientific thinking and a tool for guiding research (cf. Sismondo 1999; Morgan & 
Morrison 1999; Keller 2003; Chadarevian & Hopwood 2004). Yet, still this does not 
necessarily mean that they are absolute “proof” of artificial life itself (i.e. that it is 
possible to construct real artificial life), but simply that their boid-model materializes 
what they associate with life or lifelike activity, namely, in this case, flocking 
behaviors, which is of course done by making analogies between boids (the artificial) 
and birds (the natural). Nor do they claim that their model is “life itself”, but rather 
use it as a pointer to possibility that certain features, properties, behaviors or 
processes of “life” can be successfully simulated in silico. Either way, I maintain that 
their argument is animated and authorized by an argument of isomorphism.  
 
Now, if their boid-model is, however, a sort of digital double, a crude artificial 
representation of what they associate with natural processes, it is made, as 
philosopher of science Sergio Sismondo (1999) writes, “to stand between worlds, and 
pushed one way or another” (Sismondo 1999:258). But while it is pushed to stand 
between worlds through an argument of isomorphism, the boid-model does not itself 
assume meaning, but it is rather, I suggest, pushed to correspond to things in nature, 
thereby becoming a sort of actualization of flocking behaviors. That is, as already 
hinted, the boid-model is actively pushed to make a claim about how, in a 
computational and artificial sense, to define flocks and their boundaries in a more 
rigorous way. And this claim, I want to assert, would not have been possible without 
making a model in the first place.  
To be sure, for example, making, say, an agent-based model (not necessarily a boid-
model) with a spatial distribution of “food” and “agents” in order to uncover how 
agents evolve so-called “signaling systems” that improve their ability to efficiently 
gather and use the environmental resources in order to “improve their fitness”, might, 
according to this logic, is also made to correspond to how “natural” agents do so in 
“nature”. But what I want to put forward here is that this kind of work to make claims 
from models signals a confluence between construction and understanding, what I 
will from here on term maker’s knowledge: the sort of knowledge generated exactly 
upon constructing something new. In short, models do automatically assume meaning, 
nor do they speak for themselves, rather, they have to be actively interpreted and 
shaped to those who make them, pushed into isomorphic relations.  
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Whether the dynamics or principles of their agent-based models at the lab are 
analogized to “nature” or not - or perhaps rather analogized to their conceptions of 
nature - or simply an exercise in exploring to which extent such dynamics can be 
simulated computationally, models are, nevertheless, the crux of the matter in relation 
to what kind of knowledge that can be produced and what kind of claims that can be 
made. However, on the contrary, not all lab members want to make claims from their 
models as such, as Lana, for example, makes it clear to me when she explicitly states 
that she does not want to make any analogies to some external world or Nature with 
capital N. “I absolutely don’t care about the realism of this model,” she tells, “I am 
more interested about what happens!”, suggesting the ambivalent status and function 
of simulations, as pointed out by Sismondo.  
To which degree, or to what extent, models are supposed to imitate some external 
reality, in other words, is not equally of concern to all lab members. Whether virtual 
agents, often vying to survive in the self-made models, correspond to any “real” 
natural agents, say, whether a simulation of a virus actually corresponds to a “real” 
virus, and so on, it not always of importance to the lab members. Still, what is of 
significance to them is really whether the dynamics of their models can offer fidelity 
to the “real world” dynamics, whether these are actual or imagined, one might say. 
More precisely, whether the “behaviors” exhibited by a population of digital 
organisms really correspond to those observed among biological organisms, need not 
be of any significant importance. To this end, it is not whether the digital agents are 
accurate depictions of real biological agents, but rather whether the dynamics of the 
system, including the behaviors of the agents in them, are more or less accurate 
depictions of the properties of what the lab members themselves define.  
If computers, or models, finally, as anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (1998) has 
shown in his own ethnography, may be “worlds” in and of themselves, capable of 
mimicking some property or feature of what they associate with life (cf. Helmreich 
1998), some lab members seek to make alternative universes, which have no concrete 
reference to anything “real”. If computers, or models, occupy an ambiguous space 
between experiment and theory, as both Galison and Sismondo note, that is, “given 
the status of tools, as well as representations”, that may “easily cross categories, such 
as ‘theory’ and ‘experiment’, the bound of which are otherwise well-established” 
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(Sismondo 1999:247), they may also be used to cross boundaries between the real and 
the unreal, the real and the imagined. What I will simply claim here before going on 
to explore another model made at the lab, which is itself about exploring new 
territories, is that what allows the lab members to make claims about life is the active 
construction a model from which they may force out some corresponding identity 
between two otherwise separated categories. Now, while we have seen how the boid-
model is pushed to refine knowledge about flocking behaviors, I now want to turn to 
another model, which is equally pushed towards making new claims. However, this 
model is not about making a claim about the emergence of flocking behaviors, but 
rather about how evolution, or more specially “open-ended evolution”, might work.  
  
The Dream of Open-Ended-Evolution 
 
From the first early computational experiments with so-called digital evolution in the 
1950s, often associated with John von Neumann’s work on CA’s, to the increasingly 
sophisticated simulations of the present day, artificial life researchers, including the 
lab members at the Ikegami Lab, have collectively come to focus on issues related to 
the concept of Open-Ended Evolution (OEE). At the Ikegami Lab, Julien Hubert – a 
post doc at the lab and a trained computer scientist from the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam – described the artificial life’s ambitions to construct a full-fledged 
simulation of OEE. The set of questions some of the ab member attach to OEE is 
summarized by Julien, who reports,  
So, the ambition of Open-Ended Evolution is clearly to figure out how we 
became so complex, how animals became so complex, and why evolution, 
in a basic sense, stagnated. Why did humans become so much smarter? 
Why do crows use tools and grow smarter? And how did we get stuck in 
evolution? That’s something that is very basic to OOE. The goal, of 
course, is to understand life: what are the elements in life that actually led 
us to where we are now? Is it because of diversity? Convergence? Is it 
because the environment keeps changing and we have to adapt to it? Is it 
because we need to let it evolve for longer, like for billions of years? So, 
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in a way, the question is: how did we adapt to become more complex? 
That is what people here want to get at. 
 
OEE is basically the idea that evolution progresses not according to the logic and 
principles of Darwinian evolution, but by ever overcoming itself in generating more 
complexity and novelty in highly creative ways. OEE, I experienced during my 
fieldwork, had largely been slipped in through the backdoor, becoming a concept, 
which many lab members took to be the true theory of evolution. Lana bolsters 
Julien’s summary,  
A lot of people agree that Earth is probably an open-ended world. This 
means that from the time life appeared, it has always grown more and 
more complex with time, constantly producing new innovations. Today, 
we have very complex forms of life, which appeared from simpler forms 
of life as an effect of evolution and natural selection. The dream of OEE-
researchers is to build such a world in simulation. But it is much more 
difficult that sounds… In short, OEE is about building a living world that 
is forever interesting.  
 
A somewhat simple definition of an OEE-system, then, is that such a system would 
require that the maximum complexity of organisms in the system itself increases over 
time, or, in other words, that the complexity of its “ecosystem”, that is, the entire 
system, increases indefinitely. Some of OEE-definitions were at the lab taken directly 
from the computer scientist Kenneth Stanley (2018), who is himself a strong 
proponent of OEE-research. Stanley writes that, 
life has continued its evolution into virtually endless diverse and often 
increasingly complex forms for more than a billion years. Photosynthesis, 
flight and human intelligence are but a tiny sampling of the boundless 
feats of evolution, often far exceeding anything yet built through human 
engineering. In short, evolution on Earth is as close as we have seen to a 
never-ending algorithm – a prolific generator that continues to invent and 
diverge over eons without ceasing (Stanley 2018:7) 
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An OEE-system, according to this capacious, and highly computationally inflected 
definition, is a system capable of producing a continual stream of novel “organisms” 
and “behaviors”, rather than settling on some quasi-stable state beyond which nothing 
new occurs. Put differently, in a certain sense, the revamped boid-model of Ikegami 
and Olaf can, in comparison, be considered to be a sort of OEE-system in the way 
new flocking formations and patterns keep emerging upon one another. That is, a 
system that allows for complexity to build upon complexity through its own creative 
impulses and drives. Furthermore, also like the boid-model, an OEE-system, on many 
accounts, is also often described by using ingredient from an associated biological 
nomenclature, taking on words such as diversity, complexity, creativity, and novelty, 
which gesture towards the idea that evolution is essentially a creative force: life, as it 
were, wants to reinvent itself.  
To this end, the concept of OEE carries theoretical ties to biologist Stuart Kauffman’s 
(2007) notion of “adjacent possible theory” - the idea that evolution always pushes 
into the adjacent possible, into shadow futures hovering on the edges of the present 
state of things33. In addition, OEE may also be considered from a philosophical angle 
by its family resemblance to what philosopher Henri Bergson (1911) termed 
“Creative Evolution” - a conception of evolution that prioritizes the creation of forms 
and the continual elaboration of the “absolutely new” through “invention” (Bergson 
1911:11). With the notion of evolution as essentially a creative force, Bergson 
proposed to steer a course beyond the opposition of mechanism (associated with neo-
Darwinism) and finalism (associated with neo-Lamarckism) to see evolution as 
something operating between determinacy and indeterminacy. In short, Bergson 
proposed a philosophy that accounted both for the continuity of all living things and 
for the discontinuity implied in the evolutionary quality of creation itself. Creativity is 
at the core of OEE, as something always-already overcoming itself, becoming 
something new, without ever settling into an equilibrium state34.  
                                                
33 I will return to this concept later on, as it is also central to how the lab members see their work to be 
about pushing into the yet-to-be-known, into “adjacent possibles”.  
34 Meanwhile, however, there is no consensus on any precise definition of OEE, and a true 
understanding of OEE, as some of the lab members told me, is still “a holy grail in ALife”. When I 
became introduced to the concept of OEE by the lab members, and when I later began to read about it, 
it quickly became readily apparent how a slew of scientists across various fields such as artificial life, 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, biology, physics, computer science, information science, and 
complex systems science, winkled and pried to pin down some essential definition of it. More recently, 
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Lana is one of the lab members, who have taken upon her to construct a full-fledged 
model of OEE, meaning, in the words of Lana, to build “a living world that is forever 
interesting”, a world that keeps evolving, and does so in creative and surprising ways. 
The lab members, on their account, are thereby also variously weighing in on 
questions waging not only on how to properly understand OEE, how to measure it, 
but also how to actually construct it. However, the “dream”, as Lana notes, to 
construct an OEE-system, is not something easily realized, no simple task, since 
efforts to construct a full-fledged OEE-system have over the years proven obstinately 
resistant to even the most skillful of programmers. As Lana notes, “I’d really like to 
find out why Open-Ended Evolution doesn’t work, because I think it’s possible, and I 
think we’re missing something very important, and I’d like to find that!”  
 
Lana’s phrasing of the problem here, during fieldwork, struck me as an odd one, 
positing OEE as intrinsically dysfunctional: what is missing from OEE, some variable, 
component or element? How is OEE dysfunctional? And what sort of puzzlement is 
this: epistemological, ontological, normative, ethical? OEE is dysfunctional to whom, 
to what? Dysfunctional by what metric, by what property? Of course, what Lana 
meant when by this was that no model so far had succeeded in fulfilling the criteria 
for what counts as a OEE-system. And Lana, as I will now try to show, is one of the 
few lab members, who have explicitly taken upon her to model a full-fledged OEE-
system. Yet, she is not the first to do so.  
 
First Batch: Tierra 
 
In the early days of artificial life, in the 1990s, artificial life researcher Tom Ray had 
already, to go back to Julien’s phrasing, begun to “get at” the problem of OEE when 
he developed his own model named Tierra. Tierra is a virtual system, in which 
                                                                                                                                      
beginning in 2015, a series of artificial life workshops have been dedicated to OEE, for example, such 
as the OEE1, OEE2 and OEE3. The latest of these workshops aimed at addressing and discussing key 
issues related to OEE, such as, “behavioral hallmarks of systems undergoing OEE” and “empirical 
demonstrations of hallmarks or requirements of OEE in models or natural systems.” Others have 
suggested that it makes more sense to talk about so-called “evolved open-endedness”, called EOE, a 
term calling attention to the idea that open-endedness is a consequence of evolution itself, not the other 
way around.  
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assembly language programs lodged in random access memory (RAM) self-replicate 
based on the basis of how efficiently they make use of central processing unit (CPU) 
time and memory space. As such, according to the system’s creator Tom Ray, Tierra 
is not simply a model of evolution, but an instantiation of it (Ray 1994). In 1992, for 
example, he wrote about Tierra, “I will consider a system to be living if it is self-
replicating, and capable of open-ended evolution” (Ray 1992:372), building such a 
statement on the functionalist idea that organic life is basically utilizing energy, 
mostly derived from the sun, to organize matter. In analogy to organic life, then, Ray 
further wrote that, “digital life can be viewed as using CPU (central processing unit) 
time, to organize memory” (Ray 1992:373), which points us to the idea that organic 
life and computer life, according Ray, may share fundamental affinities.  
With Tierra, Ray (similar to many of the lab members at the Ikegami Lab) proposed 
that life is something existing in a logical and informational, and not necessarily 
material, universe, in which life can basically be considered a process of information 
replication. In other words, with Tierra, Ray made the assumption that if organic life 
evolves through processes of natural selection – i.e. as individuals or organisms 
competing for resources (light, food, space, etc.) such that the genotypes that leave the 
most descendants would increase in frequency - so too, may digital life, in parallel, 
evolve through a similar process, but as replicating algorithms that compete for CPU 
time and memory space. The digital “organisms” in Tierra, in analogy to biological 
organisms, Ray proposed, evolve strategies to exploit one another in a game of 
survival, thus mimicking the essential principles of Darwinian evolution. On this 
account, the digital critters in Tierra self-replicate and evolve “freely” in a somewhat 
“open-ended” fashion, however without the guidance of an explicit “fitness function”.  
Such ways of describing Tierra, as science scholar Katherine Hayles (1996) notes in 
her article Narratives of Artificial Life, are clearly flecked with biological language, 
including references to Darwinian evolution, natural selection, mother and daughter 
cells, parasites and ancestors (Hayles 1996). As Hayles specifically takes note of in 
Tierra, “Ray’s biomorphic namings and interpretations function not so much as an 
overlay […] as an explication of an intention that was there at the beginning. Analogy 
is not incidental or belated but central to the program’s artefactual design” (Hayles 
1996:150), to which she appends that “the program operates as much within the 
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imagination as it does within the computer” (Hayles 1996:147). Similarly, as 
anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (1998) shows, computational worlds such as Tierra 
forms the substrate for computational life, that is, life as an informational pattern, or 
pure form that is independent of its material substrate. Systems like this, Helmreich 
further notes, exemplifies the “implosion” of embodied complexities of living 
organisms onto the cleanliness of the purely formal genome that favors disembodied 
rationality over embodied materiality (Helmreich 1998). As such, while Ray asserted 
his claim that digital life is analogous to biological life, that is, digital life operates 
according to the same principles as biological life, it aligns well with how the lab 
members at the Ikegami Lab describe their own systems. However, the lab members 
at the Ikegami Lab do not conflate life artificial and life biological as such, but they 
are equally invested, as Hayles notes, in making programs that operate as much within 
their imaginations as in the computer, as we shall see in a bit.  
One of the fundamental problems of Tierra in “achieving OEE”, Lana also makes me 
aware of, is that each particular run of the system will eventually reach a state of 
equilibrium, or a kind of stasis, where only neutral variations emerge. That is, Ray’s 
Tierra-simulation basically fails at fulfilling the principles of OEE because it ends up 
leaving no space for further replication35 beyond the point of equilibrium. And such 
tendencies, Lana tells me, are generally widespread in artificial life simulations, 
whose digital “worlds” initially tend to evolve very rapidly only to reach an 
equilibrium, or, as Lana further notes, “a state where nothing interesting happens.” 
Furthermore, another major problem of earlier attempts to construct a successful 
OEE-system, Lana continues, is that each “species”, like Tierra’s digital critters, 
which are defined by the creator, for example as “species A” or “species B”, stop 
replicating when reaching a specific “fitness value”. However, a notable difference 
between Tierra and other models of evolutionary computation, such as GA’s, is that 
there is no explicit “exogenous” fitness function for the interacting agents. Rather, in 
                                                
35 As a side note, though, in order to overcome this problem, Ray introduced a program that he called 
“the reaper”, a program “killing” off the digital creatures of Tierra once memory had been filled to 
some specific level, say 80%. The reaper then selected and killed the “oldest” creatures deallocating 
their memory (Helmreich 1998:111). Such a control mechanism supposedly “equalizes” the system 
such that a sort of continuation is ensured. However, the point is that such a control mechanism is 
exerted from the “outside”, by the creator of the system, and not an internal mechanism to the system 
itself. Open-Ended Evolution, in its purest form, should be able to self-differentiate and by itself create 
novelty.  
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the case of Tierra, the fitness function is “endogenous”36, which means that there is 
simply survival and death.  
However, one of the oldest and probably the most popular explanations for why 
systems like Tierra failed at achieving OEE, Lana explains, is the one saying that 
simulated worlds are simply not “complex enough”. In other words, simulated worlds 
do not adequately correspond to real world complexity, where, as Lana says, “one 
would see millions of species interacting with each other, competing, collaborating, 
forcing life out any long-term equilibrium”, thereby suggesting to critics that building 
an extremely complex simulation with millions of computers would be key to 
increase complexity to a level corresponding to real world complexity. In short, the 
problem has to do with lack of computational power. Moreover, according to Lana, 
the issue is not a question of unbounded complexity, of reaching a certain level of 
complexity as such, nor about the lack of any consensus about how “complexity” 
should be defined. Rather, the problem is about creating, she asserts, unbounded 
“novelty”, to which she believes that we should focus instead on questions such as, 
“how did evolution ‘invent’ new things or push organisms to reinvent themselves and 
their surroundings?” On this note, then, Lana identifies two central problems in 
getting at OEE: the problem of the “environment” and the problem of “fitness”. 
 
Achieving Open-Ended-Evolution, In Theory 
 
“In many simulations” Lana explains, “you have a species of interest, for example 
like wolves and sheep, and around those you have ‘the environment’”. The first 
problem relating to the “environment”, defined as the three-dimensional virtual space 
in which such “species” vie to survive and reproduce, is that such a space itself is 
usually not subject to evolutionary pressure. This means, according to Lana, that the 
environment cannot be modified or manipulated by the species themselves, only the 
species are subject to evolutionary pressure, nor do they possess the power to alter 
                                                
36 To specify this a bit: in Tierra, the “fitness” of an agent, and the rate at which a population turns 
over, is “endogenous”, which means that it emerges from many actions and interactions over the course 
of an agent’s lifetime. This is an important point to the work of evolutionary computation that agents 
need to evolve and replicate “autonomously”.  
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their world. And Lana is, needless to say, puzzled by this because, she says, “in real 
life, ‘the environment’ is constituted by other organisms who also undergo evolution, 
and of non-biological features that can be affected and can affect the organisms 
around it”. In short, the organism-world relationship, which Lana here opposes, is a 
one-way street. Such interactions, Lana thinks, should apply equally to their models. 
That said, Lana’s second problem relating to “fitness” - a measure of how well 
“adapted” individual organisms or species are to their environment – is further related 
to her first problem of “agents” living in a fixed and unmalleable environment. But 
“fitness” specifically has to do with how simulations are typically designed, as Lana 
takes note, “in virtual worlds, evolution means that the fittest individuals will have 
more chance to reproduce than other less fit individuals. More often than not, it means 
that the species will reach an optimal, stable value of fitness, at which it stops 
evolving, or that fitness will oscillate around a constant value.” In other words, “fit” 
species will outcompete the less fit species, and in the process, win the game of 
survival, coming out on top with no “opponents”, “enemies” or “antagonists” over 
which to assert themselves. Following from this, each individual agent of a single 
species or group will stabilize and oscillate at a constant value, which means that they 
will become somewhat dormant with nothing more to do in their solipsistic world. 
Lana summarizes the second problem as it relates to the first, “I think it could be 
interesting to run a simulation where the environment would be subjected to 
evolutionary pressure, and where long term optimal fitness would not be reachable.”  
In theory, then, OEE can be achieved, Lana preemptively proposes, for example, by 
adjusting a fitness value of a digital organism as an extremely localized property, both 
in time and in space, making way for creating new niche environments. As such, 
“inter-individual interactions”, Lana says, “would prevent any good global solution to 
the problem of survival”, in the process making the model more “nuanced” and 
“original” in the sense of offering fidelity to how things work in “real life”. That is, 
rather than having individuals from one group fighting off against another group of 
individuals in order to survive, they would rather “mate” to produce offspring, which 
Lana prefers categorizing as “mutants”.  
In doing so, Lana makes the claim not to predefine “species”, but rather allow 
“speciation” to happen in situ. Evolution, then, should be “biased”, as she notes, to 
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generate “mutants” from new species that are “fitter” than mutants from “old” species 
without, she concludes, “any reference to complexity”. Finally, if speciation can be 
achieved, it will potentially ensure that the model will, in Lana’s words, “never get 
stuck”, and that “evolution should focus on affecting a net of inter-species interactions 
and the properties they rely on”. As Lana reassures me, this is not simply “theory-
talking”, so she had launched into proving her hypothesis by building her own model.  
 
The Model: A World That is Forever Interesting 
 
In her own research, Lana have for long been curious to figure out how to program a 
machine capable of adjusting its cognitive complexity to the environment, so that 
prediction emerges from action and classification emerges from prediction. “Action, 
Prediction, Classification by order of importance,” she says, “these are the functions 
an organism needs to use a complex environment to its advantage, and this is what 
happens in the real world.” To better understand this, i.e. how organisms adapt, 
cognitively, to the environment, Lana had made several models. In her current effort, 
however, to construct her own OEE-system, she had “stumbled” upon a paper by 
cognitive psychologist Donald D. Hoffman (2009).  
In the paper, Hoffman argues against three common assumptions about how human 
perception works. The first assumption is that the goal of perception is to estimate 
“true” properties of the world, the second assumption that the goal of categorization is 
to classify structure, and third and final assumption that aeons of evolution have 
shaped human senses to this end (Hoffman 2009). On “evolutionary grounds”, 
Hoffman argues, all three assumptions are false. Rather, as Hoffman states, “our 
perceptions constitute a species-specific user interface that guides behavior in a niche. 
Just as the icons of a PC’s interface hides the complexity of the computer, so our 
perceptions usefully hide the complexity of the world, and guide adaptive behavior.” 
(Hoffman 2009:1).  
Linking to her own interests, Hoffman’s proposal to offer a new “interface theory of 
perception”, Lana surmises that the following statements were also false: 1) that the 
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goal of perception is to estimate “true” properties of world, and 2) that evolution has 
supposedly shaped our sense to reach this goal. In accordance with Hoffman, then, the 
goal of perception, if there ever was one, is to “simplify the world” and that evolution 
will “favor” fitness over exactitude (Hoffman 2009). To this end, Lana reckons that 
there is a strong link between Hoffman’s claims and OEE, as a process not necessarily 
seeking optimization, but rather seeking novelty and newness. This includes for Lana 
the idea that fitness functions depend not simply on one factor, but on numerous 
factors, such as the “cost” of classification errors, the time and energy required to 
compute a category, and the specific properties of predators, prey and mates in a 
particular niche. In other words, Hoffman offers to Lana a more original, and indeed 
“realistic” take upon how “real” organisms adapt, cognitively at least, to their 
environment, an environment whose qualities and properties are not immediately 
available to the agent. The point being here that the lab members seek not only to 
build new models, but to build theories and concepts into them to better understand 
them.  
Thus, Lana had set about to design a model, partly based on Hoffman’s arguments, in 
which digital agents, (the “mutants”), do not have direct, perceptual, access, she 
notes, “to the exact, direct identity of others”, what she refers to, following Hoffman, 
as a “perceptual interface”. Equipping her mutants, then, with a perceptual interface, 
she claims, makes them “simplify” the world as “we do”, not to mistake it with 
fidelity. If one mutant, on the contrary, is to mistake the world for fidelity, as Lana 
warns me, it could “lead to terrible errors”. This is a major point in her nascent OEE-
system. Showing me a screenshot of her own first batch, she further warns me, 
“Beware! I absolutely do not care about the realism of the simulated world: light is 
born, and dies, reproduces and turn into animals,” making sure that I will not confuse 
it with reality. This allusion to “realism”, Lana affirms, means that I should not take 
her model as a full realization of the principles of OEE, but rather treat it as a sort of 
prototype, which contains things that do not correspond to how things work in the real 
world. As such, Lana is not, like Ikegami and Olaf are doing with their boid-model, 
pushing this model into an isomorphic relation as a such, but rather using it to explore 
what she associates with the concept of OEE, which is imagined to correspond to how 
evolution really works.  
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Lana narrates the screenshot above showing a part of her model, 
 
So, you have an artificial world with individuals that we hope will evolve 
into something interesting through interactions with each other. The 
yellow individuals are how we input free energy in the system. It means 
that they appear every few steps, ‘out of nothing’. They cannot move, or 
eat, or do anything interesting really. They just contain energy, and when 
the energy is used up, they die. I call it ‘light’. Then you have the mutants, 
which appear on the field like light, but with a random twist [grey and 
black individuals]. Maybe they can move, or hypothetically store more 
energy. Mutants can produce one or more kids if they reach a given 
energy threshold, so they do not need a mate in order to reproduce. The 
kid can in turn become a copy of their parents, or, mutants of mutants. 
Finally, you have the interesting mutants [red individuals]. These have 
sensors: if something has properties that their sensors can detect, they eat 
it, or try to eat it. Eating is the only way to store more energy, which can 
then be used to move, or have kids, or just not die, so that’s pretty 
important! 
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In Lana’s digital world, as shown on her screenshot, individuals do not have access to 
the exact “identity” – i.e. the amount of stored energy – of other individuals. Lana 
continues, “it sounds a bit like the real world, no?” as she appends, when she provides 
yet another example of how this is so, “you can say that buffaloes that move slowly 
are maybe not very energetic, so as a lion, you should try to eat them. But there is no 
guarantee that you will actually be able to overpower them, right?” Thus, each 
individual, in other words and to go back to her reference to Hoffman, has a 
“perceptual interface”, which “simplifies the world while not representing it with 
fidelity”. Or more precisely, what Lana is saying is that each mutant cannot fully 
know the properties, nor the intentions of the other, which in turn may lead to terrible 
errors that in this case potentially result in their own death: the lion cannot necessarily 
determine and know about the exact condition of the buffalo. Lana had thus prepared 
a virtual world with a wider margin of indeterminacy. “If we let this world evolve for 
long enough,” she concluded, “we might see interesting things.” 
 
The Quick and the Dead 
 
Running Lana’s model, “light” turns into “grass”, but with no hardwired definition of 
“species” is formulated in advance. Rather, speciation happens through interaction: 
when two individuals, or two mutants, encounter one another, one can never be sure 
of the other’s exact identity, that is, determine the “strength” of the other. However, 
through their sensors, each individual can estimate certain properties of the other, but 
must rely, as Lana says, on “heuristics”, “slow animals usually have less energy than 
me,” she explains, “therefore I should attack and eat them. Yet, you may well 
encounter an individual that appears slower than you to save energy for reproduction, 
but it still has more energy than you, hence you die in your attempt to attack it. 
Nonetheless, your heuristic, your estimation of the other, must be true most of the 
time in order for you to survive. The quicker individuals might then misread the 
slower individuals and thus end up dead.”  
In most of those simulations Lana already knows about, individuals from, say, 
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“species A” can easily recognize individuals from its own phylum or from “species 
B”, that is, know about the exact properties and identities of the other. In other words, 
A has full knowledge of B and vice versa, as Lana further reports,  
In most simulations that I have seen, an individual from species A can 
recognize any individual from species B or from its own species A with 
absolute certainty. I suspect that often this is hardcoded inside the 
program: ‘if x.species = A then ...’ Even if B undergoes a series of 
mutations increasing its fitness, A might be able to keep up by developing 
corresponding counter-mutations because there’s no choice. A eats B. If B 
becomes ‘stronger’, which means more energy storage, only the strongest 
member of A will survive and reproduce, making the entire group of A 
stronger. If some members of B become weaker through mutation, they 
will die. 
But how are perceptual interfaces key to Open-Ended-Evolution? As Lana reveals, 
evolution is not a game of the quick and the dead – becoming faster and stronger is 
not how one “wins” in evolution. Rather, if one equips an individual with a 
“perceptual interface” – a treacherous one it seems – “we allow the interplay between 
individuals or ‘species’ to be much richer and original,” she concludes. If one plays 
such a scenario with a perceptual interface installed,  
A only detects and eats individuals that have a maximum energy storage 
of X, and usually, these are individuals from species B. If some B mutate 
to get stronger, as far as A is concerned, they stop being food: they are not 
recognized as ‘B’. To survive, A might mutate to store mire than X energy 
and detect the new value of energy corresponding to B, but any other 
mutation is equally likely to help the survival of A, so maybe detecting 
only lower levels of energy would work if there are weak species around. 
Maybe exchanging the energy sensor for a speed sensor would help 
detecting B’s again or any other species. What if B become weaker? As 
far as A is concerned, B also stops being food because A’s sensors can 
only detect a certain level of energy. Not only B has several ways to ‘win’ 
over A, but A also has several ways to survive despite B’s adaptations by 
adapting to find B again, or by changing its food source.  
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However, upon finishing her explanation, Lana takes the reservation that one might 
object that this is not how the “real world” works, saying that “a cat will chase mice, 
even if they get slower.” Immediately turning this objection on its head, though, she 
rhetorically asks, “or will they? Quite a lot of animals actually evolved as not to be 
detected by their predators using tactics involving slow motion, even if it means 
moving slower in general, like sloths or in specific situation, like playing dead. In 
simulated worlds, however, going faster or becoming stronger is usually the best way 
to ‘win’ at evolution.” Now, while such descriptions make the assumption that there is 
biological, and to some degree behavioral continuity across realms biological and 
digital, it points to the fact that if this is the case, it can be algorithmically specified.  
 
The claim Lana is allowed to make from her OEE-model is that evolution is not about 
“winning”, or about becoming faster or stronger, as in Darwinian evolution, but 
rather, she argues, “despite that we don’t end up with a ‘blob of life’ with individuals 
spread everywhere, we don’t have a ‘tree of life’ clean and straight like in the 
textbooks. It’s more of a beautiful mutant broccoli of life, with blobs and branches. 
And this sim doesn’t even have sexual reproduction in it! That would make the 
broccoli even cooler.” After having run the “sim”, Lana, she was asking herself, she 
tells me, “did I build an OEE world? Ok, probably not. But I like it and it lived to my 
expectations.” Following Hayles once again, an OEE-system resides as much in the 
imagination as in the computer.  
 
Maker’s Knowledge 
 
At the Ikegami Lab, information is the true presupposition of our world in the sense 
that information is always-already posited. That is, as philosopher of science Susan 
Oyama (2000) would have it, “information … exists before the interactions in which 
it appears” (Oyama 2000:27). As such, this underwrites, I think, a structure of feeling 
among the lab members, a sense that the informational dynamics of life not only 
presuppose any sort of interaction, but also that the informational dynamics of life, i.e. 
how life is informationally organized, are somehow immortal. Indeed, if information 
can, in some instances, be pried apart from its material vessels in living and nonliving 
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entities, with information becoming the basis on which these entities are able to 
interact, then, as Ikegami notes, “information governs everything.” Here, though, I 
want to make a sober suggestion and claim that information is posited as a sort of 
meta-value, some shared quality, upon which the lab members are allowed to speak 
about life in a pure informatic idiom, an idiom that casts humans, machines, 
hurricanes, toasters and models on the same epistemological register: as complex 
dynamic systems, despite their ontological differences.  
 
To go back to Olaf’s reference to the movie The Matrix, and my own analogy to 
Plato’ allegory of the cave, the idea that “life” is knowable according to an informatic 
idiom, or rather that “life”, or some essential property of it, is animated by 
information, is perhaps the result of biology’s long process to distill and extract the 
core of life from what artificial life researchers now see as the flurry of deceiving 
shadows? To this end, as rhetorician Richard Doyle (1997) argues, life is the, “unseen 
unity that traversed all the differences and discontinuous of living beings,” becoming 
the “guarantor of biology, knowable only at a distance” (Doyle 1997:11). Similarly, 
devoid of material significance, but ascribed ultimate regulative and ordering power 
of the world, including its inhabitants, humans, machines or otherwise, information is 
the meta-value underlying life at the Ikegami Lab. In other words, as philosopher 
Eugene Thacker (2009) sees, life depends on an ontology that can never explicitly 
stated as such, so that life, Thacker notes, “appears as ontologically empty while it 
remains politically operative” (Thacker 2009:32). As such, something always, 
Thacker concludes, “happens” to life, as “that which is already expressed, already 
operative, already qualified.” (Thacker 2009:33).  
 
Or, to put it even more crudely, and perhaps even unfairly, if information is the 
“really real”, or the meta-value underlying life, it is perhaps the phlogiston – a 
substance supposed by 18th-century chemists to exist in all combustible bodies, a 
substance releasing in combustion (which later appeared as a pseudo-concept 
betraying their ignorance of how light really travels) – of contemporary 
technoscience? Nevertheless, information is what animates living and nonliving 
things for many of these lab members, who share the view that information is the 
“really real” to the epiphenomenal world we live in, offers a kind of cybernetically-
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inflected form of spirituality, one akin to that celebrated by figures such as Ray 
Kurzweil, who believes that it may be possible to upload human consciousness into 
long-lived robots (cf. Helmreich 2016:6).  
 
However, the fact that the existence of an “information layer” is “obvious” for 
artificial life researchers, as Olaf notes, it is so, I suggest, exactly because of the 
construction of models, as a backdrop for querying the informational patterns or 
structures of what they associate with living activity. Such an assertion, as rhetorician 
Richard Doyle (1997) further notes of the “postvital” turn in the twentieth-century, 
marks the collapse of the body, indeed of the material, onto “a transparent sequence 
that has nothing behind or beyond it” (Doyle 1997:13). However, while many of the 
lab members do seem to collapse bodies, living and nonliving, onto information, as 
the axiomatic basis upon which any interaction may occur, they still pursue a better 
understanding of the informational dynamics of life exactly by constructing models. 
Indeed, this confluence of making and knowing, between constructing things to make 
knowledge claims about the world, is endemic to what I mean by maker’s knowledge 
- the powerful knowledge that can be forged only be constructing, rather than finding, 
something new. 
 
Now, however, according to Ikegami, they still lack a proper understanding of how to 
deal with the relationship between “bodies” and “information.” More specifically, as 
Ikegami observes, while some of the lab members spend most of their time doing 
computer models, either revamping old ones or making new ones, they also raise a 
bunch of new questions about the relationship between the “information layer” and 
what he terms the, “physical layer”, a layer, which is simply the physical world of 
material bodies, the tangible world of materiality that we live in. Although 
information, at least to some of the lab members, can be completely pried apart from 
its material moorings, what keeps puzzling them is how to calibrate life’s 
informational dynamics to its material forms. This means that while one can speak of 
information as disembodied, the lab members do not fully recognize that it is so. To 
them, information might be governing everything, yes, but it is not necessarily 
disembodied or simply imagined to be “free-floating” outside the realm of materiality 
(cf. Helmreich 2016). 
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Thus, in keeping with Ikegami’s notion of the existence of a segmented and layered 
reality, then, he further laments, “even though information governs everything, we 
still try to understand the relation between the physical layer and the information 
layer, which is so far not successful,” to which he adds the question, “so, for example, 
if there’s one bit in the information layer, and there’s some physical structure that 
supports this one bit … I mean, if you take information from a DNA molecule and 
count one bit of DNA that encodes biological structures, how much energy is needed 
to support it?” What this means is that they lack a proper understanding of how to 
give body to information, so to speak, that is, how to translate the immortal qualities 
of information into material entities, so that such qualities might become further 
available to us and our senses in what Ikegami calls, “the real world”. 
 
It is to this complex I now turn: the problem of making sense of the relationship 
between the “information layer” and the “physical layer”, and especially what 
Ikegami means by the “real world”. More precisely, in the coming chapter, I examine 
how Ikegami construes the relationship between the “physical layer” and the “real 
world” in order to outline how the principles and logics of their informatic vision of 
vitality are extended and pushed into their understanding of reality itself. What I 
specifically want to make clear from this is that Ikegami is central to how the lab 
members see and understand reality itself. Indeed, I want to show how Ikegami 
becomes the author of an entire ontology, which is “performed” at the Ikegami Lab. 
And so, in the next chapter, I begin to unpack in more detail Ikegami’s nascent 
ontoepistemological that I call Ikegamianism, which is key to understand how 
Ikegami seeks to craft a new paradigm in science. That is, to be sure, by articulating 
MDF as an ontology, as I will show in the following chapter, I discern what 
constitutes the “onto” in the ontoepistemological framework I call Ikegamianism. 
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FLOWS 
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Takashi Ikegami’s office door at Komaba Campus, University of Tokyo. Photo 
courtesy of: author. 
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Atsushi Masumori updating us on his research at a lab meeting, Komaba Campus, 
University of Tokyo. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Introduction: The World of Massive Data Flows 
 
“We live in the era of massive, massive data flows,” Ikegami tells me one afternoon 
in his office. “The world,” he continues, “is overflowing with excess data flows and 
information and this is why we, as scientists, need to change the way we understand 
the world.” I notice his confidence when he speaks. “But this massiveness is not 
human,” he continues and pauses, brushing his hand through his dark fuzzy hair, and 
then continues to explain how this is so. These so-called “massive data flows” 
resounds what Ikegami means by the so-called “third era”, the era in which the world, 
following Barabási, who we met in chapter 2, has turned into one big laboratory. 
However, over the next hour or so, I discover that this “world” of “massive data 
flows”, which is supposedly rendered visible by the vast, and largely uncontrollable, 
digital footprints we leave in everyday life, is not the fantastic “nonhuman” digital 
reality we engage with on an everyday basis. Rather, as Ikegami explains, this 
“world” of “massive data flows” is the “real world”, not simply the digital world, one 
where all kinds of physical phenomena are emerging through all possible forms of 
informational exchanges, interactions, and the coming together of heterogeneous 
elements. 
 
I ask Ikegami to give an example of “massive data flows” and he readily responds, 
“well, I believe life is transient,” to which he appends that all phenomena, living and 
nonliving, including human beings, are basically conglomerates of heterogeneous 
“data flows”. Of course, this vision may come as no surprise, since all the lab 
members subscribe to the idea that informational dynamics are immortal. However, 
since Ikegami is equally concerned about the relationship between the so-called 
“information layer” and the “physical layer”, he here takes the notion of information 
to a new ontological level. The phenomenon of light, for example, shining off the 
surface of a wall, in turn making beautiful or strange-looking patterns; vibrations in 
the air produced by, say, a person’s throat that constitute what we know as language; 
or ripples on a liquid surface, making diffractive patterns, are all forms of physical 
phenomena, Ikegami asserts, that emerge and take shape through interactive 
dynamics, through “data flows”. And among such nonhuman phenomena, human 
beings, too, Ikegami continues, are “a common phenomenon that emerges out of 
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massive data flows,” an emergent phenomenon coming into existence as a fragile and 
precarious being just like anything else. Everything, Ikegami explains, is thereby 
impermanent and transient, and the so-called, “excess” data flows and information is 
what slips away and vaporizes, that, which never materializes into, say, solid units, 
diffractive patterns, human beings, or language, into syntax comprehensible to human 
ears. But this hyperbole, and what to me seems like a cybernetically-inflected vision 
of reality, Ikegami concludes, is one saturated, he says, with “too much information”. 
It is, in a word, a sort of reality somehow constituted not simply by information but in 
a deluge of it. But unlike Barabási’s digital reality, Ikegami’s reality is very “real”. 
 
Over the course of fieldwork, and as already noted, I would hear Ikegami and the lab 
members talk at length about how various phenomena, including human beings, as 
living phenomena, are basically fragile things. But such fragile things are not simply 
constituted by information, I learned, by heterogonous flows of information, but they 
are also seemingly entangled in a deluge of it. There is, in other words, too much 
information, too many flows, and so reality, or what Ikegami also refers to as the “real 
world”, is a sort of large-scale, more or less stochastic, complex dynamic system37. 
And insofar this is the case, Ikegami makes clear to me, we should, “embrace massive 
data in everyday life,” not only as constitutive of reality, that is, as that which is the 
basic substance of our world, but also, as he says, because “everyday life provides 
sufficient complexity and large data flows to conduct an effective analysis”. What the 
lab members need to do, as scientists, Ikegami suggests, is to learn how to harness 
and reassemble “information” - bits and pieces, bits and bytes - in new ways to 
construct new things in order to discover something new. But more importantly, I 
think, what Ikegami is really doing here is extending the logic of information and a 
cybernetic vision of reality into an ontological domain in claiming that, “the real 
world is composed of massive data flows”. 
 
                                                
37 Put into the language of the sciences of complexity, such a world is also a dynamical system capable 
of generating surprising emergent properties. However, more aligned perhaps to Ikegami’s background 
as a physicist, it also aligns to a quantum physics’ view of reality, one where there is no observable 
property of any system that in any meaningful sense has a reality extending beyond the mathematical 
equations that describe it. Yet, as we shall see later in this chapter, and the next, this world is indeed 
one that escapes the grip of mathematical equations, indeed, scientific formalisms.  
 144 
During fieldwork, many of my conversations with Ikegami often lapsed into highly 
abstract territory, and so this idea of “massive data flows”, as the basic ontological 
unit of reality, may not have come as a surprise. However, the sort of world Ikegami 
is here enacting, and the sort of world he wants to understand is not simply, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, “the information layer”, but rather a very “real” world 
suffused by “massive data flows”, or simply MDF. This world resembles, I think, that 
of Don DeLillo’s (2009) absurd media-saturated and information-glutted world of 
White Noise38 but is not confined to some virtual or digital domain. And maybe this 
analogy to DeLillo is not too far off, since the “real world”, according to Ikegami, is 
flooded with massive data flows to the extent that it creates more noise than signal. 
And so, this media-saturated “real world” cannot simply be apprehended and 
comprehended by the logics, tools, and installed systems of representation of what 
Ikegami refers to as “normal science”, which I will query in the next chapter, nor is 
this sort of reality simply reducible to, or replicable in, the binary logics of 
computation, which is why they must change the way they understand the world. The 
real world, in a word, is at once more complex, stochastic, irrational, unpredictable, 
emergent and transient than any computer program or digital reality is able to capture 
or replicate, and it is to this real world to which artificial life should be committed.  
 
Thus, if the main goal at the Ikegami Lab is ultimately to “construct” artificial life in 
the “real world”, as stated as a central ideal to the “third era”, I would be remiss not to 
ask: what is the real world? Particularly, what sort of “real world”, “reality”, or 
“principle of reality” are these researchers at the Ikegami Lab committed to when 
wanting to construct artificial life? What is it they seek to construct in the real world 
and what is the relationship between “construction”, “understanding” and “the real 
world”? If Ikegami and the lab members insist that they need to change how we 
understand the world, what sort of world is initially supposed to be understood, and 
                                                
38 In Don DeLillo’s postmodernist novel, White Noise, he comments on the dystopian connotations of 
late capitalism by pointing to the precariousness of the seemingly safe and idyllic life of small-town 
North America. However, the security of DeLillo’s consumer society is soon punctured by two 
disturbing events: an industrial accident leasing to the possibility of large-scale toxic contamination, 
and unlicensed drug experiments meant to cure the fear of death, which eventually lead to violence and 
death. DeLillo’s fiction combines humor and drama in an absurd world, juxtaposing the false 
certainties and dreams of white suburban communities and the cynical reality of a thoroughly 
commodified and TV-saturated reality. Two things especially stand out in analogy to Ikegami’s 
“world”: that the world has become increasingly suffused by information technologies, in turn 
saturating it with excessive data, and that much of this world is thus mediated and known through 
media.  
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later changed, if not the world of “nature”, nor to its computational doppelgänger, the 
virtual worlds of computer simulation? To better understand what it means to 
construct artificial life in the real world, I want to maintain, it is therefore equally 
important to understand what they mean by the “real world”, particularly what 
Ikegami means by MDF.  
 
In what follows, then, I want to address how Ikegami envisions and describes the real 
world, as a space ontologically over-excessive, complex, messy, hybridized, 
information-driven, and even, as Ikegami tells me, “savage, barbaric, and 
uncontrollable”. As we saw in the previous chapters, insofar physical phenomena of 
various types, such as humans, toasters, hurricanes, even markets, ecosystems and 
galaxies, may be considered to be complex dynamic systems, I here want to show 
how this line of thought is radically extended and amplified into an ontological 
domain to produce what I will claim is a culturally-specific ontology. Indeed, my 
claim here is that MDF, while being a concept and a human construction, is also a 
claim to reality itself. This demands direct comment: my argument is simply that 
Ikegami’s active extrapolation of reality, his vision of the “real world”, as engulfed in, 
and flooded by, “massive data flows”, is a direct claim to reality, which that MDF is 
not only a device to make a claim about reality, not simply as a descriptor of reality, 
but a direct claim to reality. This means, in short, that what is at stake here is reality 
itself. 
 
Now, once one accepts this, Ikegami’s claim to reality, consolidated in the notion of 
MDF, I believe, is part of his personal desire to construct his own paradigm. And by 
extending cybernetic tropes into ontological domains, I think, allows Ikegami not only 
to enact and perform an ontology, but also to forward-engineer the contours of a 
potential paradigm shift. This, too, demands direct comment: following 
anthropologist Nigel Thrift (2004), I want to discuss how MDF is a first and foremost 
a culturally-specific idea produced at by Ikegami to account for a world, “in which 
new qualities are being constructed, which are based on assumptions about how time-
space can turn up which would have been impossible before, spaces which are 
naturalistic in the sense that they are probably best presented as fluid forces which 
have no beginning or end.” (Thrift 2004:583). In this first reading of MDF, it may 
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simply be seen as is a culturally specific idea, which accounts for how Ikegami is 
constructing the qualities of the real world, as a sort of cybernetic, codified and 
datafied media-ecology. Such an “ecology” is not reducible to categories such as 
“nature” and “culture”, the “natural” and the “artificial”, and hence, with Thrift, MDF 
may be seen as a sort third term better equipped to account for reality.  
 
But, I want to take this claim a step further, and suggest that MDF is more than a 
culturally specific idea exactly by being a direct claim to reality. As such, I want to 
stretch my argument and treat Ikegami’s claim literally to propose that Ikegami and 
the lab members are in fact enacting, following anthropologist Mario Blaser (2009), 
an “ontology” of the world, whose very substance is massive data flows. The “real 
world”, as Ikegami claims, is basically a large-scale, non-linear and dynamic complex 
system, a sort of “figured materiality” (cf. Verran 2001), of “flow forms which strive 
for observation and projection” (Thrift 2004:590). And to this end, “ontologies”, such 
as the ontology of MDF, can be “enacted” and “performed” by concrete practices and 
interactions, as Blaser also notes, which means that ontologies do not precede 
themselves, but are rather performed in discourse and in practice (Blaser 2009:3). 
Thus, my claim is that MDF, as a claim to reality, applies pressure to already 
established biological understandings of “nature”, but it also becomes a device of 
“world-making”39 (cf. Stengers 2018) exactly by virtue of calling attention to, or 
indeed calling out, an ontology, which is not only saturated by information but 
flooded by it.  
 
Performing an ontology of MDF, I argue, is the first step of Ikegami’s plan and desire 
to construct and establish his own paradigm. What I mean by being the first step is 
that building, or rather “performing”, and ontology is expressive of what Ikegami’s 
flaming ambition to somehow offer new ways seeing and attending to the world. But 
it is also expressive of his role at the lab, as a central figure, who is able to provide 
ontological guidance to his lab members by inviting them to see reality as massive 
                                                
39 The notions of “Gaia” and “Chthulucene”, for example, are concerned with world-making in the way 
they capture, or attempt to capture, divergent and overlapping activities, often unintentional, many of 
which exist irrespective of human control (Tsing 2015a; Tsing 2015b).  
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data flows40. Finally, as it will later become apparent, this ontology is the first step in 
a larger plan to construct, I will argue, a new “ontoepistemological framework” (cf. 
Barad 2007), by which Ikegami offers guidance to his lab members. For now, though, 
this chapter concerns the ontological part of Ikegami’s ontoepistemological 
framework.  
 
The subtitle of this chapter – The Word for World Is Massive Data Flows – is 
therefore a recoded play on Stefan Helmreich’s (1998) chapter The Word for World Is 
Computer41 in his ethnography Silicon Second Nature, in which he shows how many 
of the early artificial life scientists at the SFI were convinced that “computers are 
literally alternative worlds” or “alternative universes” (Helmreich 1998:65). Thus, if 
early artificial life scientists, according to Helmreich, understood computers to be 
ontologically on par with “nature”, as self-consistent, complete, and closed systems 
governed by low-level rules that support higher-level phenomena, seeing them as 
machines operating much like “nature”, then Ikegami and his lab members understand 
computers to be ontologically discontinuous with “reality”. As such, computer 
simulations may be “worlds” in themselves, but they do not correspond to, or align 
themselves with, the complexity of the real world. And once one accepts that MDF is 
not simply a reasonable model of reality, but also indeed synonymous with reality 
itself, it makes sense to say that Ikegami and the lab members aspire to the assertive 
claim that the world is massive data flows. Allow me to begin by sketching how the 
lab members talk about the “real world” and how Ikegami defines “massive data 
flows”, MDF, and how they construe the relationship between MDF and the real 
world.  
 
                                                
40 Meanwhile, one may equally question the novelty in Ikegami’s ontology. Is he not simply replicating 
a quantum physics’ view of reality, simulating a cybernetic vision of reality, or is he simply talking 
into the hype of his day? Also, one may speculate whether Ikegami is also here applying ideas from 
one domain onto another. For example, if Social Darwinism is a set of theories that apply biological 
concepts to sociology, politics and social life, is MDF not similarly applying cybernetic principles and 
concepts to reality to the point where it conflates with reality? 
41 In his book, the title of the chapter The Word for World Is Computer is itself a play on sci-fi author 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s (1976) The Word for World is Forest, a tale about a tribe of forest-dwelling people 
who use their dreams as a resource for guidance in the waking world (Helmreich 1998:65). However, 
unlike early artificial life researchers’ claim that computers are ontologically on par with nature, the 
artificial life researchers at the Ikegami Lab claim the opposite: computers are not worlds but tools with 
which to explore phenomena “outside” but also “internalized” phenomena such as mind, memory, and 
more.  
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Massive Data Flows  
 
On numerous occasions, I overheard lab members speak about the “real world” as 
opposed to the digital worlds of computer simulations. None of them, as it may 
already be apparent from the previous chapters, claimed that computer simulations 
were accurate copies of the real world, but rather that they could spark new questions 
about life and the living. Moreover, simulations, many of them claimed, often 
harbored their own internal logics, logics that were preconfigured and determined by 
their creators, not by “nature” or the “real world”, which also hampered their 
credibility in terms of being accurate representations of reality. The real world, many 
of them claim, is on the contrary both uncontrollable and unpredictable, governed by 
its own logics and dynamics, which cannot easily be replicated within any computer 
system. While the lab members have different ways of describing the real world, the 
most protuberant term used for describing reality is, however, “massive data flows”, 
or simply, MDF, a theoretical term invented for pinning down the uncontrollable, 
open, stochastic and volatile dynamics of the real world. So, while lab members do 
talk about the real world, Ikegami is the one consolidating MDF as a shorthand for 
what they mean by it.  
 
Thus, in its most basic sense, Ikegami defines MDF as such, 
 
MDF is a generic term that identifies a new kind of system dynamics: 
self-organization in complex open environments. Composed of many 
interacting heterogeneous elements, MDF systems exhibit self-referential, 
self-modifying, and self-sustaining dynamics that can enable door-
opening innovations. While the Web may be the best example of an MDF 
system, the concept is generic to natural and artificial systems such as 
brains, cells, markets and ecosystems. 
 
In this basic definition of MDF, we learn that it is generic in the sense of being highly 
capacious and plastic, which renders it is sufficiently hazy enough to be applied to 
just about any kind of system ranging from the slimy organs called brains to the 
abstract categories called biospheres. As such, an MDF-system may not be any 
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different, say, from any other complex dynamic system described by the lab members, 
for example like those we encountered in the previous chapters: anything from 
economies and ecosystems, as higher-order, although nonlinear and non-equilibrium, 
systems, may here count as “MDF-systems” with the inherent potential for 
“emergence”. To this end, this extreme degree of conceptual elasticity recalls many of 
the ideas we encountered in the previous chapters, in which ideas of complex systems 
science have been smuggled into the nomenclature of artificial life. Yet, what is here 
made to make a difference between MDF-systems and complex dynamic systems, 
according to Ikegami, is that MDF-systems operate in “complex open environments”, 
i.e. in the “real world”, a site which is profoundly out of control and unpredictable.  
 
In a sharper definition of MDF, though, it is described as a concept, as they say, 
which, “is the generic term that explains the co-evolution of excess flows,” that, 
“provides a new methodology for understanding data flows, which includes material, 
energy and information flows”. MDF is thereby, “analogous to Darwinian evolution 
and the organization of an ecological system,” in the way, “MDF patterns grow, and 
this growth determines the organization of a systems’ own state autonomously”. Now, 
according to this specification, particularly the specifying notion that MDF is 
analogues to Darwinian evolution, does not mean that MDF is opposed to biological 
evolutionary processes. Rather, it means that MDF is based on principles of 
Darwinian evolution, which is to say that it works much in the same way.  
 
But some of the lab members also stress that MDF supersedes the principles of 
natural evolution, which means that it in turn becomes “larger” than natural evolution 
itself exactly by encompassing things that are not normally subsumed by such 
principles. For example, if natural selection privileges genealogy as the marker of 
organic species – for example that all life is related and has descended from a 
common ancestor - MDF privileges, they say, “a bundle of evolutionary paths” that 
gestures towards the idea that “life emerges in adjacent possible events”, i.e. as a 
future type that arises not from a single source but from multiple sources. It is, in 
other words, not necessarily the coming together of biological substances or 
circumstances from a single “primordial soup”, which is the only path giving rise to 
life; a bundle of excess flows of data and information may equally give rise to the 
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living. Stressing that MDF somehow supersedes natural evolution, then, is what 
supposedly makes it special to many of the lab members, who use the term to deviate 
from any “normal” understanding of evolution. But as a self-invented concept, the 
term functions, I think, to mark a specific version of reality, which is explicitly 
different from other versions that deal with the complexities of evolution, nature, and 
reality.  
 
Now, before going any further to discuss how the term MDF is applied in their work, 
this notion that MDF is analogous to Darwinian evolution demands direct comment. I 
quickly found myself into deep theoretical waters when I learned that MDF was a sort 
of spin-off from Darwinian evolution, itself a theory of evolution. It seemed, I 
remember thinking, like an ambitious and bombastic intellectual project to offer an 
entirely new theory of evolution. Indeed, it struck me that MDF was something like a 
theory of everything. What do they specifically mean when they say that MDF is 
“analogous” to Darwinian evolution, and what is “adjacent possible events”? How is 
MDF different from Darwinian evolution? Why the need to mark this difference?  
In its most basic sense, Darwinian evolution, needless to say, is associated with its 
namesake, the famous naturalist Charles Darwin, who in the mid- to late nineteenth-
century speculated that living form materialized out what could be environmental or 
ecological dynamics, dynamics by which he formulated his theory of evolution by 
natural selection. All life, Darwin ruminated, is related, and has descended from a 
common ancestor, and as random mutations occur within the “genetic code” of an 
organism, only the beneficial mutations are preserved in the service of survival (cf. 
Darwin in Beer 2000). The beneficial genetic mutations are passed on to the next 
generation and so on, and over time, accumulating and resulting in an entirely 
different organism, which may not be considered a variation of the original, but 
altogether different in kind. Thus, for Darwin, the “forms” at stake in his theory of 
evolution materialize in organic “species” or “organisms”, that is, as durable but 
changeable genealogical kinds “emerging”, as it were, from evolutionary processes.  
Now, if MDF is analogous to these processes, then it means that all living form may 
equally materialize out of massive, excessive data flows, which in the words of the 
lab members include “material, energy and information flows”, i.e. more than the 
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biological. This also allows them, I think, to claim, or at least speculate, that life 
might emerge and take form through processes and dynamics that are not exclusively 
“natural”, nor organic. However, it is not quite so simple, since MDF does not settle 
into an equilibrium, nor seeks to optimize from evolutionary processes in the sense 
that it is only about survival42 of the fittest, as canonically coined by Darwin’s 
countryman, philosopher and biologist Herbert Spencer, but rather it keeps pushing 
into what the “adjacent possible”. However, before moving on to discuss adjacent 
possible theory, I will here pause to comment on the idea of continual and random 
evolution contrary to fixed and determined evolution, which is seemingly inherent to 
the notion of MDF. In later years, after Darwin first began to consolidate a more 
thorough idea of natural evolution, he thereby offered an alternative to, “the 
rationalistic ideal of the complete determination by fixed law of the behavior of each 
individual particle in the universe” (Wiener 1972:4). In other words, the results of 
Darwin’s work offered a vision of a world that was open, undetermined, pluralistic, 
random and individual, a world in which the development of living things was subject 
to certain environmental processes. Yet, the outcomes of such processes depended, 
according to Darwin, upon chance, accident and coincidence, as individual variations 
were fundamentally unpredictable and undirected (cf. Wiener 1972). To this end, 
MDF and Darwinian evolution are analogous, but they disagree on the what counts as 
the constituent parts.   
The “adjacent possible”, which is also part of MDF, is in its most basic sense 
associated with theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman’s43 (2008) notion of “adjacent 
possible theory”. Adjacent possible theory posits that evolution always pushes into 
the so-called “adjacent possible”, into shadow futures hovering on the edges of the 
present state of things (Kauffman 2008). In other words, if Darwin’s “forms” 
materialize in “species” and “organisms” (that is, settle into concrete things, however, 
based on contingency and randomness), they may equally, according to Kauffman, 
also hold an infinite set of possible forms or, in his terminology, an infinite set of 
                                                
42 That is, MDF-systems do not necessarily sustain themselves only because they vie to survive and 
reproduce, for example, by having the only function to pass on beneficial mutations in the service of 
survival. More likely, MDF-systems are patterned systems that seek to expand, or become something 
other than what they were, by adapting to environmental conditions.  
43 On a side note, Kauffman was himself associated with the Santa Fe Institute from 1986 to 1997, the 
years during which the field of artificial life was drawn into coherence by its founder Christopher 
Langton.  
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“adjacent possibles”. Living forms, then, may potentially become something other 
than what they are, always-already holding the potential to become something more, 
something less, something different, or something new. Kauffman himself claims that 
biospheres, for example, on average keep expanding into the adjacent possible 
(Kauffman 2008), that is, that biospheres always push “outwards” to increase the 
diversity of what can happen next. Yet, if they expand too rapidly, they will destroy 
their own internal organization, which leads Kauffman to propose the that a system, 
such as the biosphere, complex as it may be, must maintain an internal gating 
mechanism. The point being that biospheres are essentially too complex to predict, 
which means that a biosphere’s “configuration space” – the specific set of known 
variables, laws and forces at play – is in advance unknowable and unpredictable.  
Kauffman’s “configuration space”, in turn, may be thought of as Darwin’s “pre-
adaptations”, by which a causal consequence of a part of an organism may turn out to 
be useful in some new, surprising way, a consequence that cannot be predicted in 
advance. For example, the fact that squirrels have developed useful “wings” from 
useless “flaps,” or that some molecular mutation in a bacterium suddenly allows it to 
pick up calcium currents, are instances of the unpredictable qualities of Darwin’s pre-
adaptions or Kauffman’s configuration space. In short, such mutations count as 
instances where morphologies, as it were, push into the adjacent possible – they 
become something other than what they were. More to the point, Kauffman’s own 
models, though rigorous, mathematical and dense, posit that adjacent possibles are 
always-already potential, undetermined, and surprising, always hovering as shadow 
futures at the edges of the present state of things. Kauffman, however, in contrast to 
Darwin, has taken this idea to its logical conclusion, noting that adjacent possible 
theory not only concerns evolution or organic things, but rather all kinds of 
phenomena, including the real world, social processes, society, synthetic substances, 
and artificial media, things that may equally be mutually entangled and always-
already pushing into the adjacent possible. As such, Kauffman’s more ambitious 
claim holds that an innumerable potentiality for becoming something else is key to the 
adjacent possible. Yet, still, one cannot posit in advance, nor predict, the outcomes.   
Stochasticity, randomness, unpredictability, and indetermination are essential 
components of MDF-systems that they are considered to be “open” systems, which 
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means that they always carry the potential for becoming something else (i.e. they are 
non-equilibrium systems). MDF-systems are generated in complex interactions of 
material, energy and information flows (thus, they are non-linear systems), and, as 
Ikegami tells me,  
 
Unlike systems studied in isolation or at equilibrium, MDF-systems are 
open and driven systems, existing within a rich context, constantly 
changing, growing, evolving, and thereby autonomously changing the 
way in which they interact with the environment around them. The 
patterns that they exhibit are neither imposed from outside, nor arise 
internally, but are a consequence of the interface between endogenous 
data flows within the system and exogenous data flows that perturb it. 
 
Now, the point here, following Ikegami, is that MDF-systems do not exist prior to 
their interactions, which means that they “emerge” and “self-organize” from the 
muddle of massive data flow themselves. As such, as Ikegami concludes, “if ‘Big 
Data’ systems exhibit volume, velocity, and variety, MDF-systems exhibit vitality.” 
Notably, Ikegami’s version of Darwinian evolution and its associated theory of the 
adjacent possible is built and assembled on the basis of prior theories. Yet, MDF is 
itself, to pun, a variation of other more or less similar theories made to mark clear 
differences from conventional Darwinian ideas about evolution through natural 
selection. But any attempt to untangle and comprehend any real differences between 
Darwinian evolution and MDF still seems difficult, as both theories suggest that 
evolutionary outcomes cannot be predetermined in advance and thereby depend upon 
chance. This focus on chance and serendipity, though, is exactly what makes it 
compelling and operative.  
 
When asked to clarify how MDF is different from Darwinian evolution, Ikegami tells 
me that it is exactly by what it refers to: MDF is not simply “natural evolution”, nor 
identical to Darwinian evolution, but rather a modified conception of evolution that 
encompasses more than the “natural”. It is, in the words of Ikegami, “larger” than 
biological life. MDF, Ikegami asserts, is a single, universal conceptual framework that 
allow the them to describe dynamic processes of self-organization and self-modifying 
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capacities inherent to an infinite number of entities – living and nonliving, even 
languages, cultures, humans and nonhumans – and not simply “organisms” or 
“species”. Anything, which can be termed “system” in the sense that it is a composite 
of other things, according to MDF, basically evolve according to the same 
evolutionary logic. But the point is that evolutionary processes do not only occur in 
“nature”.  
 
MDF, however, is not so much fully-fledged theory of evolution, but rather itself a 
rewired variation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, peppered with more recent 
scientific insights and concepts provided by scientists such as Stuart Kauffman and 
Kenneth Stanley (the latter, whose ideas about OEE we saw in chapter 3). While 
MDF is not a fully consistent theory, it is after all, I think, a social tool that is the 
difference that makes a difference in the sense that it exposes Ikegami’s desire for 
inventing new theoretical apparatuses, and ultimately his desire for articulating his 
own paradigm. That is, MDF, although in many ways resembling established 
evolutionary principles, is a useful social tool for establishing professional and 
intellectual boundaries between artificial life and, say, conventional biology, for 
example, in terms of defining what evolution really is. But more importantly, it also 
expresses, I want to suggest, a desire to be innovative and inventive. 
 
Once one accepts that MDF is a concept that accounts for how various forms of 
worldly phenomena, and not just natural phenomena, come-into-being through 
interaction, it can easily be extended, I think, to describe the “real world”. The “real 
world”, then, is at the Ikegami Lab imagined to be a sort of open-ended, highly 
precarious, yet unpredictable, system always-already pushing holding the potential for 
pushing into the adjacent possible with an infinite number of potentialities and 
probable proclivities. At least in theory. Now, in what follows, I want to show how 
MDF becomes operative to their work at the lab by examining one particular MDF-
system: “The Web”. The Internet, they believe, once again following Barabási, is a 
site where to explore the dynamics of massive data flows, a site leaving residues of 
human interaction and sociality. 
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The Wide World Web 
 
I met Mizuki Oka in a basement café in central Tokyo. Oka, a computer scientist from 
the Tsukuba University and an external lab member of the Ikegami Lab, wore a sharp 
pair of steel-rimmed glasses, navy blue chinos and a white shirt44. Although employed 
at Tsukuba University outside Tokyo, she was at the time of my fieldwork engaged in 
a collaborative research project with Ikegami, a project about “tagging” in web-
services. After buying her a cup of coffee, she tells me that once Ikegami introduced 
her to artificial life a few years back, she “felt like a bachelor student again”. 
Artificial life was less “rigid”, she tells me, which immediately remedied her ongoing 
frustrations about computer science, her native discipline. For too long, she continues, 
she had been frustrated about the uptight ways computer scientists tended to design 
software systems. “Computer science is a very rigid science. Well, it’s not really a 
science, and people don’t care about theory, about understanding what’s behind […]” 
she goes on, “artificial life cares about that, artificial life is science.”  
 
Over the next hour or so, Oka tells me about the many differences between computer 
science and artificial life, slowly lapsing into talking about her own collaborative 
project with Ikegami. “The web … or the Internet”, she says, “is a perfect example of 
a complex system,” a term she had been introduced to by Ikegami, “like an 
ecosystem, the web has its own internal structure and logic. So, Ikegami-san and I 
wanted to explore that.” The Internet, Oka suggests, is a complex system, a site for 
exploring human behavior as good as any other place because it is, in her words, 
“open” to external perturbations and interventions, a criterion for real world activity. 
A few years prior to my arrival in Japan, she and Ikegami had agreed to do a project 
on “tagging” dynamics and behaviors online, seeing, for example, social media 
platforms as complex, yet open complex systems, which are self-referential, self-
modifying, and self-sustaining.  
 
                                                
44 Mizuki Oka is one of the close collaborators of the Ikegami Lab whom I had the pleasure to meet in 
person. Besides working on projects with Ikegami, she is employed as an assistant professor at 
Tsukuba University, one of the oldest universities in Japan. Oka is rarely, however, at the lab, and have 
no other formal affiliation than being an “external member”. 
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Oka’s symbolic association between the Internet and ecosystems - with the word 
“ecosystem” conventionally meant to describe a community of living organisms in 
conjunction with the nonliving components of their environment - is also 
commonplace among other lab members. Indeed, Oka, like many other lab members, 
does not shy away from using biological concepts and metaphors to describe technical 
or non-natural systems, for example, such as the Internet. Like an ecosystem, the 
endogenous structure of the Internet itself, Oka further tells me, is being continuously 
reorganized upon being perturbed by exogenous flows. To her, it is evident that our 
era of mass media and the proliferation of the Internet, she says, “carries” so much 
information that we, as humans, are unable to keep pace, i.e. unable to make full 
meaning of all the information around us. Thus, “the Internet-system”, Oka reports, 
“consists of a massive number of computers and signal transmission cables, such that 
each composite computer is a purposeful unit that receives and sends information to 
other computers”. Seeing the Internet system, then, as a “real world” instantiation of 
an MDF-system (not a complex dynamic system), Oka further suggests that it can 
itself be considered as a large-scale “homeostatic” device, operating like some sort of 
living “super-organism”, transferring and exchanging information at an 
incomprehensible rate. In other words, according to Oka, it makes perfect sense 
describing such a system as a sort of “living” system or an “MDF-system” since it 
performs analogously to, say, an ecosystem.  
 
Ikegami, too, notes that “though the Internet changes quickly, it preserves a certain 
structure over time. But at the same time, new pages are constantly being created, 
either by people or by automated bots. […] the Internet is capable of constantly 
exchanging data by adapting to environmental changes. This ‘ecosystem’ of the 
Internet has been established over the past several decades”. Ikegami and Oka’s 
explicit analogy, linking “the Internet” to “ecosystems”, as historian of science Lily 
Kay (2000) has noted, is not only striking but also indicative of the prevalence of 
computational metaphors for things biotic, which were ported into biology from 
linguistics and information sciences during the 1940s and 1950s (Kay 2000). Here, 
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however, as Ikegami and Oka reveal, they are now ported back from biology to the 
information sciences45.  
 
Now, if the word “ecosystem”, according to Oka and Ikegami, is a metaphor for how 
the Internet works, it presumes commensurability between both human and nonhuman 
agents, or “users”, in terms of organization. MDF-systems, in other words, are 
organized by organization, organization builds organization. But if the word 
“ecosystem” applies to the “Internet-system”, construed as an “MDF-system”, that is, 
if these systems are qualitatively identical, it seizes to be a metaphor; they become 
ontologically synonymous with one another, and only then does it make sense to 
claim that we are indeed engulfed in “massive data flows”. And rightly so, as Ikegami 
claims, “the Web is a candidate for lifelike phenomena, in which services that run on 
the Web must deal with massive data flows, where the underlying structure and the 
overlying information flow changes constantly.” Social networking services, such as 
Twitter, LINE or Facebook, for example, as Ikegami elaborates, are nowadays major 
sources for generating web dynamics that might be similar to the dynamics of nervous 
systems or ecosystems. “Such spatially and temporally extended web space”, Ikegami 
tells me, “can be used as a metaphor for living states or conscious states, as the Web 
picks up the unconscious state of collective human behaviors, for example, 
recommendations of products or advertisements based on the user’s collective 
behavior.” And so, Ikegami and Oka are not subtle about the idea that the Internet 
works much like a super-organism, rather, they are quite explicit about it, as Ikegami 
reports,  
 
The Web is perhaps the most complex system that we know of. Its 
massive scale, complex dynamism, open richness, and social character 
mean that it may more profitable to study using tools and concepts 
appropriate for understanding nervous systems, organisms, ecosystems 
and society, rather than approaches more traditionally employed to 
engineer technology. Simultaneously, scientists, like us, who try to 
                                                
45 For an elaborate account of how physics and information theory have influenced molecular biology 
in the mid-twentieth century, read Lily Kay’s Who Wrote the Book of Life?: A History of the Genetic 
Code, in which she notes, for example, that the “language of life” is a metaphor infused with 
“operational force” that was made literal and given scientific legitimacy by linguistics only in the 
1950s and 1960s (Kay 2000:1).  
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understand this wide array of complex natural systems may have much to 
gain by considering the emerging study of the Web. 
 
What is perhaps clear from this assertion is that metaphors, following Lily Kay once 
again, travel freely between artificial life and biology, between the natural sciences 
and the information sciences. But while Ikegami and Oka are, however, claiming that 
the Internet-system is an ecosystem, like a sort of super-organism, they are also 
making an ontological claim, not simply a metaphorical one. Just as the Internet is an 
entity held together by relations and by interactions, pushing into the adjacent 
possible, so too is reality a sort of configuration space, by which it always becomes 
something other than what it was. As MDF patterns grow in order to determine the 
organization of a systems’ own state autonomously, there is nothing preventing 
Ikegami and Oka claiming that this also applies to how the real world works. Society, 
like an ecosystem, for example, is equally structured by social relations, constituting a 
large-scale network, in which individuals may perturb the collective and vice versa, 
and as such, society, like and ecosystem, may be no different from the Internet. In this 
sense, it makes perfect sense for Oka and Ikegami to claim that the web is a sort of 
“model” of social relations, which can be mapped and analyzed.  
 
The Internet-system, like the any real world-system, or indeed a system constituted, as 
Ikegami notes, in “real world dynamics”, in other words, is what emerges or what 
happens in between endogenous data flows within the system and exogenous data 
flows that perturb it.  
 
Now, once one accepts that it is reasonable to conflate such phenomena on a 
qualitative register, this kind of cybernetic thinking, one might say, collapses things 
into transient flows and flux, processes and transitions, which in turn riffs on the idea 
that things, such as the Internet or society, rather than being things that exist prior to 
their interaction, are things that emerge. Such postmodernist ideas have been around 
for quite a while, and besides relating to a slew of ideas concerning “emergence”, 
such ideas may also recall feminist scholar Karen Barad’s (2007) notion that entities 
emerge in, “the mutual constitution of entangled agencies” (Barad 2007:33), what 
Barad terms, “intra-action”. Thus, Barad opposes her term “intra-action” to the 
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conventional notion of “interaction”, as that which assumes a prior separation 
between individual agencies that do not precede their intra-action: agencies, or if we 
follow Nathaniel’s notion of “individuation” from the previous chapter, “emerge 
through their intra-action” (Barad 2007:33). More to the point, this claim that the 
Internet is an MDF-system, situated and constituted in the real world, means that its 
distinct agency and identity, and the features Ikegami and Oka associate with it, such 
as massive scale, complex dynamism, open richness, social character, etc., are distinct 
only in a relational sense, not in any fixed or absolute sense. The Internet, as well as 
the real world, then, cannot exist outside the mutual entanglements of massive data 
flows, without which it they could not exist independently as MDF-systems.  
 
An MDF-system, then, is what forms up - or what is kept in-formation by information 
- in a dynamic configuration space, in which human-nonhuman borders are 
transgressed, as they are reconfigured by endogenous and exogenous data flows. As 
such, they are systems emerging, as Donna Haraway notes, “only by relation, by 
engagement in situated, worldly encounters” (Haraway 1994:64) that take place in a 
socio-technical “apparatus” (Barad 2007). Here, though, this claim, as I have been 
trying to suggest, is further pushed into a relation of equivalence with reality itself, as 
a site of massive data flows, in which we, according to Ikegami and Oka, emerge 
ourselves as MDF-systems. Yet, once this is clear, Ikegami is not shy to further 
extend this claim to include the “real world”, indeed, to claim that the world is 
ontologically “too complex”. 
 
The Complexity of the Real World 
 
While not all artificial life researchers at the Ikegami use the concept of MDF, all of 
them refer to the “real world”, as a space, which is highly complex, although not 
completely distinct, from the virtual worlds of computer simulations. That is, the real 
world is not as such ontologically distinct from the virtual worlds in their computers; 
rather the virtual worlds are simply part of the real world. The real world, the lab 
members say, is therefore omnipresent, like a cosmos, in which everything is part. 
Some lab members, however, use MDF and the notion of the real world 
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interchangeably, but maintain, as we saw in the previous chapter, that information is 
the basic ontological unit common for living and nonliving things. For example, Lana 
notes that, “artificial life focuses on the body and its interactions with the real world,” 
suggesting that artificial life systems should be somehow able to act within, and take 
action upon, a physical world and not just remain couched in the virtual realm of the 
computer. Ikegami, when not using the term MDF, believes that, “the real world is 
complex and unpredictable,” a world, “beyond logic, because there’s something 
beyond logic that living systems use to survive in the world”, which also bolsters the 
need for focusing on what Ikegami calls, “real world dynamics”. At the core of such 
claims, still, is that information is that relational substance that ultimately binds and 
unbinds entities. Putting it this way, there is nothing preventing Ikegami and the lab 
members to claim that reality is jumble of massive data flows.  
 
All the lab members agree on the baseline distinction that the “real world”, whether 
glossed in the concept of MDF or not, is an “open-ended world system”, a somewhat 
entropic space that is essentially highly complex and unpredictable46. Such a world, 
moreover, cannot simply be apprehended by any mechanistic modes of reasoning, 
which have historically been employed by science. Neither can it be fully understood 
by the binary logics of computation, nor be observed from a detached point of 
observation, from a “God’s eye”-perspective. In the real world, Ikegami claims, the 
rules of causality do not apply. And as he further notes, “in the real world, I’m part of 
the world, and it is from here we want to describe it, the ‘internal observer’,” an 
observation that makes sense due to the fact that things basically emerge in massive 
data flows, including “life”, and the fact that the real world is omnipresent, always-
already. “I mean, computers are, of course, part of the world too,” Ikegami continues, 
“but they have no power to change anything in the real world. Computer-generated 
monsters will never eat you. Cause and effect can be simulated in computers, not in 
the real world,” bolstering Lana’s suggestion that artificial life systems need physical 
bodies to interact with the world. “In the real world,” Ikegami continues, “we should 
                                                
46 This view includes seeing the “real world” as open-ended site containing a certain amount of “free 
energy” available for entities to “self-organize”, a view that resounds a physics-view of the universe. 
This view, in turn, is informed by theoretical and quantum physics, which hold that free energy is what 
entities need at their disposal to self-organize and maintain their organization. Free energy, on this 
view, is the resource living things compete for.  
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not try to stop the massive data flows, but recognize that it’s there and then make 
something out of it.” 
 
Ikegami’s statement here, I think, also demands direct comment: the complexity of 
the real world, according to this view, is ontologically discontinuous with the 
complexity that can be conjured in computational media. However, more importantly, 
Ikegami is here alluding once again to the sort of maker’s knowledge introduced in 
the previous chapter: that massive data flows are not just constitutive of reality, but so 
too, something to be harnessed and made use of to produce something new. Yet, one 
of the reasons as to why computers have no power to change anything in the real 
world is tied to the lab members’ notion of “complexity”, which is here defined as an 
in-between form of complexity in the sense that it refers to that which is both 
organized and disorganized. Allow me to pause for a bit in order to explain how 
Ikegami and the lab members define “complexity”.  
 
Darwinian evolution is an example of organized complexity, Lana tells me, because 
“it involves components strongly coupled together, producing organized data that 
cannot be described by using only statistics”, whereas “Brownian motion”47, on the 
contrary, may constitute an example of disorganized complexity, since it refers to data 
that is produced from many components of the system loosely interacting together. 
The type of data generated from disorganized complexity looks complex if each point 
is observed in isolation, but it can be described in a simple way using probability 
distributions (cf. Weaver 1947). The sort of “complexity” Ikegami refers to is both 
(organized and disorganized), which is perhaps best shored up by mathematician 
James P. Crutchfield (1989), who defines complexity as a mixture of two types of 
simple systems: random systems, which look complex but are statistically simple, and 
periodic systems, which are simple to predict. Systems between these two extremes 
qualify, according to Crutchfield (and Ikegami), as “complex” (cf. Crutchfield & 
Young 1989). This view of complexity, then, in the words of Ikegami, essentially 
renders computers unable to capture both modes of complexity, either in terms of lack 
                                                
47 Brownian motion, or pedesis, named after the botanist Robert Brown in 1827, refers to the random 
motion of particles suspended in a fluid – liquid or gas – resulting from their collision with the fast-
moving molecules on the fluid. The patterns generated in Brownian motion are formed from random 
fluctuations in a particle’s position inside a fluid sub-domain with relocation to another sub-domain. 
Each relocation is then followed by more fluctuations within the new closed volume.  
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of computational power or because computer simulations are too tightly controlled by 
the experimenter, i.e. only able to reach a tightly controlled form of complexity. The 
real world, according to this logic then, may be said to emerge in, and consist of, a 
mixture of organized and disorganized forms of complexity, never completely 
predictable and knowable, but always able to push into the adjacent possible.  
 
What Ikegami and the lab members refer to as the, “complexity of the real world”, is 
a sort of complexity, between disorganized and organized, that exceeds the levels of 
complexity one can fabricate within computational media. This is why the real world, 
as Ikegami says, “provides sufficient complexity and large data flows to conduct an 
effective analysis.” But this also means, Ikegami tells me, that “the real world is 
basically unpredictable, as he offers a sober down-to-earth example,  
 
[in the real world] there are people with autism, there are criminal people, 
and so on, so what is typical human behavior? It’s quite difficult to define, 
right? Maybe the common denominator is that we use the same chemical 
and cellular systems, chemical components and architectures, things that 
we, humans, share with each other. That’s basically the only thing that we 
share, but also culture … There’s something that we share with each 
other. I mean, there are some things, like cells and culture that humankind 
share. However, if you’re trying to detect whether this guy is a ‘typical’ 
human then we’re faced with some difficulties, so there’s no proper 
definition of what’s ‘human’ or what’s ‘humankind’. That’s what I call 
life, you know, in the real world. What we miss in a computer is a sense 
of ‘being there’; life is essentially scary, right? Uncontrollable, barbaric, 
savage. Life is not simulated, it’s lived. 
 
In fact, during many of my conversations with Ikegami during fieldwork, he variously 
alluded to this conception of reality, as a “lived” reality in the sense that it is first and 
foremost experiential and subjective. To this end, Ikegami claims that, “life is not 
simulated, it’s lived”, a view, one might say already, that runs somewhat contrary to 
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what any hard-nosed, natural scientist is willing to admit48. But this is not to say that 
the real world is any less complex.  
 
Indeed, Ikegami’s view of a lived and experientially available reality, in which the 
rules of causality are inoperative, bespeaks, I think, what sociologist Andrew 
Pickering (2010) calls an “ontology of unknowability” – a sort of nonmodern view of 
reality that is set to reveal, rather than enframe, a world of “becomings” playing out in 
an “ontological theater” (Pickering 2010:51)49. However, if life is “lived” rather than 
“simulated”, it is not quite “theater”, but rather something very “real”, carried (not 
acted or played) out in the “real world”. Lived life happens, in other words, outside 
the digital domain of the computer and outside the limited confines of the laboratory. 
Yet, this real world, is not, it seems, completely unknowable, as Ikegami himself 
seems to have plenty of hermeneutic tools at his disposal to discern it, for one, MDF. 
Nonetheless, this lived reality is also, it seems, relentless and even uncivilized, 
simultaneously very “human” and something “more-than-human”. But ultimately, it is 
a reality that cannot easily be captured by the simulations of computation, ones and 
zeroes, nor simply apprehended in mechanistic terms of cause and effect.  
 
This seeming incompatibility between the level of complexity of the real world, 
compared to the level of complexity constructible in a simulated double (in computer 
simulations) is perhaps best highlighted in Ikegami’s own words, “complexity is 
something that is higher in the real world compared to a computer world. The real 
world is messy. The complexity of the real world is so messy that we cannot expect 
there’s a simple law that can explain what is going on in the world. Computers can 
                                                
48 I will come back to this point later on in the next chapter, which is about how the artificial life 
researchers at the Ikegami Lab attempt to formulate a new “nonmodern” epistemology for their field.  
49 Pickering, like Ikegami, draws heavily on the work early cybernetics of the 1950s to describe how 
cybernetic systems, such as the homeostat - an electromechanical device created by cyberneticist Ross 
Ashby, first imagined in 1941, yet finally constructed and realized as a “real machine” in 1948. The 
homeostat became a new way to explore the workings of the adaptive brain, as a machine consisting of 
a coil that magnetically moved a needle, whose movement would vary the current to the coil. By doing 
so, the homeostat would randomly reorganize itself to find a condition of dynamic equilibrium with its 
environment, regardless of its starting point and any external intervention (Pickering 2010:105). Such a 
cybernetic system would, Pickering shows, not depend on the amount of energy flowing through it, but 
on how the variation of energy induces variations in connected systems, like the environment. Key to 
this line of thinking was that these processes could not be understood as causal relations, but rather as 
feedback loops between different systems. Thereby, Pickering agues, the homeostat was not only 
essentially “unknowable”, but also became “ontological theater – as variously conjuring up and playing 
out an ontological vision of performance and unknowability” (Pickering 2010:51).  
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generate very high levels of complexity, but this complexity is different from what 
you see in the real world. And part of the messiness in the real world is something 
that may kill you, eat you, and things like that. You’re always entangled in it.” Here, 
Ikegami asserts that the real world is a harsh environment, where one risks death and 
consumption. Although Ikegami sees a violent world, nonetheless, he insists that we 
accept that the real world is basically unknowable, which does not necessarily mean 
that we cannot make something of it.  
 
However, before jumping ahead to discuss how MDF becomes a culturally-specific 
ontology, I want to go back a bit to discuss how the notion of MDF is first and 
foremost a culturally-certified idea, which becomes a sort “third term” conjured to 
account for a reality before.  
 
Third Term 
 
The notion of MDF, I believe, begs the double question of what it explains and how 
to explain it. Thus, as already highlighted so far, MDF offers a condensed, albeit 
metaphorical, vision of reality, accounting for the heterogeneous and often surprising 
links between bodies and information, scales and levels of complexity. As such, it 
comes close to being a metaphorical device with which to shore up what Ikegami and 
the lab members associate with reality. Now, agreeing with anthropologist Stefan 
Helmreich (2009) that theories are tools for explaining worlds and phenomena in the 
world to be examined (Helmreich 2009:23), I believe it makes sense asking what 
MDF seeks to explain but also that it is something needs to be explained itself. On the 
one hand, then, if MDF is simply a theory in the sense that it is a rhetorical device that 
can be used to bolster, authorize, and/or legitimize linkages and relations between 
different worldly phenomena, or to animate certain practices to reorient inquires of 
life accordingly, it is, I think, vividly expressive of a culturally-specific worldview. 
On the other hand, if MDF is an ontological category, which I believe it is since 
Ikegami and the lab members use it to make a direct claim to reality (even though it is 
iffy and slippery), it not only harnesses a highly-dynamic, interrelated and material-
semiotic reality, which is not seemingly concomitant with “nature”, but rather, 
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concomitant with something akin to a sort of “second nature”, “after nature”, or “new 
nature” (Strathern 1992; Helmreich 1998). On this view, then, MDF is also, I will 
claim, a culturally-specific ontology. 
 
Insofar MDF is a meant to be a theoretical device that transcends dichotomous 
thinking, including the conceptual barriers between the natural and the artificial, it 
amounts to become a sort of third term, which is characterized by a very high degree 
of plasticity. It is exactly this plasticity, I contend, that allows the lab members to 
claim that MDF is a more apposite word to describe the nature of reality in which we 
live, where phenomena emerge not in nature or in culture, through natural, social or 
cultural processes, but in and through massive data flows, i.e. in a relational space 
linking all these domains. Thus, whether MDF is a metaphor of reality or conflated 
with reality itself, neither or both, it nonetheless strikes at the heart of anthropological 
debates about the relationship between figure and ground, reality and representation, 
words and things, nature, culture, and ontology (cf. Henare et. al. 2007; Venkantesan 
et. al. 2010).  
 
On the one side, if one understands MDF as simply a metaphor of reality, it is reduced 
to reside solely in the realm of language and epistemology, which in turn delimits it to 
the way people use language and symbols to describe and represent reality. Seeing 
MDF in this way, it becomes a signal in a sea of noise that points to reveal a part of 
the epistemological orientation of the Ikegami Lab, i.e. their cultural vision on reality. 
In turn, this allows for the observing anthropologist to make a second-order account 
about how they view the nature of reality. Certainly, though, MDF, as a concept, is an 
object that gathers and projects a collective view of reality among the artificial life 
researchers at the Ikegami Lab, a pointer, I think, to how reality itself is constructed at 
the lab. It is self-evident among them that the categories of “nature” and “culture”, 
nor “evolution”, can adequately account for the complexity of the real world.  
 
However, on the contrary, it is here once again important to stress that the artificial 
life researchers at the Ikegami Lab do not simply think of MDF as a concept. Rather, 
they use it explicitly to make a claim to reality, which means that what is at stake in 
their use of the word is reality itself. If we take this claim seriously, including 
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Ikegami’s contention that, “everything is mathematics”50, by which he means that all 
things, including our descriptions of the world, are part of the world, MDF is not only 
descriptive of reality but it is also part of it, a thing existing in the world. Thus, 
according to this logic, I think MDF can be both an ontology, a worldview and a 
theory of reality. What is clear, nevertheless, is that MDF is always-already part of 
reality itself. But if we take this staging of MDF literally, as to what MDF is in the 
context of artificial life at the Ikegami Lab, it makes sense to query how MDF is a 
useful device for performing an ontology (cf. Blaser 2009).  
 
Thinking about MDF in this way, it can itself be seen as a social tool, as already 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, as something “emerging” in and through 
social processes itself. Such “social processes”, I also want to add, are mainly 
characterized by Ikegami’s mostly successful attempts to enroll his lab members in 
his own universe of ideas. Moreover, though, this is also to say that ontologies may 
emerge first and foremost from social interactions and engagements, not something 
existing prior to these. So, to this end, anthropology has, in the past decade or so, 
taken the notion of “ontology” in its own direction by referring to the moment-to-
moment creation and perception of existence, “the variable sets of historically 
contingent assumptions through which humans apprehend reality” (Kohn 2015:312). 
Thus, if one views MDF as socially and historically contingent assumption, as 
something socially constructed in a moment-to-moment process at the lab, it may 
equally constitute an ontology. In other words, as a culturally and historically 
contingent concept that would not have been meaningful, say, 100 years ago, or 
without taking into account the proliferating networks of communication technologies 
of our present moment (cf. Thrift 2004), MDF may equally be treated as a culturally 
and historically contingent ontology, threaded into existence through a slew of 
historical and social possibilities. Again, still, it is important to stress that the lab 
members use the term in many different ways, both to make a claim about what 
MDF-systems are, and how they work, and to make a claim to reality, as a flux of 
massive data flows, to the point where it conflates with reality itself. And so, there 
                                                
50 Ikegami, during fieldwork, used this phrase to assert that everything, in a loose sense, can be 
subsumed to mathematics because everything is part of the same reality: mathematical equations, 
descriptions, diagrams, toasters, humans and robots, to name a few, are all part of the world, which 
means that descriptions of the reality cannot be untethered from it (cf. Alexander 2014).  
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are, of course, acute dangers to the work of untangling the relationship between MDF 
what is and what it purports to represent, i.e. reality. Yet, MDF, I want to maintain, 
remains highly operative to how the lab members envision and make claims about 
reality and to how Ikegami seeks to establish his own paradigm. I will come back to 
this point later on.  
 
For now, in trying to untangle this relationship between what MDF is and what it 
refers to, one might find useful anthropologist Ernest Gellner’s (2003) essay Concepts 
and Society from 1962, in which he examines the many displacements and 
epistemological discontinuities separating “our” concepts from “theirs”, that is, emic 
concepts from etic concepts (Gellner 2003). As a precursor to later anthropological 
debates popularly disseminating into the so-called “ontological turn” (cf. Henare et. al 
2007), Gellner challenges the hermeneutic generosity of anthropologists, who, at his 
time, were rushing to make sense of all indigenous institutions and activities, which 
eventually made them end up resorting to the idea of a social whole. In turn, this 
leveraged that if an institution was illogical or incoherent, it was only so because we 
had yet to make full sense of the social context to which it adhered. Gellner contends 
that such a view runs the risk of stabilizing the anthropological notion of a “concept” 
by way of ignoring those social practices that are not viewed as directly contributing 
to social stability. In other words, this stabilization leaves no space for ambiguity or 
discontinuity.  
 
Now, if one follows Gellner’s critique, the real challenge for anthropology is to 
formulate and invent concepts that are not “one” with society or the institutions they 
allegedly represent (Gellner 2003). Concepts, according to Gellner, should rather be 
formulated such that they cross boundaries and be changeable between and across 
contexts. Needless to say, perhaps, the concept of MDF is itself invented to cross 
thresholds between “nature” and “culture”, the “biological” and the “artificial”, 
concepts, the lab members believe, which do not fully able to capture the sort of 
reality we live in. Moreover, if one accepts Gellner’s overdue contention, the emic 
concept of MDF can also be considered a “concept” (an emic term), which 
nonetheless stresses both a capacity for providing stable meaning to reality (the real 
world) and a capacity to out-place itself in gathering up disparate meanings across 
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contexts: as ontology, as method, as explanatory device, and possibly more. That is, 
in practice, MDF is a concept that sustains itself, I think, exactly by its own plasticity 
and volatile usage, at once analogous to reality and isomorphic with it: massive data 
flows are at once “out there” and “in here”; it is what constitutes reality and what we 
are part of51 
 
In dealing with MDF as a concept, then, one might still be tempted to treat it as a 
symbolic category, a mere conception of reality. However, doing so, one may also 
come to deny the existence of what it purports to represent: an ontology of massive 
data flows. To be sure, while still wobbling on dubious territory, MDF harbors the 
dual capacity to be at once conflated with reality and still different from it: on the one 
side, the artificial life researchers use it as a self-invented concept to describe and 
explain reality (i.e. it provides a new methodology for understanding data flows, the 
flux information making up reality), and on the other side, they claim that MDF is 
reality (we live in an era of massive data flows, all systems alike are MDF-systems). 
Insofar MDF is considered a sort of third term, either epistemologically or 
ontologically, it accounts for the complex and hybrid material-semiotic networks 
(Latour 1993), of which we are part, and of which the lab members are part and 
believe to be constitutive of the real world.  
 
To this end, MDF is in part, I believe, fostered and mobilized to be a theoretical 
response to already established categories of science (i.e. nature, culture, evolution) 
by merging the natural and the artificial, the human and the nonhuman under one 
heading. Such categories are not in and of themselves, Ikegami believes, fully capable 
of capturing a hybridized reality. On this view, MDF may already offer a sort of 
parallax view, not necessarily of life, but of reality itself, meant to capture a world 
that cannot be apprehended by current scientific concepts. But as such, it is 
nonetheless, not simply a culturally specific indigenous point of (world)view, but 
rather, I argue, it is also a culturally specific ontology that fuses the purported 
differences between natural and cultural worlds, including biological and artificial 
                                                
51 Much of the thinking animating MDF resounds many of the notions conjured by early cybernetics in 
the 1950s, for example, when cyberneticist Norbert Wiener proposed to understand social and political 
oppression as a problem of communication. Cybernetics of the 1950s, and probably also today, cast the 
entire universe according to the same cybenrtic idiom, a universe in which humans and machines are 
systems of communication trying to keep in sync with their environment (cf. Pickering 2010).  
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domains, into a one single framework. Furthermore, MDF already challenges the 
assumption that things like “life” can be apprehended as either natural or artificial, or 
for that matter that life’s primary ontological unit is DNA. Instead, MDF leverages a 
single universal framework by which seemingly different and incompatible, and even 
mutually exclusive, entities can be apprehended simultaneously.  
 
As such, MDF accounts for reality, as a sort of integrated, unified universe, where 
natural, social and cultural worlds and forces, including biological and artificial 
elements, cannot be studied in isolation of one another. Or better, MDF offers a 
relational account of the dynamic relationships between such elements, which should 
be considered to be inextricably entangled within one another. Now, allow me to 
elaborate a bit further on this point that MDF is a culturally specific ontology, and not 
just a third term or simply a worldview, as it pertains to how it becomes politically 
operative to how lab members are invited to understand reality and how it allows 
them to challenge dominant “scientific” layouts of reality itself.  
 
The Really Real 
 
Anthropologist Marisol De La Cadena (2010) has shown that the notion of 
Pachamama - the close equivalent to the notion of “Mother Earth” - generated tension 
in the 2008-Ecuadorian constitution when it entered into regimes of environmental 
governance (De La Cadena 2010). In this context, the whole concept of Pachamama, 
De La Cadena notes, is not simply a rhetorical device to reinforce the environmental 
movement and enshrine environmental care in law. Rather, Pachamama, as it is meant 
from the indigenous point of (world)view, De La Cadena claims, disturbs the 
ontological assumptions of modernist views on the world, including the views of the 
political left and right, and it does so exactly by way of positing the existence of 
Pachamama as a sentient spirit being (De La Cadena 2010). While the political left, 
for example, might argue against the industrial and exploitive neoliberal agendas of 
their opponents, none of them would likely argue for the reality of the environment’s 
spiritual sentience. In short, Pachamama is, like MDF, an ontological claim in the 
sense that it posits what things are and what the universe is made of.   
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While MDF might carry with it many political implications, it posits, I think, the 
existence of data and information as the “really real” to the epiphenomenal world we 
live in, a world that resides in a sort of “matrix-like” space to which the artificial life 
researchers are committed (cf. chapter 3). More specifically, though, if information is 
the basic substance of reality, and MDF denotes how data and information is 
exchanged, which is supposedly analogous to Darwinian evolution, it points to the 
underlying principles, which give form, shape and direction to the living world. That 
MDF is analogues to Darwinian evolution does not only mean that it is thought of as a 
process running parallel to it, it is also a process adding to it; MDF, after all, is 
“larger” than Darwinian evolution. More to the point, following De La Cadena, MDF 
is an ontological argument to reality, the really real, that may challenge other 
ontological arguments to reality, for example those that hold that DNA is the basic 
building block of life. To this end, MDF disturbs the ontological assumptions of any 
modernist or realist view on the world, but it also expresses Ikegami’s craving for 
scientific and conceptual novelty.  
 
Now, in an equally politically-inflected vein, anthropologist Mario Blaser (2009), in 
his study among the Yshiro people of Northern Paraguay, considers “ontology” from 
a narrative perspective. On Blaser’s account, ontologies can be enacted by concrete 
practices and interactions, which means that ontologies do not precede themselves, 
but are rather “performed” (Blaser 2009:3)52. One example of how this plays out is 
that of a sustainable hunting program, collectively conceived between the Yshiro 
Nation (Unión de las Comunidades Indígenas de la Nación Yshir) and the European-
Union-funded (EU) sustainable development project, “Prodechaco”. In his study, 
Blaser shows how ensuing misunderstandings between these two groups, through 
drawing on Viveiros de Castro’s (2004) notion of “uncontrolled equivocation”53 (de 
Castro 2004), spirals from a profound difference in their understandings of reality, 
where each group thinks they are focused on the same thing (sustainable hunting 
practices), when in fact they are not. Blaser further notes that there were signs of this 
latent equivocation in the earlier stages of the program, but these were initially ignored 
                                                
52 Read: MDF-systems. 
53 “Uncontrolled equivocation”, according to de Castro, is a type of communicative disjuncture where 
the interlocutors are not talking about the same thing, and do not know this (de Castro 2004). 
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by both groups for various reasons. But the key point in this controversy, as Blaser sets 
out to show, is that the purported epistemological superiority of the state and the EU-
group was enacted such that the Yshiro, he writes, “could believe whatever they 
wanted about the environment, but the actions prompted by these beliefs should not 
run counter to what the biologists knew about the environment” (Blaser 2009:14 my 
emphasis). As such, Blaser shows how the modern world, or rather a modern ontology, 
sustains itself through “performances that tend to suppress and/or contain the 
enactment of other possible worlds” (Blaser 2009:16).  
 
If MDF is an ontology, indeed a culturally specific ontology performed on a moment-
to-moment basis at the Ikegami Lab, it may indeed, following Blaser and De La 
Cadena, be made to suppress other ontologies. If this is so, then, I believe MDF is 
deliberately made to deviate from any conventional biological understanding of 
reality, as “the difference that makes a difference” (cf. Bateson 1987:459) in relation to 
how the lab members apprehend the real world. Moreover, enacting MDF is 
simultaneously works to suppress modernist ontologies and to authorize a world to 
which the lab members should be committed, i.e. an ontologically “flattened” world 
in which “nature” and “biology” are not the primary units of reality. As such, MDF 
offers for them a sort of updated view of “nature”, a kind of “third nature” of sorts (cf. 
Helmreich 1998). This aligns to anthropologist Stefan Helmreich’s own coinage, 
“silicon second nature”, which is a self-conscious play on notion of the substance or 
space that artificial life researchers, Helmreich claims, seek to create in computers 
(Helmreich 1998:11)54. MDF, here, is a space outside the computer, the “real world”.  
 
Yet, MDF, of course, is not a computer model. But as a concept it embodies a claim 
to reality, yet it is still not really a reflection of “first nature”, since it does not seek to 
mirror “first nature” (the sort of nature hailed by conventional biologists). Rather, 
MDF is a synthesis of both first and second natures, the real and the simulated, 
information and physical bodies, seeking to capture the given and the contingent, the 
rule-driven and the stochastic, the determinate and the random, the organized and the 
                                                
54 Helmreich himself tracks his own term – silicon second nature – back to Hegel’s idea of “first 
nature”: the given, pristine, edenic nature of physical and biotic processes, laws and forms, with 
“second nature”, referring to the rule-driven social world of society, the market, culture and the city. 
Helmreich’s silicon second natures are those natures, which are rule-ordered human constructions, but 
also devices meant to mirror first natures (cf. Helmreich 1998:12).   
 172 
disorganized. Still, however, in any case, MDF is a human construction. And as a 
third term, it is a human construction that applies pressure both to already established 
understandings of the world and to what reality really is. It is, then, a figure of 
“world-making”55 (Stengers 2018), similar to, say, the notions of “Gaia” or 
“Chthulucene” (cf. Tsing 2015; Lovelock 2009), which are also instances of world-
making. MDF is wired to capture, or is at least an attempt to capture, convergent, 
divergent and overlapping activities, which are both intentional and unintentional, 
some of which exist irrespective of human control (Tsing 2015). More concretely, 
MDF may amount to be a device of world-making, picking out an instance of reality 
as tangled up in heterogeneous, overlapping and excessive streams of data and 
information that exist irrespective of human control and, at times, beyond human 
proprioception56. 
 
To go back to Blaser, and his notion that performing an ontology may be made to 
suppress and/or contain the enactment of other possible worlds (cf. Blaser 2009:16), 
MDF may be potentially be used to display not simply epistemological superiority 
over other modes of thought in the sense that the lab members try to gain 
epistemological superiority to dominant figurations of “nature” or of “life”. It may 
also, I want to suggest, display ontological superiority to other ontologies.   
 
In this ontological sense, MDF is an active reconfiguration of the world, both as 
possibility and actuality, that attunes the lab members to display both epistemological 
and ontological superiority to other, often hegemonic, conceptions of reality, which 
maintain that “first nature” is the ultimate reality. As such, the lab members see MDF 
as adding a new ontological dimension, or in their words, “layer”, to the study of life, 
one by which Darwinian evolution is not the only set of principles giving rise to life. 
Still, MDF is not made to denounce the principles of Darwinian evolution, but rather 
supposed to build upon them in order to fathom a sort of reality in informational 
overdrive, which may well, however, operate according to similar principles: The 
                                                
55 The notions of “Gaia” and “Chthulucene” for example, are concerned with world-making in the way 
they capture, or attempt to capture, divergent and overlapping activities, often unintentional, many of 
which exist irrespective of human control (Tsing 2015). MDF is not really “nature”, but perhaps closer 
to being Gaia or Chthulucene.  
56 Keep in mind that MDF denotes a world, which is not only suffused by massive data flows, but 
flooded by it. 
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Internet, as we have seen, for example, is marshalled as live example of an MDF-
system that “evolve” much like organisms do in natural evolution. But in its radical 
definition, MDF posits that we are not only of Darwinian evolution, as the 
culminations of biological processes, circumstances and organic substances, but also, 
and perhaps more likely, of MDF, in the sense that MDF is conjured to enfold the 
biological within it in order to expand the purview of the living world to include more 
than the biological.  
 
Hence, MDF, is a both a “third term” that offers a new framing of reality, which is 
premonitory to theorize life, and an ontology that becomes politically operative to call 
upon radically alternate worlds (cf. Henare et.al. 2007; Kohn 2015). Indeed, as I will 
also claim, MDF is a notion that solidifies and embodies what the lab members at the 
Ikegami Lab mean by artificial life being “larger” than biological life. But more 
significantly, the invention and introduction of MDF, I think, is vividly expressive of 
Ikegami’s yearning for novelty and theoretical innovation. Yet, meanwhile, as Oka 
and others also suggest, artificial life is a “science” in the sense that they really care 
about how “things work”, and thereby they also cast themselves as “real” scientists, 
who are not simply solving practical problems, for example by building computer 
models or other technical contraptions. Rather, they are scientists with grit, who 
engage in the arduous labor of producing new theories and concepts, not simply 
solving puzzles.  
 
But, in terms of MDF, I claim that is first and foremost a culturally and historically 
contingent ontology, which also, perhaps conveniently for Ikegami, the explicit effect 
of being a sort of a social tool with which to display the intellectual and theoretical 
prowess of the Ikegami Lab. And as a social tool, it also becomes expressive of 
Ikegami’s larger plan and desire to establish a new paradigm, indeed, a new way of 
seeing and attending to arguments and the world at large. Now, in the final section of 
this chapter I want to summarize this chapter and unpack how this ontology of MDF 
is also considered by Ikegami to be a, “source of emergence”, that is, as a site from 
where new (living) phenomena may emerge. 
 
 
 174 
An Ontology of MDF 
 
Ikegami solidly believes that MDF is “a source of emergence”. This means that thinks 
of the real world as a sort of data-rich and information-glutted cradle from which, he 
says, “life may potentially emerge”. If life is an “emergent phenomenon”, as Ikegami 
reassures me, one must accept that, “MDF is the mother of emergent phenomena”57, 
by which Ikegami is explicitly suggesting that the conditions of possibility for 
emergence begins not in the exchanges of biological substances, nor with 
computational media, but with the coming-together of massive amounts of data and 
information fluctuating the real world.  
 
However, as I highlighted in chapter 3, even though many of the lab members believe 
that information governs everything and while they subscribe to a cybernetic vision of 
the reality, they also insist upon granting priority to the material specificity of life’s 
forms. Hence, they actively grapple with the relationship between what they call the 
“information layer” and the “physical layer” in coming to terms with “life”. That is, 
as we also saw in the previous chapter, hurricanes, humans, and machines may be 
complex dynamic systems, even MDF-systems, but they are still different systems 
because each of them are characterized by the kinds of messages or types of 
information they are capable of receiving and sending. Some forms of information are 
not automatically commensurable with other forms, and vice versa, as some systems 
may not be wired to receive or send certain types of information, and so on. Keep in 
mind here that Ikegami extends the meaning of information to include not just some 
intangible, free-floating form, but also very tangible material forces. In short, the 
material specificities of any system matter in terms of what kinds of information 
become relevant, which is also what enables the lab members to differentiate one 
system from the other.  
 
                                                
57 Anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (1998) has shown, in his ethnography among artificial life 
researchers at the SFI, how normative notions of “fathering” inform the ways they “play God” when 
attempting to make “life” (Helmreich 1998:120). Despite of such motifs being quilted into artificial life 
talk, some researchers wondered whether artificial life might basically be seen as an expression of male 
researchers’ “birth envy” (Helmreich 1998:120).  
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To this end, MDF-systems may equally be systems of interconnected information 
circuits, composed of other systems and subsystems, and components of larger 
systems, as are material objects and social organizations, etc. At the heart of such an 
observation is that any system is emergent, always-already able to push into the 
adjacent possible. And so, taken to its logical conclusion everything is emergent. 
Meanwhile, given the extreme plasticity and Platonism of MDF, the lab members 
may then describe and identify just about any given thing in the world as an MDF-
system simply because the dynamics, by which any given phenomena are organized, 
are based on the same set of principles. Yet, none of them claim, as we have already 
seen, that humans are similar to hurricanes, but that there are elements of their 
respective behaviors and modes of organization, which are more or less the same if 
not outright identical.  
 
That said, to go back a bit to discuss this relationship between the “information layer” 
and the “physical layer”, or between information and the materiality of the world, 
anthropologist Nigel Thrift (2004) may once again be helpful. In many accounts of 
contemporary “information societies”, Thrift notices, “information” is often taken to 
be a monolithic entity, which is essentially disembodied and intangible (cf. Thrift 
2004). However, the lab members do not account for information as completely 
disembodied. But this does not mean that the lab members stray from seeing 
information as a monolithic entity, but one that is not essentially disembodied. As 
MDF clarifies, data and information, after all, may include material and immaterial 
entities. Yet, according to Thrift, the standard view often goes that the increasing 
pervasiveness of computers and electronics communication networks has generated a 
world in which, “a numerical flux […] is central to activities rather than incidental” 
(Thrift 2004:590), a pervasiveness that reconfigures space as highly abstract, in which 
one, “assumes that there are fixed reference points, cardinal dimensions and the like.” 
(Thrift 2004:590). On this view, computers and electronics communication have 
given rise to a variety of so-called “flow architectures”, which render the world 
“reconfigured as a global trading zone in which network forms, which strive for co-
ordination, are replaced by flow forms which strive for observation and projection” 
(Thrift 2004:590). To this end, one can easily argue that there are not, in principle, 
any essential incompatibilities between, say, humans and machines, since they may 
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both be emerging through in “trading zones”, as material nodes in a larger network of 
flows. Thrift further notes that such a view not only produces, “shifts in what is 
understood as ‘human’ but also shifts in what is understood as ‘environment’ since, 
increasingly, the ‘artificial’ environment is sentient and has the feel of a set of 
‘natural’ forces blowing this way and that.” (Thrift 2004:591)58.  
 
Anthropologist, Karin Knorr-Cetina (2004), too, elaborates on the idea of flow 
architectures, which she prefers calling “timeworlds” or “flowworlds”,  
 
In a timeworld or flowworld […] the content itself is processual – a ‘melt’ 
of material that is continually in flux, and that exists only as it is being 
projected forward and calls forth participants’ reactions and contribution 
to the flux. Only ‘frames’, it would seem, for examples, the frames that 
computer screens represent in a global financial market, are presupposed 
in this flowworld. The content wherein some action takes place, is not 
separate from the totality of ongoing things. (Knorr-Cetina 2004:40) 
 
Thus, if MDF is a sort of flow architecture, indeed a timeworld or flowworld, it is a 
“trading zone” in which a “strive for co-ordination” is not necessarily “replaced by 
flow forms”, but is indeed required to be “projected”. MDF describes “melt” of 
materiality that is continually in flux, but it does not necessarily dissolve it. Quite the 
opposite, since “life” is not captured, or in the words of Knorr-Cetina, “framed” by 
computer screens, it needs instead to be rendered “real” in the real world. However, in 
the world of MDF, there is not just information, let alone that fact that there is 
always-already too much of it, but there is also materialities and energies flowing 
alongside information.   
 
Following Thrift and Knorr-Cetina, then, flow forms need not be projected in the 
sense that they need to be predicted, but rather in the sense they need to be projected 
onto something else, that is, to be extended outwards, mapped onto, or churned or 
molded to material and aesthetic ends. What this means in the context of the Ikegami 
                                                
58 Thrift also makes the point that such a worldview is challenges the idea of a Spinozian universe of 
geometrical laws, which re-naturalize the universe as one that has been constructed or can be 
constructed rather than one necessarily extant (cf. Thrift 2004:591).  
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Lab is specifically that data and information must be harnessed somehow in order to 
construct new embodied systems, such as robots, which are able to interact within and 
with the real world. Flow architectures organize flow architectures. More precisely, 
this means that the lab members want to “amplify” their systems by staging them in 
“real world dynamics,” in “massive data flows”, in order to conduct new types of 
analysis, which may otherwise be inaccessible to them. Ikegami explains,  
 
I think that people understand that it’s easier to implement self-
reproduction, sort of evolutionary processes, and homeostatic structures, 
in a computer. But you don’t find life systems over there. So, we noticed 
that self-reproduction, evolution and self-maintenance, homeostasis, and 
all these fancy words, are insufficient in order to define life. Even if we 
implement them it does not make something into life. So again, what is 
missing? People like me and my lab try to bring life back to the real 
world. […] Our goal is not black or white, it’s not our goal to say this is 
alive and this is not. We don’t need the notion of life in order to describe 
the moon or the sun, or any physical phenomena. Words like self-
reproduction, and so on, are useful to describe life, but still somehow, 
self-reproduction keeps returning to the conventions of physics, so there’s 
nothing new to this. We cannot describe what life is purely by physics and 
chemistry. Artificial life is about bridging the gap between physics and 
chemistry and, sort of, spaces of meaning.  
 
What is missing, Ikegami seems to imply, is a new mode of apprehension, by which 
we should not simply seek to describe phenomena in mechanistic terms, but rather 
seek to make new meanings. In other words, the task is to create new meaning of life, 
by which Ikegami means that scientific descriptions of worldly phenomena and 
informational dynamics do not automatically assume meaning. Rather, creating 
meaning, according to Ikegami, requires affective, interpretive and hermeneutic labor: 
life is what is to be made meaning of, that which should be apprehended and 
translated into new meanings beyond the sort of meanings inferred by science, 
particularly physics and chemistry, i.e. by well-worn, established scientific 
formalisms.  
 178 
Thus, to summarize, MDF is a culturally specific ontology performed by Ikegami, in 
part, to guide the ontological orientation of his lab. And so, MDF is a convincing 
rendition of reality, both large-scale MDF-system and as a sort of flow architecture 
that needs to be projected, the reality in which we live, and in which information can 
be apprehended, collected, parsed and classified in new and alternative ways. To this 
end, if MDF is a term that consolidates what they mean by the “real world”, indeed 
what I claim is a claim to reality, it may also be seen as forming the first part of 
Ikegami’s nascent “ontoepistemological” that I call Ikegamianism – Ikegami’s own 
ontoepistemological framework. Indeed, Ikegamianism is a core component of 
Ikegami’s desire to generate and articulate a new paradigm in science. And so, to go 
back a bit, it is by articulating MDF as an ontology that Ikegami is allowed make a 
claim to reality. But it also becomes a social tool that may be mobilized to 
demonstrate artificial life’s ability to construct worlds of their own.  
 
Thus, if MDF constitutes the “onto” in Ikegamianism, as I claim it is, it is nonetheless 
only the beginning, as Ikegami also seeks to articulate what he calls a, “new 
epistemology of artificial life”. In the next chapter, then, I explore what Ikegami 
means by this “new epistemology of artificial life”, and thus how he consolidates his 
onto epistemological framework I call Ikegamianism. And by this, it is necessary, I 
believe, to also take a closer look at Ikegami himself, as a charismatic leader at the 
Ikegami Lab. 
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ATTUNING TO THE EMERGENT 
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Takashi Ikegami ruminating. Ikegami is the head and namesake of the Ikegami Lab. 
He is by many of the lab members seen as a “creative” genius, who, “does everything 
Alife”. In this photo, he is seen in what I came to call the “Ikegami-pose”, a posture 
he would usually take when someone asked him a question. His style betrays that of 
an austere scientist and the visionary artist. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Introduction: Boring Calculations 
 
Ikegami looks up after taking a sip of his coffee I had fetched for him at the 
convenience store next to campus and suddenly exclaims, “science is mostly boring 
… boring calculations, and so what!?” Ikegami and I are sitting in his office one clear 
day in spring 2017, when he suddenly starts ranting against what he calls “normal 
science” - a mode of science he sees as impassionate, objective and ultimately 
indifferent to the “real world”. Prior to our meeting, we had lunch together close to 
campus and we began talking discussing how artificial life was different from other 
fields. It was different, Ikegami assured me, mainly because it was not normal 
science. Back at the office, Ikegami elaborates on our ongoing discussion and tells me 
that, “normal science” is mostly about apprehending what he otherwise sees as an 
exciting and lively world. Those who do normal science are essentially, he says, 
making “boring calculations”. And so, doing normal science, in other words, fails to 
recognize and appreciate that some things are incalculable and therefore cannot be 
easily translated into the language of science. Needless to say, normal science, to 
Ikegami, is “boring” and should therefore be avoided. At least if one wants to be an 
innovative and creative scientist.  
 
As I listen to Ikegami’s disapproval of normal science, I notice that his style betrays a 
tension between the logical and rigorous figure of the scientist and the creative and 
spontaneous figure of the artist. Ikegami’s appearance - dressed in a colorful Jackson 
Pollock-patterned shirt, worn-out sneakers, his dark fuzzy hair, slim face and body - 
immediately betrays any prejudicial image of a stereotypical, white-coated scientist. 
In fact, from the looks of it, I notice that he looks more like the famous Japanese rock 
singer Kiyoshiro Imawano, or someone like Mick Jagger, than an actual scientist. 
However, his looks, I further notice, are supplemented by his words and his larger-
than-life-personality, assuming a sort of Jungian archetype: the artist-scientist. His 
style, then, both betrays that of the rational and stale scientist, but also that of the 
creative and spontaneous artist, who dreams and ruminates, who gets easily distracted 
by his own thoughts so he has to be pulled out of the rain. He is somehow in between 
these two archetypes, simultaneously embodying both and being neither of them, 
vastly knowledgeable, rigorous, and objective, curious, spontaneous and impulsive, 
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and not least creative. And indeed, when Ikegami is not busy talking to me, teaching, 
researching, or trying to convince scientists of the inadequacy of “normal science”, he 
rejoices in going to art exhibitions, play electronic music, conduct concerts, and 
indulge in various art-science events around the city of Tokyo. He is, in other words, 
not someone who would fit into his own depiction of normal science.  
 
Normal science, according to Ikegami is thus a mode of science he opposes, a mode 
strongly based on the doctrines of objective representation, and as such, it is closely 
related to, if not synonymous with, the sort of normal science identified by 
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1962). Kuhn’s notion of normal science, like 
Ikegami’s, is characterized, or perhaps caricatured, as a kind of science by which 
scientists theorize, observe, and experiment within a rigid, fixed and settled paradigm 
(Kuhn 1962). They are, in the words of Kuhn, simply solving “puzzles” without 
pushing the boundaries the paradigm under which they work. Similarly, in the words 
of Ikegami, they are simply making “boring calculations” without pushing the 
boundaries of the paradigm under which they work. They are, in other words, slaves 
to what Ikegami refers to as their own “frames of reference”. 
 
And so, standing opposed to, and working against, normal science, Ikegami and the 
lab members, I learned during fieldwork, are engaging in outlining the contours of 
what Ikegami calls, “a new epistemology of artificial life” – an epistemological 
framework based on embodied modes of knowing, more aligned to a sort of post-
phenomenological approach to the “things-in-themselves”, as they appear in 
materially, socially and culturally structured worlds (cf. Hasse 2008). This new 
epistemology of artificial life is first and foremost about developing embodied and 
affective responses to the things they are constructing at the lab, by which, as 
anthropologist Cathrine Hasse (2008) writes, “knowing subjects become knowing 
embodiment” (Hasse 2008:45). But more importantly, such an epistemology of 
artificial life, Ikegami hopes, may therefore counter the hegemonic paradigm normal 
science by shattering the doctrines of objectivism and scientism that he believes are 
inherent to normal science. In short, normal science is characteristic of paradigm 
under which practitioners are largely suffering from a disregard for experienced 
reality (cf. Bourdieu 1977).  
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Ikegami, then, as we saw in the previous chapter, seeks not only to create his own 
ontology, but he also seeks to build a new way of doing science altogether, indeed, a 
new epistemology. In a word, a new epistemology of artificial life, Ikegami tells me, 
relies not so much on strict scientific formalisms or the cold rationalities of science, 
but rather on an embodied mode of knowing that acknowledges, following Bourdieu 
(1977) experienced reality. And as already made clear in chapter 4, this reality is 
highly stochastic and unpredictable, a jumble of “massive data flows”. A new 
epistemology relies, then, on somehow teasing out new, even more capacious and 
nuanced meanings of life upon a mode of embodied knowing, following Hasse, in the 
sense that knowing subjects become knowing embodiment. In a word, Ikegami calls 
attention to the idea that one may indeed sound out new meanings of life more 
impressionistically.  
 
If one of the central goals for the lab members of the Ikegami Lab is to construct 
artificial life in the real world, then doing so is not simply an end in itself. It is also, I 
believe, what allows them to create new meanings of life, meanings that expand 
beyond the sort that can be generated by established scientific formalisms. In order to 
create new meanings of life, from the jumble of massive data flows, one has to change 
perspectives. As Ikegami notes, “in the real world, I’m part of the world, and it is 
from here we want to describe it, from a first-person subjective perspective”, and so a 
new epistemology of artificial life, Ikegami believes, is therefore not only necessary 
but vital to how we are supposed to know and understand life. This epistemology is 
therefore inextricably tied to and rooted in the ontology of MDF that we saw in the 
previous chapter, and to this end, as Karen Barad (2007) also notes, following 
physicist Niels Bohr, I want to recognize that epistemological and ontological issues 
are always-already inseparable, which means that the nature of knowledge cannot be 
separated from the nature of being (Barad 2007). For my convenience here, I want to 
show here how Ikegami’s new epistemology of artificial life cannot be untethered 
from the ontology of MDF.  
 
Thus, in this chapter, I want to attend to two interrelated themes when unpacking the 
relationship between epistemology and ontology, between “normal science” and the 
“new epistemology of artificial life”. The first theme concerns Ikegami himself, as a 
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self-described artist-scientist, whose charismatic authority, charm and wit, I want to 
show, are primary engines of agency at the lab. Ikegami’s flamboyant and bombastic 
personality and his style of leadership are traits that allow him to command his lab. 
Following sociologist Max Weber (1954), and his notion of ideal types of legitimate 
leadership, authority and domination, I discuss how Ikegami becomes a charismatic 
leader, who makes “sacred norms”, which are produced by his word (cf. Weber 1954; 
Spencer 1970). Such “sacred norms”, I hold, are embodied in what I call 
Ikegamiansim, in turn, constituting a sort of creed that offers guidance to the lab 
members and to which the lab members adhere. Indeed, during fieldwork, I often 
noticed how Ikegami was by the lab members – or rather his “followers” – described 
as a “genius”, “creative artist” and a “source of inspiration”, and many of them 
viewed him as a sort of prophet or pioneer. As a sort of prophet or spiritual leader, 
whose personality, charm, wit, and style of leadership, generates sacred norms, I want 
to suggests that scientific practices at the Ikegami Lab are primarily motivated by 
Ikegami’s ability to, “destroy old norms and create new ones” (Spencer 1970:125). 
Ikegami is, in other words, a main character and primary engine of agency to how 
things get done at the lab, at least when it comes to providing the overall 
philosophical, metaphysical, ontological and epistemological orientation of the lab.  
 
Now, while this first theme concentrates on Ikegami himself, and his role as a 
charismatic leader, the second theme is concerned with the intrinsic meanings of his 
new epistemology of artificial life. This new epistemology, if seen in relation to 
Ikegami as a prophetic leader, is basically a gospel about learning how to attune to the 
emergent in offering a way to learn how to apprehend surprises, the serendipitous, and 
to be sensitive to that, which emerges beyond the technical specifications of the 
phenomena under observation. Thus, for example, if the models seen in chapter 3 are 
objects made significant because they are pushed to offer empirical evidence of the 
ontological continuity between seemingly disparate cases of behaviors (such as the 
flocking behaviors of boids and birds), this new epistemology, in particular, is about 
learning how to sense, or in the words of Ikegami, “how to pick up”, some emergent 
signature, or trace, of vitality. This requires an embodied gaze; indeed, it requires 
what Ikegami calls an, “internal observer,” and learning to “pick up” the emergent, 
then, is perhaps best illustrated by microbiologist Minakata Kumagusu (1971) and his 
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notion of “tact” – a heightened attentiveness and receptive attitude to the surprises of 
things, even things that might lie hidden in plain view (Kumagusu 1971; Kumagusu 
1951; Delaplace 2014:54). Tact, for Kumagusu, is not an antonym to reason, nor 
something simply synonymous with the intuitions or inspirations of genius. Rather, it 
may be said to be an intensified affective and embodied limit point, where that which 
one has consciously learned suddenly encounters worldly surprises that go beyond 
this learning (cf. Kumagusu 1951; Kumagusu 1971; Kumagusu 1973). “Life”, on to 
this view, is basically semiotic, through and through, the product of sign processes 
(cf. Bateson 1987; Deacon 1997), and learning how to read these signs of emergent 
vitality - signs that are not immediately visible to us, but potentially experientially 
available to us in some impressionistic sense.  
 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind when unpacking this new epistemology, 
however, that Ikegami’s charisma and style of leadership, I want to maintain, remains 
a central component in inciting, enrolling, mobilizing, and captivating the lab 
members. That is, in short, Ikegami’s charisma is key to his success in terms of 
whether he fails or succeeds in convincing his lab members that they are indeed 
working to establish a new paradigm. So far, for example, it is clear that all the lab 
members subscribe to the idea that normal science is bad. But, Ikegami’s desire to 
build his own paradigm, I also want to show, is also vividly expressive of his 
authoritative role at the lab and at driving force at the heart of Ikegamianism. Put 
differently, this so-called “new epistemology of artificial life”, I hope to show, is 
inextricably linked to the ontology of MDF, but it is also an important part of 
Ikegami’s attempt to articulate a creed, i.e. to articulate a set of beliefs and norms that 
guide lab members’ actions. But now, I want to begin by reiterating a story told by 
Ikegami about how science, “makes a beautiful world” in order to explain what he 
means by “normal science” and how this relates to “a new epistemology of artificial 
life”.  
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Science Makes a Beautiful World 
 
Science, to Ikegami, is basically one among many “layers of description”. Other 
“layers”, he says, may include art or religion, even other ways of knowing the world, 
for example, through reading, through sensing, or through making calculations. Our 
access to reality, in other words, is always mediated. Likewise, science – this vastly 
abstract term – is a layer, Ikegami claims, which is uptight with formalisms that find 
their most canonical expression in mathematical equations and chemical formula, but 
also in models, illustrations and diagrams (cf. Jay 1988). Science, in other words, is a 
specific mode of mediation that is essentially, Ikegami claims, undergirded by a 
strong rhetoric of universalism, remaining mere representations of what they purport 
to represent. They are, simply put, optics or lenses through which to know the world.  
 
To better understand what Ikegami means by normal science, as a layer of 
description, including its associated layers of description, such as equations or 
models, it might be useful to listen in on some of Ikegami’s stories about friends and 
colleagues, who had over the years gone off to do what he refers to as “real science” 
in other fields outside artificial life. One of such friends, I learned, was and still is a 
close friend of Ikegami: biologist Charles “Chuck” Taylor at the University of 
California Los Angeles (UCLA), who had, Ikegami tells me, “stepped down from 
artificial life because he wanted to do experiments the real birds and not just boid-
models”. Others, however, had fled the field of artificial life not necessarily to do 
“real science”, but rather to pursue and establish careers in less precarious and more 
career-promising fields, wanting rather to make universal findings or commercial 
applications of their research. Thus, “after 20 years or so,” Ikegami continues,  
 
people got more interested in doing ‘normal science’, you know, 
concerned about how and where to publish papers, in which scientific 
journals, and stuff like that, so that kind of killed the field. Playing with 
‘toy models’, and doing the kind of experiments we do, people believe 
have no universal value. And the journals don’t care about such things 
[…] the entire tendency has changed drastically, so now people want to 
publish in big journals, like ‘Nature’, and so on. And people doing 
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artificial life, too, don’t want to play around with ‘toy models’ anymore, 
but seem to go off to computer science or synthetic biology because they 
want to work with ‘real’ cells and deal with molecules and things like 
that. 
 
One of the many motivations for why people are leaving the field of artificial life, in 
the words of Ikegami, is because, “people seem to be more curious about finding 
universal features of life, and if you deviate from this ambition, you’re ruled out, it’s 
not science,” but Ikegami also reassures me, “I don’t like that tendency.” Now, 
Ikegami’s story here marks some important differences between what counts as “real 
science”, or simply “science”, and non-science. But it also marks, I believe, a 
structure of feeling in him of a sort of inferiority to what counts as science to begin 
with: someone or something somewhere has mapped the rules of science, by which 
artificial life, according to Ikegami, are out of bounds. More importantly, though, 
what is missing, he believes, from science is playfulness or at least the willingness to 
be different from the prescriptive norms of normal science. 
 
Now, according to Ikegami, science is only one among many layers of description, 
noting that science is basically about, “making descriptions and equations of the 
natural world,” and then claim that, “these are the basic equations for this and that.” 
Science, to this end, lack, Ikegami believes, modesty and more importantly an open 
attitude to other perspectives and interpretations of the world. Moreover, what he 
means by people wanting to find “universal features of life”, then, is that they want to 
make “rational” equations that formulate some universal law describing what life is in 
some absolute sense, i.e. a belief that life can be reduced to, and adequately known, 
by an equation. Yet, as Ikegami reports, “writing down equations is something 
scientists do to understand something about the world. Equations are for human 
beings. I don’t want to describe life by saying, ‘ok, this is the concept to understand 
life’ or, ‘this is the equations for living systems’ or ‘this is the material you put into 
the system to make it alive’.” In other words, scientists should not only allow for 
alternative readings of the world, but also actively pursue new readings that are not 
necessarily automatically legitimated on the basis of, say, mathematical equations. 
That is, it is not simply about making some new mathematical equation, but it is 
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rather what comes next that matters, asking instead what a mathematical equation 
might tell us about the thing it refers to.  
 
Thus, the fact that scientists make equations to understand the world, as Ikegami 
notes, is a way to make “nature” or “reality” calculable, and if it cannot be made 
calculable, it is not, as Ikegami further notes, “real science”59. “Real science”, it must 
be noted is here also interchangeably being mixed up with “normal science”, but it 
basically refers to the same sense of science, as a sort of universal belief system, 
which is couched firmly in the idioms of “rationalism” and “scientism” – beliefs that 
opinions and actions should be based exclusively on reason and knowledge rather 
than, say, on religious belief, affective or emotional responses. Moreover, normal 
science is a paradigm, according to Ikegami, in which scientific knowledge is 
believed to have direct access to “nature” and therefore to “truth”. Again, Ikegami 
asserts, there are other truths to be observed, indeed to be interpreted, if one indulges 
in doing things differently.  
 
Ikegami’s portrayal of “normal science”, I came to notice, resemble in many ways the 
kind of “modern science” that sociologists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s 
(1971) had set out to rebuke during the 1930s and 1940s, although doing so for 
slightly different reasons than Ikegami. Horkheimer and Adorno, in their own 
disapproval of Enlightenment science, view “science” as basically an enterprise 
seeking to disenchant the world by extirpating “irrationalities”, such as magic, 
animism and vitalism in wielding an unprecedented and authoritative judgment on 
“nature” (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno 1971). On this view, science and conventional 
scientific formalisms, as it were, are geared to make nature calculable, and in the 
process, ends up conflating calculability with usefulness, sometimes even meaning. 
The basic mistake among scientists, as Ikegami also asserts, is exactly to confuse, say, 
mathematical equations (as scientific representations and epistemological tools) with 
                                                
59 Read: The Word for World is Massive Data Flows (cf. chapter 4) 
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“reality itself”60. This does not mean, though, that equations, as representations of a 
given phenomenon or some physical reality, cannot be useful, but rather that they 
cannot explain everything. Indeed, the way they are used as absolute and authoritative 
accounts by scientists, according to Ikegami, is what makes them disenchanting of a 
world he sees to be substantially richer and more complex (cf. chapter 4).  
 
Normal science, then, is according to Ikegami engaged in making “nature” calculable 
to the point where the materiality of nature conflates with its measure, taking it most 
canonical expression in mathematical equations. Now, as Ikegami for obvious reasons 
contends, normal science is not the only way to make sense of reality, nature or the 
physical world, but simply one among many ways to describe and make sense of the 
world at large. Hence, to go back to Adorno and Horkheimer’s rebuke of modern 
science, and insofar theirs was a rebuke of a specific “layer of description”, Ikegami 
seeks to rebuke the “layer of description” of normal science. He reports,  
 
Irrationality does not exist in the natural sciences. There’s no such thing 
as irrational chemical reactions or irrational mathematics. Irrationality 
appears unique to human society, but scientists behave like it doesn’t 
exist. For example, if your house is flooded by a Tsunami, but the house 
next door is untouched, you would probably wonder, ‘why does this 
happen to me?’ And that’s actually the problem! On a general level, we 
would measure the damage by saying, ‘a certain area was devastated by 
the Tsunami’, but on your level, the ratio of damage is one to one. Even if 
30% of a particular area was destroyed, it won’t necessarily mean 
anything to you. Your problem is whether you were affected or not. So, 
we need to have people share these emotions. But since irrationality 
                                                
60 Historian of mathematics Amir Alexander’s (2014) brilliant book Infinitesimal: How a Dangerous 
Mathematical Theory Shaped the Modern World, addresses this problem in telling the story of how 
infinitesimals - the ground for general methods of the integral calculus known today - during the mid-
17th-century became controversial for the Catholic church, who feared that such indivisibles placed 
paradoxes at the heart of God’s creation, confusing matter with its measure (Alexander 2015). The 
materiality of the world, Alexander implies in his book, cannot be untethered from the formalisms 
people used to describe it. Yet, debates in mathematics have been waged for centuries on how to 
calibrate matter with its measure.  
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doesn’t exist in physical science, you don’t even have to think about what 
it means. If we don’t understand those things, if there’s no such thing as 
irrationality, then we’ll all be content. If we only had to use physics or 
chemistry or mathematics, then everything ends right there, but our world 
is on a different level. We need to think about connections. Irrationality 
appears from nowhere. It emerges just like time emerges, and that’s what 
society’s like. Instead of trying to resolve irrationality we should simply 
recognize that it’s there and think about what we can create from it. If we 
don’t do so, however, a beautiful world will continue to exist. Physics, 
chemistry, mathematics are equivalent to a beautiful world … Yet, the 
basic rule for a scientist is not to believe in mystery, but in a way, 
scientists keep believing in illusion, magic, and mysterious things. 
Ikegami’s emphasis on meaning, again, suggests that the “layer of description” of 
normal science, especially physics, chemistry and mathematics, generally fails to 
make proper meanings of any given phenomena, for example, such as the damage 
ratio of a Tsunami. What matters to the scientists, who act as proponents of normal 
science, is to shore up such an event by making “objective”, rational calculations, and 
then even reduce it to such. However, there are ways to break up with this scientific 
vision of the world, as Ikegami continues, “but science is also the body of a 
community. And what the variable is must be determined by the community itself. 
Basically, you can say what you want to say. Science is really a matter of 
community.” 
Now, there are a lot of things going on here: what Ikegami is basically suggesting is 
that scientific formalisms, especially mathematical equations and chemical formula, 
are clumsy mediators of reality. Indeed, harking back to the previous chapter for a 
moment, computer models, equations, diagrams, scribbles, formula, words, theories, 
may even be said to be clumsy mediators of a highly complex and excessively 
information-flooded reality. Yet, still, this does not mean they are not useful, but 
simply that they should not be mistaken for being anything more than representations 
of reality, and very bad and heavy-handed renditions of that reality. They are, to be 
sure, nothing more than descriptions of reality, but nevertheless still part of reality. As 
such, they do not possess any real explanatory power, but remain descriptions. 
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However, this does not mean that such descriptions are unreal or inauthentic, but 
simply that they are useful descriptors of reality, and thus exist in the world, which 
should not, however, be taken for more than what they are.  
 
But in addressing that science is a community - indeed a community of people who 
work under the same heading, “science” - Ikegami is also allowed, I think, to open up 
the possibility for breaching the doctrines of normal science by critiquing the norms 
and forms of settled expert authority (cf. Enwezor 2012; Franceschini 2017). In other 
words, recognizing that science is flecked with a slew of rationalities, some of which 
may be less embedded in cultural participation, none of them, especially not normal 
science, are “culture-free” (Tambiah 1990). Indeed, on the contrary, as Ikegami 
suggests, the criteria by which one assesses truth or veracity is determined by the 
“community”, which is to say that it is determined by the given “cultural formation” 
at that specific time and space. This notion, I think, also applies pressure to the 
criteria for determining what counts as “scientific”, what counts as “scientific 
knowledge”, and what counts as proper scientific conduct in terms of research. 
Normal science, then, is a distinct, culturally-enclosed space, or community, akin to 
what philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard (1998) has called, “kernels of 
apodicticity” - those regional “rationalisms” that are entrenched within specific 
epistemic territories (or what he calls cantons) by which objects are assessable only in 
relation to specified epistemic matrices (Bachelard 1998).  
 
Ikegami’s depiction of normal science, then, casts it as an arbiter of universal truth, 
even though it is, in fact, a community of people, who simply share a “culture” of 
“objectivism” and “scientism”. But really, according to Ikegami, and if one follows 
feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988), scientists share a “partial perspective” and in 
doing so, they decide upon their own rules of apodicticity and criteria of veracity, 
which are nonetheless, to Ikegami, contestable. As such, Ikegami’s version of science 
is also one resounding one of the central claims of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) – a 
theoretical and methodological approach to social theory where everything in the 
social and natural worlds co-exist in constantly shifting networks of relations – where 
the production of “facts”, as anthropologist Bruno Latour argues (1987), is 
simultaneously the process by which such “facts” come to be accepted as facts. How 
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facts become accepted as facts, Latour says, depends on which supporters are enrolled 
and how actor networks are extended by trials of strength until the cost of dissent 
becomes too high (Latour 1987). In other words, central to Ikegami’s claim is that the 
“facts” of normal science have failed to enroll them as supporters and thus failed at 
gathering a strong consensus about what constitutes the appropriate criteria for 
veracity.  
 
A Charismatic Leader 
 
How, then, does one make sure to enroll supporters to gather consensus? Ikegami’s 
charismatic aura, his status as a “pioneer” among the lab members, and his 
unconventional approaches, I think, is exactly what persuades lab members that 
normal science is generally bad. Moreover, Ikegami’s status as a sort of spiritual 
leader among the lab members is exactly what motivates belief in the idea that a new 
epistemology is needed, indeed, that a new paradigm of science is required for 
making new meanings of life. And this is exactly, I believe, what allows Ikegami to 
destabilize and challenge the entire scientific enterprise itself: he is a charismatic 
leader, who is confident that he is on a righteous path, and as such, he is also 
confident that he can open a new space of possibility for articulating fresh rules of 
apodicticity and criteria of veracity and truth.  
 
But in order to establish himself as a trustworthy leader, it depends first and foremost 
on his ability to renounce normal science and on thus convincing us that normal 
science is detrimental to scientific progress. So, one has to be convinced that the 
“hard facts”, which may, according to Ikegami, easily come undone, are negotiable, 
not axiomatic. Once one accepts that, Ikegami is allowed to say that scientists, who 
usually tend to say they enjoy exclusive and absolute access to the truth of nature and 
its operations, in fact only enjoy only a partial perspective (cf. Haraway 1988). This 
is, of course, part of Ikegami’s strategy to denounce normal science, to say that we 
only enjoy a partial perspective on things. Denouncing normal science therefore 
depends on Ikegami’s ability to deconstruct it, but only as a way to construct his own 
paradigm, that is, to reconstruct the outlines of kernels of apodicticity by which to 
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assess truth. To this end, Ikegami simply joins a cacophony of anthropological and 
sociological voices, who have spent the past fifty years deconstructing science. But 
evidently, Ikegami’s own deconstruction of normal science, I think, here serves a very 
specific purpose: deconstructing normal science allows him to reconstruct a new 
mode of science. As such, Ikegami’s deconstruction of normal science, as sociologist 
Silvia Gherardi (2017) notes, is a sort of “local tailoring”, which is seemingly 
invisible to the whole group – i.e. the lab members – but nevertheless constitutes a 
shared representation of normal science. Ikegami, then, vexes on on a, “regime of 
visibility/invisibility” (Gherardi 2017:bp), not in order to make normal science 
“invisible” as such, but rather to make artificial life more visible. After all, normal 
science to Ikegami and the lab members is a visible adversary.  
 
If the deconstruction of normal science, then, is an active strategy, indeed a sort of 
“local tailoring” allowing Ikegami to admit new definitions of what counts as a proper 
kernel of apodicticity, by which to evaluate and assess truth, then doing so, I think, 
vividly exposes how Ikegami embodies a certain type of authority at the lab. In the 
words of Gherardi, it, “illustrates the way in which classifications perform courses of 
action in an invisible manner” (Gherardi 2017:bo). Ikegami’s vision and 
deconstruction of normal science thus dissipate among lab members, who adopt a 
view of science, including its tools, approaches and methods, that it is largely 
detrimental to scientific and intellectual progress.  
 
As such, Ikegami’s version of normal science is somewhat identical to how 
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1962) describes “normal science, which is an 
enterprise that attempts to, “force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible 
box that the paradigm supplies,” where, “no part of normal science is to call forth new 
sorts of phenomena”. Normal science, to Kuhn, is a paradigm, in which, scientists do 
not, “normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those 
invented by others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to the articulation of 
those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies.” (Kuhn 1962:24). 
And so, what Ikegami shares with Kuhn’s conception of normal science is that 
“normal-scientific research” largely fails to get at something new. Needless to say, 
Ikegami represents, or rather makes himself a representative of, the opposite of 
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normal science, and encourages his students to do the same. This deconstruction of 
science, in turn, is a display of Ikegami’s power and authority at the lab, his ability to 
do “invisible” work that actively steers the course of action at the lab (cf. Gherardi 
2017). Ikegami, then, surreptitiously establishes himself as someone who is by 
himself able to “silence” normal science by casting it as “inappropriate knowledge”, 
but he also someone, as we saw in the previous chapter (chapter 4), who is able to 
articulate his own ontology. Now, to this end, he mediates the relationship between 
what is bad science and what is good science, what reality is and what it is not. And 
so, he clandestinely smuggles an “invisible infrastructure” of norms, visions and 
beliefs into the social world of his lab (cf. Gherardi 2017). In other words, he 
establishes himself as a charismatic leader, whose visionary outlook, personal 
qualities and emotional posture affect the lab members in ways that make them follow 
him.  
 
Now, sociologist Max Weber (1954) distinguishes between three ideal types of 
legitimate political leadership, domination and authority by specifying three more or 
less distinct types of domination: traditional authority, legal authority, and charismatic 
authority (Weber 1954). Such ideal types may be manifest in all kinds of 
organizations, from corporate enterprises to governments, and legitimate all sorts of 
actions. Now, if scientific practices under the aegis of normal science are governed 
and legitimated by their adherence to tradition and custom, as Ikegami seems to 
suggest they are, it is an enterprise largely ruled what Weber calls “traditional 
authority” – a mode of authority in which an organization (in this case normal science 
or the scientific enterprise) is tied to tradition or custom (Weber 1954). And if normal 
science is guided by rules, laws and traditions, as Kuhn suggests, noting that normal 
science is a “tradition-bound activity” (Kuhn 1962:6), it makes sense to say that 
normal science is an organization, or a ruling regime, that is largely tied to, and 
legitimated by, traditional values and customs. And, as Kuhn further notes, in normal 
science, there must, “be rules that limit both the nature of acceptable solutions and the 
steps by which they are to be obtained” (Kuhn 1962:38). Thus, Ikegami’s notion of 
normal science is a sort of paradigm governed and legitimated by tradition and 
custom: scientists, such as Ikegami’s friend Chuck Taylor, for example, adhere to a 
set of rules of doing “proper” or “real” science. However, in addition, normal science 
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may also fall under Weber’s second type of domination - “legal authority” - by which 
Weber sees a form of leadership in which the authority an organization is bound to 
legal rationality, legal legitimacy and/or bureaucracy (Weber 1954). But notably, 
normal science is mostly bound by rules and traditions that must to be followed in 
order for “science” to be real “science”. 
 
Now, charismatic authority, Weber says, is opposed to both traditional and legal 
authority by virtue of deriving its power from the charisma of the leader himself 
(Weber 1954; Spencer 1970). Thus, charismatic authority, in contrast to both 
traditional and legal authority, “sweeps aside old norms and generates 
charismatically-certified new norms [i.e. ‘…norms legitimated by … virtue of 
affectual attitudes…’]) (Spencer 1970:126 my emphasis), and so the leader generates 
the norms and not vice versa. Since authority and legitimacy derives directly from the 
personal qualities of the leader, affectual action should here be understood as qulaities 
such as positive attachment, awe, fear, reverence, and so on. Key to charismatic 
authority, then, is that it involves some emotional posture or personal quality as the 
basis for executing and asserting authority (Weber 1954; Spencer 1970).  
 
Ikegami, to go back, is such a charismatic leader, one who generates the norms and 
whose creeds are followed. That is, I want to claim that Ikegami is a charismatic 
leader whose visionary outlook, emotional posture, and affectual attitude, affect and 
propel lab members to follow his creed and join him on his mission to “construct 
artificial life in the real world”. In other words, Ikegami’s, “affect is generated by the 
personal qualities […] and is attached to his person” (Spencer 1970:130), and as such 
he leads his lab by surreptitiously generating new norms, for example, by making 
evident to us all that science in general, and normal science in particular, is about 
making “boring calculations”. More prominently, I also want to claim, Ikegami is not 
only convincing lab members that normal science is bad, he is also simultaneously 
providing them with philosophical, metaphysical, ontological and epistemological 
guidance. He defines the principles of reality, MDF, as we saw in chapter 4; he 
defines the principles by which this reality is supposed to be apprehended by 
denouncing normal science; and he even goes as far as to say that, “one can basically 
say anything in science […] so it is the community, who decides what is true and 
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what is not”. And while such utterances edge on the anti-philosophy of philosopher of 
science Paul Feyerabend (1975) - things are true if we decide they are, or at least if 
we agree on the baseline principles for determining what they are or how they work –
they also reveal that Ikegami is the one deciding the overall orientation and attitude of 
his lab, an attitude that is seemingly contagious among lab members. 
 
Now, as Ikegami concludes: as long as scientists persevere in the paradigm of normal 
science, in their own, self-made kernels of apodicticity, and in turn reproduce this 
scheme of normal science, “a beautiful world will continue to exist”. Yet, still, the 
“beautiful world” to which he refers is the world normal science wants to see, but this 
beautiful world only exists because it is framed by normal science. In turn, it is also 
the vision of normal science Ikegami wants his lab members to see, and it is exactly a 
vision that makes his own enterprise of artificial life seem more novel and radical: in 
this world, normal science is not only congealed, but largely detrimental to scientific 
and intellectual progress, and this is why it must be deconstructed.  
 
Deconstructing/Reconstructing Science 
 
Simply put, normal science is characterized by being a set of research practices 
contained within, and legitimated by, a specific set of rules and norms. This is, at 
least, how Ikegami and the lab members see it. And as such, normal science is a likely 
candidate for being the type of clean or “pure” science that orders an otherwise 
disorderly and “messy” world, characteristic of a modernist paradigm that bifurcates 
the world into ontologically distinct and purified domains, “nature” and “society” (cf. 
Latour 1993). Rephrasing Ikegami, then, normal science makes the world “beautiful” 
exactly because it orders the world into neatly demarcated categories. However, as 
Ikegami contends, he does not really want a beautiful world and he encourages his lab 
members to adopt the same stance. Rather, Ikegami suggest that we 1) acknowledge 
that the world is messy in both an ontological and a relational sense, and 2) therefore 
we must engage such a world, he says, “as it is” without reducing it to the 
apprehensions and formalisms of normal science. In playing on the dichotomous 
relationship between the clean and the messy, to follow anthropologist Mary Douglas 
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(2001), Ikegami not only want reality to be messy and impure, that is, to be what 
Douglas calls “matter-out-of-place” (Douglas 2001:41), but he also wants to make 
normal science “out-of-place” exactly in order to make “place” for his new 
epistemology of artificial life.  
 
If one plays on the relationship between the pure and the impure, the clean and the 
messy, I want to claim here that Ikegami, as a charismatic leader, is also in the 
process of calibrating the relationship between normal science and their own 
enterprise. And this calibration involves the work of deconstructing normal science 
for the benefit of crafting his own mode of science, on reworking the relationship 
between good science and bad science, and on reworking the relationship between his 
own “new” epistemology and his self-articulated ontology of MDF. That is, wanting 
to formulate a new epistemology of artificial life rests upon deconstructing normal 
science, but also on the sustaining belief among lab members that the real world is 
indeed composed of massive data flows, and so an epistemology of artificial life must 
be defined in relation to an ontology of MDF. Thus, Ikegami’s new epistemology is 
essentially a response and answer to his own self-invented ontology that posits reality 
as unruly and ontologically impure, but this, in turn, reveals that Ikegami must 
mediate the relationship not only between normal science and his own mode of 
science, but also between epistemology and ontology.  
 
Now, what Ikegami means by the notion that, “science makes a beautiful world” is 
that normal science practices filter phenomena through its own layer of description. 
But it also means that scientific practices, in general, essentially endeavor to render 
clean an untidy and messy reality in an idiom of “rationality”, “objectivism”, and 
“scientism”. But through his deconstruction of normal science, Ikegami also exposes 
how he is largely unimpeded by such doctrines, which also enables him to become an 
adversary of normal science. As such, Ikegami instills a collective attitude among his 
lab members to cast themselves as rebels to an established order, an order they 
collectively seek to topple. And this self-imposed image, I think, is no coincidence. 
Rather, it propels Ikegami and the lab members to imagine themselves as insurgents, 
who operate at the fringes of science. This attitude, I hold, is rooted in, and animated 
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by, Ikegami’s charismatic authority expressed in his ability to mediate relations 
between different modes of science, ontology and epistemology.    
 
While Ikegami is the key to understand how the lab members come to share a sort of 
rebel-identity, it remains critical to keep in mind that he must be able to sustain his 
charismatic authority. In other words, if the lab members fail to put their trust in 
Ikegami as a “pioneer” and spiritual leader, indeed, if they fail to remain convinced 
that the world is flooded by massive data flows, Ikegami would in turn lose his ability 
to hold on to his followers. So, if normal science represents a certain type of ordered 
system - or a “culture” if we follow Ikegami’s view that science is a community of 
people sharing the same set of epistemic matrices that brings ontological closure to 
the messiness of the world with mathematical precision61 - it epitomizes a specific 
normal-science-paradigm (cf. Kuhn 1962). As also Kuhn asserts, a normal-science-
paradigm configures the world into a set of ordered relations, where practitioners 
share a specific set of “values”, either symbolic generalizations or models. And so, it 
provides them a sense of community as a whole, what Kuhn terms a “disciplinary 
matrix” (Kuhn 1962:184). Thus, the disciplinary matrix of normal science is bound to 
tradition and custom. However, taken to the Ikegami Lab, the disciplinary matrix and 
the sense of community among the lab members, I hold, is bound to Ikegami’s 
personal qualities and charismatic style of leadership. Indeed, their collective rebel-
identity without the Ikegami would potentially collapse insofar Ikegami should 
suddenly be unable to sustain this disciplinary matrix.  
 
Ikegami not only wants to be the contravention of normal science, but he also asserts 
that the world is essentially ontologically disordered and should therefore be 
apprehended as such. To this end, following Douglas once again in this language of 
disorder, complexity, pathogenicity and hygiene, if Ikegami sees that the world is 
ontologically disordered (the kind of world normal science is in the breach to account 
for, however, unsuccessfully), or in Ikegami’s words “messy”, then he wants to keep 
                                                
61 To go back here to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s (1971), this process to make nature 
calculable, ironically, as they point out, ends up collapsing under its own weight, eventually inverting 
on itself, becoming that which it seeks to eradicate: an irrational enterprise (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno 
1971). That is, the excessive belief in rationality in its very excessiveness slips into what it opposes, 
ultimately imploding into irrationality.  
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it that way. And my claim is that he does so because it serves a specific purpose for 
him: it makes artificial life stand out against the crow and it allows him to establish 
and command the disciplinary matrices by which his lab operates.  
 
Now, to take a step back, this is not to say that “science” in general, or doing what 
Kuhn calls normal-scientific research, is an irrelevant activity for artificial life. After 
all, much of the field was founded on many of the doctrines of normal science in 
developing new methodologies and techniques for simulating lifelike processes in 
silico. But normal science, as Ikegami makes clear, is associated with the ordinary, 
the familiar and the regular, not the extraordinary, the unfamiliar and the irregular. 
Put differently, the scientific formalisms of normal science (for example “rational” 
mathematical equations or chemical formulas) cannot explain all aspects of worldly 
phenomena, but tend to explain them by turning them into equations or formulas, i.e. 
the conduct “business as usual”. Artificial life is not business as usual; it is, rather 
about being innovative and creative, about not limiting oneself to assess truth purely 
by reason, by rationality, by predictability. It is about expanding towards new 
horizons of possibility and reach for new meanings of life through attuning to the 
emergent, to serendipitous moments, about qualia and about making affective 
responses to a living world. But before going further into some of the details of the, 
“new epistemology”, indeed this embodied and affective mode of knowing, it serves 
to say here that what Ikegami encourages a belief among lab members to think of 
artificial life as the contravention to normal science in being extraordinary, unusual 
and remarkable. Thus, allow me now, before moving on to unpack the internal logic 
this new epistemology, to show how this view is adopted among lab members.  
 
Ikegami’s Zealots 
 
What it means to be an artificial life researcher, Olaf tells me one day when I visit 
him at ELSI, is basically to keep an open attitude to the serendipitous, to 
serendipitous ideas and to surprises. In the words of Olaf, the main problem of the 
asphyxiating paradigm of “normal science”, a term he echoes following Ikegami, is 
that it fails, he tells me, to do the, “the ‘Elon Musk-kind-of-thing”, by which he means 
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the lacking ability of scientists to think “big”. For Olaf, big scientific thinking - the 
opposite of normal science – is the ability to be extraordinary and to conduct 
unorthodox scientific research. But for Olaf, this “Elon-Musk-kind-of-thing” 
essentially involves building future humanity, future possibilities, and about making 
new scientific discoveries, in short, it is about being extraordinary and larger-than-
life. However, whereas such “big” ideas, according to Olaf, are organized around 
technological advancements, for example, such as to establish the technological 
conditions of possibility to rocket humans into outer space, as Olaf says, to “become a 
Type III-kind-of-civilization, or at least Type II”62, they also reveal how Olaf thinks 
of artificial life as an enterprise beyond the confines of normal science. Olaf’s vision 
here, though, is highly exaggerated, and this exaggeration is not negative, but exactly 
what Olaf and the lab members are going for: they want to be pioneers of an 
unorthodox mode of science, who think “big” and believe they are destined to make a 
paradigm shift. 
 
Olaf’s exaggerated techno-utopian vision, however, is not shared by all the lab 
members. Some lab members, I experienced, were more restrained in their claims, 
focusing less on building Kardashevian Type-civilizations. Yet, all of them still 
subscribed to a view that artificial life was working against convention and against 
dominant norms, for example, by envisioning how the training of neural networks to 
act “naturally” would do away with conventional AI, a way to break the dominant 
way of thinking about “intelligence” and “cognition”. All the lab members, in other 
words, in their own way felt that artificial life held the promise to circumvent and 
transform the world altogether, either by changing society, for example, by 
developing new technologies that change the way people think, or by changing 
science, for example, by establishing new paradigms. Yet, most visions, to be fair, 
were less fantastic than Olaf’s, but all the lab members marketed artificial life as an 
unorthodox and unconventional scientific enterprise with the potential to break the 
                                                
62 Olaf was here specifically referring to the hypothetical Kardashev-scale, named after the Soviet 
astronomer Nikolai Kardashev in 1964, which regards energy consumption on a cosmic scale. The 
Kardashev-scale is essentially, although hypothetically, a method of measuring a civilization’s level of 
technological advancement based on the amount of energy they are able to utilize. The Kardashev-
scale has three designated categories: 1) A Type I-Civilization, also called a “planetary civilization”, 
which can use and stire all the energy available on its planet. 2) A Type II-Civilization, also called a 
“stellar civilization”, which can use and control energy at the scale of its solar system. And finally, a 3) 
Type III-Civilization, also called a “galactic civilization”, which can control energy at the scale of its 
entire host galaxy.  
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conventions of normal science through novelty and innovation. Or, in other words, by 
thinking “big” and by being extraordinary.  
 
Technological advancements, though, were always marketed with positive 
potentiality (Taussig et. al. 2013)63, and as Olaf reveals, related to his observation that 
normal science fails at doing “the Elon Musk-kind-of-thing”. But while technological 
advancements are the arbiters of humanity’s future possibilities, Olaf is equally 
concerned about ways to do science in general. As he reports, “so, there are two ways 
to do science: you can do this experiment, like I have this hypothesis, and this specific 
hypothesis, and I know where I will get the results. This way allows for little 
progress, but it’s still very important for science. However, it is a way to do science, 
where you know where you are going from the beginning.” This is what Olaf calls 
“normal science”, following Ikegami. Olaf, however, also sometimes describes 
normal science as, “incremental science”, a sort of science working in chronological 
lockstep, but always in a linear and fixed way. “But Takashi and I,” Olaf continues, 
“we prefer to focus on surprises in science,” and making artificial life do the “Elon-
Musk-kind-of-thing”, Olaf concludes, would be “nice”.  
 
Now, many of the lab members are first and foremost in agreement that artificial life 
is a sort of “basic science”, one committed, they say, to ask “fundamental” and 
“scientific questions about life”. But like Olaf, they also feel compelled to think “big” 
and to carefully attend to “surprises” when asking these questions. But what is clear is 
that all of them generally subscribe to Ikegami’s bifurcation between good science 
and bad science. As Olaf further tells me, because the field focuses on “serendipitous 
ideas”, they should approach the subject matter accordingly, that is, by about making 
unplanned, surprising and fortunate discoveries, and thereby not plan everything in 
advance. This acknowledgement of the serendipitous, indeed this recognition that 
chance and incidence are productive things, I want to suggest, is part of Ikegami’s 
vision of the world. That is, the lab members align themselves and their ideas to his, 
to ideas of “emergence”, “normal science”, and the “serendipitous”. For example, in 
their eagerness to spot and/or invent something new, to capture something emergent, 
as cultural theorist Mitchell Whitelaw (2004) notes, is about catching, “something 
                                                
63 Read: chapter 2 on how technologies are tethered to dreams of betterment (cf. Lock & Nguyen 2010) 
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novel or unanticipated, something extra” (Whitelaw 2004:207). To many of the lab 
members this is the primary distinctive marker separating artificial life from normal 
science: that they actively, and perhaps strategically, seek to evade scientific 
orthodoxy in order to make cast themselves as insurgents or rebels.  
 
One day during fieldwork, I asked Olaf how artificial life could do the “Elon-Musk-
kind-of-thing” in practice. He replied, “I think it has something to do with this divide 
between scientific understandings, you know, as I told you, to do with this 
incremental science, where you know where you’re going.” Thus, to go back to Olaf’s 
notion of incremental science, which is mode of scientific research both synonymous 
or analogous with normal science that adds trivial additions to scientific knowledge, 
going from hypothesis to testing to result, it, “is a procedure where you know where 
you’re going from the start”. Or, more precisely, incremental science is where you 
know what you want to know from the beginning. “Artificial life is at the other 
extreme”, Olaf appends, “we know almost nothing about life. I mean, that’s not quite 
true because we know about a few properties, but we don’t know how to piece 
everything together yet. We don’t know about our chances of discovering life outside 
the Earth, but we know about some of its properties. But what artificial life does is 
maybe something like what Copernicus did at his time.” And this is the pinnacle of 
what it means to do the “Elon-Musk-kind-of-thing”. Allow me to explain. 
 
The Renaissance-era mathematician and astronomer, Nicolaus Copernicus, who 
formulated a model of the universe that situated the Sun, rather than the Earth, at the 
center of the universe, according to Olaf, is the difference that made a difference to 
how we came to view ourselves, the world, and our place in it, and our knowledge of 
it. “It was unthinkable back then that his hypothesis would be right”, Olaf tells me, 
implying that Copernicus’ hypothesis was not only at the time controversial for the 
Catholic church, which feared that his model placed paradoxes at the heart of God’s 
creation, but also that it fundamentally constitutes what Olaf sees as a 
“breakthrough”. Copernicus’ model, according to Olaf, has simply, but radically, 
changed our understanding of the universe, and our place in it, and so too, he notes, 
can artificial life. But, as Olaf further notes, “Copernicus was not the only one with 
this idea. There were hundreds of similar ideas and most of them were false, but some 
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of them were about right, yet they didn’t win the lottery,” leading Olaf to conclude, 
“so, there are these serendipitous ideas in science anyway. And you have to go a little 
bit crazy, like Copernicus did. Many leaps in science looked like this, like Einstein, 
the fact that you would need another observer in your model and so on.”64 
 
Olaf’s story about Copernicus, of course, exposes a long-term dream quilted into the 
project of artificial life, which is shared among many of the lab members, who hope 
that they will someday, somehow revolutionize the world by changing our 
understandings of it. But Olaf’s story also addresses and exposes that is dream is 
tethered to an ambition to make a paradigm change, just like Copernican astronomy 
did. In fact, I often heard lab members idolize popular scientists, who they associated 
with paradigm changes, such as Albert Einstein, Erwin Schrödinger, or Richard 
Feynman. Ikegami, for example, who is fond of Schrödinger, would often also refer to 
avant-garde artists, such as Shuji Terayama or pioneers such as the Wright Brothers – 
the American aviation pioneers, who generally credited with inventing, building, and 
flying the world’s first successful motor-operated airplane. Imagine, Ikegami thinks 
together with Olaf and the rest of the lab, what it would be like if artificial life was 
credited with inviting and building the world’s first artificial living being?  
 
In the words of Olaf, artificial life should differ from normal science exactly by 
focusing on “surprises” and “serendipitous ideas”, things normal science cannot grasp 
by clinging to convention, or rather, closer to Weber, by obeying the traditions of 
normal science. Stories such as Olaf’s, I think, mirrors Ikegami’s position at the lab, 
becoming symbolic of how the lab members are trained to cast themselves not only as 
insurgents and rebels, but also as intellectual pioneers and vanguards, poised to push 
beyond the limits of what they associate with normal science. In the process, Ikegami 
becomes a luminary, whose charismatic personality and suave ways of seeing and 
attending arguments constitute a new mode of legitimate rule. And so, this leads me 
back to how he defines his, “new epistemology of artificial life”.  
 
                                                
64 On a side note here, this also vividly exemplifies how I experienced many of the lab members 
talking about the promises of artificial life. Many of them, like Olaf, drew direct parallels to famous, 
sometimes popular, accounts of “scientific breakthroughs”, often celebrating the inspired, but 
misunderstood figure of the genius. One evening, out drinking, I enthusiastically spent a good 2-hours 
listening in to a discussion about Albert Einstein’s and Elon Musk’s many achievements.  
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A New Epistemology of Artificial Life: Between Science and Art 
 
Ikegami, the son of a physicist, turned artist-scientist, began his career in molecular 
biology. “In college in the 1980s”, he tells me, “molecular biology was popular, so I 
considered that kind of academic research. But it was not the type of biology that I 
had anticipated. I wanted to understand life from different perspectives, so I reckoned 
that I needed to learn about physics and mathematics first.” In switching his attention 
to physics instead, Ikegami became enamored with the likes of Erwin Schrödinger 
and Richard Feynman. Both of them, felt at the time, had offered better and more 
fundamental accounts of life than any conventional biologist. However, while an 
admirer of physicists, for example such as Erwin Schrödinger, Ikegami also became 
enamored by the writings of figures such as Kenji Miyazawa, Osamu Dazai and Shuji 
Terayama65. Writers such as these have strongly influenced Ikegami’s own thinking 
about life and the living world in ways that have become integral to how he imagines 
the project of artificial life at large. Indeed, Ikegami seeks to draw inspiration from 
both inside and outside science, in literature, music and film.  
 
On a trip to Paris in 1998, the same year as he became interested in evolutionary 
robotics and physical awareness, Ikegami met artists such as Gabriel Orozco and 
Carsten Nicolai (Alva Noto)66, an encounter that would irreversibly reshape his vision 
of science altogether. After this encounter, he realized, he tells me, that, “art is a 
totally different way to present ideas to people”, a form that offers, “a great 
opportunity of expression when there’s something I cannot simply explain with 
                                                
65 I want to add here an anecdote from my fieldwork, in which Ikegami and I were sharing our 
predilections for Osamu Dazai. In some of my interviews with Ikegami, we were sometimes lead astray 
into discussing some of Dazai’s works, namely his last novel No Longer Human (Ningen Shikkaku) 
from 1948. Dazai himself, a synecdoche for, and an icon of the perpetual attempt to grapple with life’s 
meaning, the meaning of being a human being, death, anxiety and the futility of existence, Dazai dod 
not know how to be human. Many of Dazai’s late novels, for example, reflect a relentless self-
abnegation, in which his protagonists experience complete estrangement, not only from human society, 
but also from being human, alienated from her own species, even existence itself. In No Longer 
Human, the novel’s protagonist, Oba Yozo, experiences a predominant feeling of stark terror at the 
incomprehensibility of other people around him – parents, teachers, friends, stranger and lovers. To cut 
a long story short, Ikegami and I often used authors, who we were both fond of, as metaphorical 
devices to discuss across domains science, art and technology.  
66 One evening in 2017, I had the privilege to join Ikegami at an art-science event with Carsten Nicolai, 
who met to discuss a bunch of topics ranging from life to music to the Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik (DDR). 
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words,” he says. “So, I realized that there are things happening in what we call the 
open everyday life that cannot be explained in terms of physics and mathematics.” 
 
Thus, to go back to Ikegami’s notion that science makes a beautiful world, art is what 
captures, Ikegami suggests, that which “escapes rational logic” and those things that 
cannot be easily made sense of by the rationalities of normal science. Indeed, as 
Ikegami reports, art is essentially a path to make artificial life meet artistic and 
aesthetic ends, that is, to offer ways to express what scientific formalisms cannot. “I 
find in art,” he further tells me, “a great opportunity for expression when there’s 
something I cannot simply explain with words, so I’d like to understand life by 
creating it.” He reports,  
 
we sometimes need art pieces and artwork to express, or to compensate 
for, what we cannot explain scientifically. So, if life is not simulated, but 
lived, art is what gives a sense of something scary, which is also a sense 
of something realistic, something you can express with art, something this 
is part of the messiness of the world. […] You know, there’s a bunch of 
interesting mountains in Japan, rich animals and landscapes, and the mind 
is like that: there are many different minds, scientific minds, but no one is 
better than the other. The scientific mind is like a rainforest, different 
plants and animals. And this way of understanding the scientific mind is 
important, but it’s easy to get lost. Art, you cannot say one type of art is 
better than the other, but science tends to do that. It’s ok sometimes. But 
the imagination is becoming poorer.  
 
Two things basically happen here: 1) Ikegami seeks to level the playing fields of 
science and art, as two distinct domains operating by different kernels of apodicticity, 
and 2) tells us that art pieces and artworks are propitious substitutes for expressing 
what cannot be explained scientifically. Art pieces, then, or rather by transforming 
artificial life systems to art pieces, offer a sort of “subtleness”, or subtle lifelikeness, 
which Ikegami believes is important to understand what life is. And this subtleness 
cannot necessarily be explained scientifically. “I think subtleness is quite important to 
understand what life is,” Ikegami goes on, “maybe I’m wrong, but that’s what I 
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concerned with: how to ‘pick up’ this subtleness, you know, to see if there’s a hint 
somewhere behind it all.”  
 
Now, to pause, while it is clear, as already mentioned, that Ikegami’s style betrays a 
tension between the logical and rigorous figure of the scientist and the creative and 
spontaneous figure of the artist, he is not saying that science should turn into art. 
Rather, he maintains that art and science are distinct domains, but science can simply 
take from the domain of art new ways of expressing what cannot be properly 
expressed in scientific terms. That is, if science orders reality according to its own 
epistemic matrices and formalisms, art can compensate for what is not easily captured 
by science. It is therefore, in Ikegami’s words, this, “middle ground” between art and 
science, in which a new epistemology articulate for the field should be articulated, a 
liminal space where science makes active use of artistic expressions to convey what it 
cannot explain itself.  
 
So, to go back to Ikegami’s notion that scientists keep believing in “mysterious 
things”, Ikegami is not saying that artists are necessarily any better at apprehending 
the “mysterious”. Rather, he is saying that scientists should seek some sort of middle 
ground between art and science to somehow tease out new meanings of life by 
keeping the objective gaze of the scientist and the subjective gaze of the artist. One 
person, who Ikegami thinks speaks eloquently of life from a sort of middle ground 
position, is his favorite physicist: Erwin Schrödinger. “Physicists like Schrödinger,” 
he tells me, “the father of quantum mechanics wanted to know why some matter 
becomes life, why some matter doesn’t, and what the distinction between the two is. 
So, when Schrödinger published his book What is Life? In 1944, it shook the world, 
and I think, out of many physicists, Schrödinger is the one person who wrote 
excellently of quantum mechanics, which inspired many people to think about life 
like Schrödinger did. Schrödinger said that ‘eating’ entropy is life, and when he 
presented the ‘aperiodic crystal’, a little broken crystal, as an actual origin of life, I 
think there were various ‘tips’ in it.” 
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During the latter half of the Second World War, the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who 
was busy to understand the physics of life67, made two auspicious proposals: The first 
he called negentropy, a concept used to capture what he saw as the remarkable ability 
of living systems not only to avoid the effects of entropy production, as dictated by 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, but also to just the opposite, to increase 
organization: for an organism to maintain some structure, it must rid itself of the 
disorder that accompanies life-maintaining processes. The second proposal, notably of 
equal importance, is the idea that the hereditary mechanism that must exist so traits of 
individuals can be passed to offspring is more likely to be stored in what he called an 
“aperiodic crystal” – a structure with a specific but non-periodic arrangement of 
atoms, encoding information that guided the development of organisms. Molecules, 
Schrödinger believed, were too small and amorphous solids were too chaotic, so life’s 
structure had to be a sort of crystal (cf. Schrödinger 1944). (This proposal was made 
before the discovery of DNA). While the idea of the aperiodic crystal may inform 
Ikegami’s ideas about life, the point is here that Schrödinger also constitutes a role 
model for Ikegami in terms of taking a sort of middle ground position.  
 
Thus, the “tips” Ikegami refers to are indicators that life more likely refers to the 
structure of an aperiodic crystal, a structure capable of harboring and transmitting the 
logic of heredity, which is legible as a sort of “code-script”68 (cf. Helmreich 2016; 
Schrödinger 1944). The idea that life can be legible as a code-script or indeed thought 
of as information, Ikegami further implies, could not have been fulfilled without 
Schrödinger’s construal in the first place, and the “tips” in Schrödinger’s aperiodic 
crystal, in other words, are thereby pointers to the idea that life is more likely to 
unfold from the unified formal structure not necessarily holding DNA as a central 
basis for hereditary transmission and for life. These “tips”, although not especially 
artistic, or for that matter apprehended artistically, are what Ikegami refers to as 
                                                
67 The physics of life is a branch of theoretical physics that aims to survey how physics is relevant for 
biological applications. The field attempts to describe how physics is needed for understanding basic 
principles of biology, for example, the delicate balance between order and disorder in living systems, 
especially in describing how physics play a role in “high” biological functions, such as learning and 
thinking.  
68 Schrödinger’s account of life as an aperiodic crystal was later enlisted into models of the double 
helix of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), into informatic and cybernetic visions of vitality, and the 
decoding of the “genetic code. 
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“shadows” or “deflections” of life, traces or signs that may somehow enable one to 
forge new meanings of life.  
 
While well-versed in the great history of science, Ikegami looks to art and artistic 
expression as places of inspiration. But he does so to formulate alternative ways to 
make new meanings of life, which are not framed by scientific formalism. Indeed, a 
new epistemology of artificial life, then, should be one attuned to capture what 
Ikegami refers to as “deflections” or “shadows” of life - emergent qualities not easily 
captured by normal science. In practice, a new epistemology of artificial life, as 
Ikegami suggests, first involves 1) “constructing artificial life in the real world” in 
order to 2) be able to make “new meanings of life”, but based first and foremost on 
aesthetic judgements, i.e. the beholder’s affective and embodied responses to the 
artworks or objects in question, not on scientific formalism. What Ikegami means by 
Schrödinger is not the one should copy Schrödinger’s ideas on a one-to-one-basis, but 
rather to illustrate that Schrödinger, during his time, offered alternative views of life 
that were not at first accepted as “facts” (cf. Latour 1987). But unlike Schrödinger, 
however, Ikegami sees that “construction”, that is, the making of artificial life systems 
is the beginning of a series of events that might lead to better apprehend such 
“deflections” and thereby new meanings of life: i.e. one must build the things first and 
then make sense of them afterwards. To this end, Ikegami emphasizes that we should 
prioritize the beholder’s interpretation of the materiality of the medium over an 
evaluation of the artist/creator’s intentional deployment of that medium as the ground 
of a materialist expression (cf. Cronan 2013). This is to say, in other words, that 
Ikegami change the register of apprehension by which we understand life by 
synthesizing science with art, by taking a stance more closely aligned to 
postphenomenology and hermeneutics in order to “pick up”, as he says, the subtle 
emergences of life from the things they make.  
 
Thus, learning to become sensitive to ways “deflections” of life may emerge through 
a sort of “affective formalism” - a formalism more closely aligned to 
postphenomenology, philosophy and art (Cronan 2013) – is critical to this 
epistemology of artificial life. Again, while Schrödinger was not considered an artist 
as such, according to Ikegami, he still dared to think beyond the paradigm of his time 
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and thereby to think about life in alternative ways. Indeed, Schrödinger was “ahead” 
of his time, his account of life as an aperiodic crystal would later be enlisted into 
model of DNA, into those cybernetic visions of vitality we still encounter today. 
 
A new epistemology of artificial life, in this sense, is a formalism, or a critical 
framework, which is inextricably linked to the construction and materiality of 
artificial life systems. By constructing new artificial life systems, for example, such as 
the OEE-model of chapter 3 or, as we shall see later, androids, the effect on the 
beholder, generated by the material properties of such objects, including their form, 
color, and visual rhythm, should be privileged over cognitive questions ranging from 
the creator’s conscious or unconscious intent to the beholder’s affective identification 
with the artwork in question (cf. Cronan 2013). Yet, unlike affective formalism, 
Ikegami’s vision also necessitates that one attunes to the emergent without necessarily 
excluding a reading of the artist/creators’ intentions. After all, the intention behind 
artificial life systems is to make them “lifelike” and to make us think about life in new 
ways. Still, the point is that life’s meanings, according to Ikegami’s epistemology, 
may be somehow torqued out through the beholder’s interpretation of the materiality 
in question, which includes the material properties of an object, its form, color, or 
visual rhythm. In turn, Ikegami believes that this may splinter any preconceived or 
established definition of life exactly by making such definitions available for 
collective reinterpretation by the “masses”. In other words, and put differently, life’s 
definitions are not exclusively to be determined by science, nor to be framed by 
scientific formalisms, but rather by a new mode of apprehension that involves 
affective and embodied modes of knowing. To this end, negotiating and settling life’s 
ontological basis, then, is a question of “attuning to the emergent”, of individual and 
collective affective identifications and responses to the things they make at the lab, to 
heighten one’s sensitivity to how life emerges.  
 
Attuning to the Emergent 
 
One of the main issues relating study of life has historically been how to distinguish 
between attributes of life that are truly universal against attributes that solely hinge on 
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some particular history. Many of the lab members, including Ikegami, are aware of 
this problem. But in an attempt to untangle this complex, Ikegami tells me a 
comparative story about how two altogether different approaches in biology have led 
to the articulation of two relatively similar theories of life. But this time, Ikegami is 
not referring to Schrödinger, but to the prominent natural scientists Charles Darwin 
and Minakata Kumagusu. Both were scholars, Ikegami notes, who, like Schrödinger, 
offered new ways to think about life and the living, and both examples of how 
different paths can lead to similar results and vice versa. Indeed, seeing these two 
figures as pioneers of biology, especially due to their contribution to the life sciences 
by developing their respective theories of evolution, Ikegami’s seeks to highlight and 
address the problematic and intricate relationship between scientific observation, 
inference, and theory-making. That is, in other words, Darwin and Kumagusu are 
central figures to how Ikegami seeks to articulate his new epistemology of artificial 
life and how this epistemology is embroiled and woven into the grand narrative of the 
Ikegami Lab. Indeed, more concretely, the story of Darwin and Kumagusu is at the 
heart of what of what it means to attune to the emergent.  
In the early 1900s, the microbiologist Minakata Kumagusu (1867-1941), a scientific 
maverick and accomplished, though eccentric, scientist, made his claim to scientific 
fame in his study of slime molds (myxomycetes and mycetozoa): slimy, fungus-like 
things with strange lifecycles. With an interest in folklore and the supernatural, 
Kumagusu widely engaged in philosophical reflections on the relations between 
different kinds of knowledge and various kinds of phenomena. In his work, he 
conceptualized the combined set of worldly phenomena in a shape of a mandala, 
encompassed by the great mystery (daifushigi) of Dainichi Nyorai – the cosmic 
Buddha and central divinity in esoteric Buddhism. In this order, beings and entities 
encounter one another in a complex bundle of visible and invisible webs. Seeing 
vitality to unfold in such webs, Kumagusu distinguished between “wonders” 
belonging to what can be translated as abstract things (koto), concrete things (mono), 
the mind (kokoro), and reason (kotowari) (Minakata 1951). Above all, and more 
importantly in relation to Ikegami, Kumagusu recognized that the scientific search for 
the law of causality did not facilitate an understanding of all the world’s relations, 
what he called en and in – or as a compound innen – considering the environment in 
terms of unstable networks of innen. Such networks, Kumagusu believed, were 
 211 
generally shrouded in mystery. He writes,  
Today’s science grasps (or is expected to grasp) the riddles of causality. It 
comprehends causality or in (but not coincidence or en) … En is what 
emerges out of the intertwining of one series of causes and effects with 
another. In order to grasp the total picture of the world, both cause and 
effect (in) and their interrelationships (en) should be understood” 
(Kumagusu 1971:391-92).  
For Kumagusu, reasons, relations, and entities in the domain of daifushigi existed, but 
their mode of existence evaded, he thought, the scope of modern science, which 
typically looked only for laws of causality, what he called in. To translate this into 
Ikegami Lab vernacular, modern science largely fails to tackle and comprehend en, 
looking instead only for in. Rather than studying causality, Kumagusu contended, 
scientists should focus instead on chance or co-incidence as pivotal to better 
understand the ontology of things, which meant cultivating one’s perceptual abilities 
to apprehend en, that is, by developing what he called tact (Kumagusu 1971).  
For modern science, lack of observability has for long called upon methodological 
anxieties, as unobservable or invisible entities, say, such as spirits or ghosts, slip away 
not only from the installed systems of representation employed by scientists but also 
scientific modes of reasoning. Indeed, strict empiricist or positivist methods for 
encountering such entities either ignore them, relegate them to the realm of 
metaphysics or superstition, or they are simply inadequate. But Kumagusu’s view of 
the “wondrous” not only draws indirect parallels to artificial life’s notion of 
“emergence”, as that, Mitchell Whitelaw (2004) writes, which “refers to something 
novel or unanticipated, something extra” (Whitelaw 2004:208), but it also marks his 
acknowledgement of the multiple bodies and the environments of the world, which 
are so varied that they can neither be tamed or captured by the scientific descriptions 
of modern science. Nor can they easily be grasped, Kumagusu said, by lived 
experience in its conventional phenomenological sense.  
On Kumagusu’s view, entities are enmeshed in en with the potential for evoking and 
event affecting a person or a thing. Kumagusu writes,  
Without cause (in), there is no effect (ga). And if the cause is different, 
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then the effect also becomes different. En means that as one series of 
cause and effect (inga) continues, it is infiltrated by another series. The 
influence of en is called and occurrence (ki) … Therefore, various series 
of cause and effect continue on the body. At any moment, we encounter 
innumerable en. They can make occurrences happen, depending on how 
one minds them or how they touch one’s body. Because of these 
occurrences, some causes and effect that were continuous until now move 
out of their orbit, while others return to their original path. (Kumagusu 
1971:391) 
Thus, as Kumagusu suggests, it all hinges on the prospect of learning to be affected 
within the web. Events occurring beyond scientific cognition and description are 
arrested neither in the split between belief and disbelief, nor between existence and 
non-existence. Rather, as Kumagusu proposed, the occurrence (or “emergence”, 
again, to stick with artificial life nomenclature) of events depends on learning to be 
affected by different entities and relations within the webs of en.  
Now, to go back to Kumagusu’s slime mold, which is neither living nor dead, but 
perhaps best characterized as a quasi-living thing, like viruses, he saw that it changed 
from being a moving ameba to small fungus-like bodies in a very short amount of 
time. According to Kumagusu, from observing the dynamic life cycle of slime molds, 
the criteria of life and death in general is not as simple as one might expect because in 
the transformation of myxomycete, living cells and dead cells interact with each other 
in complicated ways. This, in turn, makes it difficult to draw a clear-cut line between 
life and death of either one cell or one individual life. To be able to notice slime 
molds, then, became a question of tact, as Kumagusu saw in slime molds the active 
interfaces between the thing and its environment. Moreover, slime molds were 
objects, one might say, embodying the continuity between life and death in the sense 
that they manifested, in their way of being in the world, a continuity between different 
orders or scales of the living, from the microbial level to the ecological level. Thus, 
thinking with slime molds, Kumagusu formulated a universal theory of life’s total 
connectivity from the smaller anecdotal vital signs exuded by myxomycete.  
In parallel, although about sixty years prior to Kumagusu’s development of his 
biological theory of life, in 1831, natural scientist Charles Darwin had been invited 
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onboard the HMS Beagle on route to conduct a hydrographic survey of the southern 
part of the South American coast. For five years, Darwin surveyed the South 
American coastlines, coming across the Galápagos islands. Here, he filled dozens of 
notebooks with careful observations on animals and plants and collected thousands of 
specimens, which he then crated home to his native England for further study. 
Returning from his sea voyage, Darwin argued inductively from data and specimens 
he and other crewmembers had collected, that a process of descent with modification 
could be inferred as the force giving form to organisms. That is, form that was 
transmitted down generations. In his work from 1859, On the Origin of Species, based 
on his experiences in the South Americas, Darwin speculated, he wrote, that 
“probably all organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from 
some a single primordial form, into which life was first breathed” (Darwin in Beer 
2000:48).  
In other words, Darwin offered an account in part from his collection of specimens69 
of how living form materialized out of what could be environmental or ecological 
dynamics, by which his theory of evolution by natural selection encompasses that all 
life is related and has descended from a common ancestor: birds, bananas, fish and 
flowers. In short, life emerges from nonlife, and complex organisms naturally evolve 
from simple ancestors over time. As random genetic mutations occur within an 
organism’s genetic code, only the beneficial mutations are preserved in the service of 
survival, the process Darwin called “natural selection”. The beneficial genetic 
mutations are passed on to the next generation and so on, over time, accumulating and 
resulting in an entirely different organism, which may not be considered a variation of 
the original, but altogether different in kind.  
Now, Ikegami’s science history lesson here is directly interwoven with the ambitions 
he has for his field, and particularly serving his interest in defining the contours of a 
new epistemology for his field. Ikegami’s reference to Darwin and Kumagusu 
exposes not only his historical awareness about some of the issues relating to 
scientific observation and the prospects of making theoretical knowledge claims about 
                                                
69 Some people point to “Darwin’s finches” – including various finch species, such as the warbler 
finch, sharp-beaked finch, ground finch, and common cactus finch - as symbols of evolution in the 
Galapagos islands. However, Darwin, apparently, hardly mentioned finches in his later writings. But 
like Kumagusu’s slime molds, finches were among the species collected by Darwin to formulate his 
theory of evolution among mockingbirds and tortoises.  
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the world, which are based in practices of empirical observation. It also exposes, I 
think, his ability to marshal “great scientists” to serve his cause and to bolster his 
position as a leading figure at the lab. The story of Darwin and Kumagusu, who, 
although in slightly ways attempt to determine life’s form from its matter, provide the 
resources Ikegami needs for building his own epistemology. Like Kumagusu, who 
saw in slime molds the dynamics of like, so too must artificial life be engaged in 
strained intellectual labor of making theoretical inferences from empirical phenomena 
they make. As such, Ikegami sees that this work of inference can also be based on the 
construction of artificial life in the real world, but it still requires one to attune to the 
emergent. Or rather, to follow Kumagusu’s argument, it requires of someone the 
prospect of learning to be affected within the web. The difference, however, is that 
this web is spun by artificial life researchers themselves. As such, one thing I believe 
Ikegami is also pinpointing in telling this parallel story of Darwin and Kumagusu, is 
their mutually shared interest in locating life’s form, here understood as a sort of 
empty signifier, which can be imbued with meaning. However, Ikegami, in contrast to 
Kumagusu and Darwin, seeks to do so from a very different, perhaps even mutually 
exclusive, set of proclivities and conditions of possibility, but his story ultimately 
concedes, I believe, that his epistemology of artificial life is a sort of intellectual 
continuation of Kumagusu’s and Darwin’s projects at large.  
The artificial life researchers at the Ikegami Lab, needless to say, are not committed 
to explore either slime molds or to collect specimens like Darwin and Kumagusu, but 
Ikegami seems to imply, through their story, that life, or at least a theory of life, might 
be articulated in a somewhat similar fashion. Not from biological substance, but from 
the artificially-created things they make at the lab. Or, as he says, “either through 
computational simulation, robot manipulation, or chemical experiment, the 
exploration of potential behavioral patterns is necessary to build a new natural history 
of artificial life.” Building a new natural history of artificial life, oxymoronic as it 
may seem, Ikegami suggests, is about establishing the correct conditions of possibility 
for doing so. Thus, if, for Darwin, the “forms” at stake in his theory of evolution 
materialize in “species” or “organisms”, that is, as durable but changeable 
genealogical kinds, or for Kumagusu, the “forms” at stake in his mandala theory of 
life materialize in slime molds, it suggests that form is essentially crystallized with 
respect to two altogether different kinds of causal ontologies. Form, here, then 
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suggests, as art historian Henri Focillon (1989) reports, that it is, “surrounded by a 
certain aura; although it is our most strict definition of space, it also suggests to us the 
existence of other forms.” (Focillon 1989:34). In other words, life’s form, as 
pertaining to Darwin and Kumagusu, is crystallized with respect to two different 
fields of possibility, suggesting the possibility of other forms: if both of their theories 
of life and evolution were accounts of how living form materializes out of 
environmental or ecological dynamics, they were based nonetheless in different 
logical frames. Now, once one realizes that Ikegami’s story here serves a particular 
purpose, namely to bolster the coherency and validity of Ikegami’s epistemology, 
including his own position at the lab and in a broader intellectual landscape, one may 
also notice that this story aligns to the previously mentioned ideas about the adjacent 
possible and ideas about open-ended evolution.  
This is exactly what Ikegami is going for here: to make his stories fit to his own 
project, in which he largely gestures towards making his own field of possibility, an 
effort, by which he and his team of researchers may seek anew to abstract other 
possible forms and meanings of life. Ikegami’s story, then, is not only a narrative way 
to tie artificial life into the wider history of science, technology and biology, as we 
saw some of the contours of in chapter 2, but it is also a strategic way to extend 
inquiries and amplify explanations of living form by virtue of modifying how one 
infers not only from observation, but also from construction, new meanings of life. 
Indeed, the conditions of possibility for identifying life’s possible forms, and possible 
meanings are based on the construction of artificial life systems, by building them 
piece by piece, from synthetic materials. But it is important to keep in mind that 
Ikegami is at the center of this epistemology; he is, after all, the one who controls the 
overall narrative of the lab. Thus, if Darwin and Kumagusu were writing the natural 
history of biological life, Ikegami promises to write the natural history of artificial life 
by constructing it70. Now, in the final section of this chapter, I want to show Ikegami 
                                                
70 On a side note, this also relates to biologist and mathematician D’arcy Wentworth Thompson (1917), 
who in his work On Growth and Form, argued that the shape of organisms was both constrained and 
shaped by a sort of mathematics or geometry of nature (Thompson 1917). Thompson drew heavily on 
the language of physics and mathematics to make sense of organismic morphology, believing that 
embryology, for example, like his successor Schrödinger, could learn much from studying crystal 
growth patterns (Thompson 1917). Now, if Thompson claimed that morphology arose through 
mechanical interactions with an organism’s environment, in promoting the use of algebraic and 
geometric formalisms to account for living form, then Ikegami agrees. But what happens to such 
claims in the advent of new technoscientific practices, in which artificial life researchers are directly 
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imagines how this new epistemology is supposed to be pushed into practice. 
 
A Real World Laboratory of Play 
 
To illustrate how Ikegami seeks to push this new epistemology into practice, the work 
of artist Shuji Terayama (1935-1983) makes for an appropriate facsimile. Indeed, 
since Ikegami’s new epistemology is a “middle ground” between art and science, 
Terayama’s work may highlight how artistic approaches and performances are central 
to Ikegami’s thinking about artificial life. During fieldwork, Ikegami often referred to 
Terayama’s experimental feature film, Throw Away Your Books, Rally in the Streets 
[Sho o suteyo machi e deyou] (1971) - a piece of agitprop about an angst-ridden 
teenager taking to the streets to escape from his dysfunctional family – as being 
highly influential to his work. While the film is commonly considered to be a 
metaphor for Japan’s descent into crude materialism, following the Second World 
War, Ikegami’s construal of the film is that it epitomizes that the world happens “out 
there” in “the streets”, in the “real world”. To the viewer, Throw Away Your Books, 
Rally in the Streets opens with an agonizingly protracted black screen carried by a 
subtle soundscape, and just as the viewer begins to think there is something wrong 
with the video, a young man dressed in a trench coat appears and berates the viewer’s 
idiocy for having fallen for the trick: what are we doing here, sitting watching this 
film waiting for something to happen when the real action is, and always has been, 
out in the streets? Hanging around will not do us any good, the viewer is told, a 
signal, Ikegami thinks, which emblazons the fact that the real world has always 
happened outside the confines of the laboratory.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
engaged in constructing, in a synthetic way, living form, when “organismic morphology” is at the 
hands of humans? Might this amount to say that social, cultural and affective practices, too, may 
constitute living form? If we follow the lab members at the Ikegami Lab, the answer would be yes, 
insofar you must construct the things you want to understand. Moreover, though, Ikegami adds that 
living form may equally be accounted for, not simply by employing algebraic and geometric 
formalisms (note that these are instances of what Ikegami regards as normal science formalisms), but 
by viewing living form through a sort of affective formalism, through art, through the body of an 
internal observer, a view that holds the observers’ affective response to living form, whether generated 
by the material properties of an object, its form, color, or visual rhythm, as integral to its meaning.  
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Terayama’s film, however, is to Ikegami nothing more than a metaphor. But there are, 
I think, many substantive similarities between Ikegami and Terayama in the way they 
both seek to approach vexing questions about reality and how one should be 
committed to that reality. And as such, Ikegami’s reference to Terayama is no 
coincidence, but an active attempt, I think, to mirror his his vision of artificial life and 
what he hopes to achieve by it. After all, Terayama and Ikegami agree that the “real 
world” is outside the theater and outside the laboratory, respectively, and it is to this 
world we should be committed, both when doing art but also when doing science.  
 
Around the time when Ikegami was born, in the dying days of the 1960s-youth 
rebellion, an era when Japan’s underground was reaching its peak, Terayama was a 
central figure in creative expression, shuffling the liminal spaces between materiality, 
imagination, fact and fiction. Many years later, in our contemporary moment, Ikegami 
now seeks to make artificial life meet aesthetic ends, hoping to create things that 
capture people’s imaginations. Ikegami, as many of the lab members say, is a 
“generalist”, one, “who does everything Alife”, but Terayama, too, was also a 
rounder: a poet, playwright, novelist, photographer, sports commentator and 
filmmaker. Now, for Ikegami, Terayama is not only a role model, but he is one of the 
most innovative figures of the 1960s and 1970s Japanese avant-garde, most vividly 
expressed in his fierce attempts to rupture and dissolve facades, surfaces, faces, 
illusions and identities. In Terayama’s piece, The Reading Machine [Shokenki] 
(1977), for example, a Borgesian satire on knowledge and technology, bibliophilic 
desires lead to the construction of a pedal-powered reading machine, depicting a 
scene where the camera lingers on an image of a man crawling through a book. Or, in 
Laura [Rora] (1974), where Terayama’s attention to surfaces culminates in the 
consummation between performer and spectator, as three strippers hurl insults at the 
audience only to lure one of them to literally enter the screen, from which he emerges 
clutching his torn clothes after being stripped and mauled on celluloid. Come here, the 
strippers say, come into the screen. And it is exactly this same sort of enticing and 
boundary-rupturing qualities that Ikegami encourages his lab members to build into 
the things they are constructing at the lab. Indeed, these are vital components to his 
epistemology of artificial life.  
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But there are other quite striking similarities between Ikegami and Tearayama in the 
way Ikegami construes Terayama’s artistic performances in daily life. Terayama saw 
conventional theater as bourgeoisie and elitist, which animated him to return to do 
something more impromptu, honest, and unorthodox, what he called “theater for the 
masses”. For example, in his most ambitious work to date, called Knock, Terayama 
staged a 30-hour live performance through the backstreets of Tokyo’s Suginami ward. 
At 3 p.m. on April 19, 1975, an assembled audience, equipped with maps, was guided 
through 19 performances around Suginami, some of which were rehearsed, while 
others were impromptu. But all the performances required the audience’s 
participation, demanding of them to become part of the “play” itself. As such, 
Terayama was a “choreographer of the masses”, as he went into public life (a domain 
he saw as his “laboratory of play”), turning the street into stage. Similarly, Ikegami 
strives to “bring artificial life to the real world” in a similar fashion, to turn the “real 
world” into his own “laboratory of play”, however, imagining the real world, still, as 
a lived reality, which may potentially also be dangerous. But this is part of the catch: 
anything can happen in the real world.  
 
To further bolster this point, Ikegami refers to yet another artist. In 1982, during Nam 
June Paik’s (1932-2006) show Becoming Robot at the Whitney Museum, New York 
City, Robot K-456, named for Mozart’s Piano Concerto No. 18 in B-Flat major, 
K.456, was run over by a car. What Paik saw as the catastrophe of technology in the 
twentieth century, Ikegami sees as the epitome of what it means to bring “artificial 
life to the real world”. In the words of Ikegami, “I base some of my theories on the 
work of the artist Nam June Paik. You know, usually, you build a robot in a 
laboratory-setting and you experiment on it there. But Paik took the robot to the city. 
And in the city the robot was hit by a car, and so it was the first robot to ever have 
been involved in a traffic accident.” That K-456 was the first to machine to become 
involved in a traffic accident, Ikegami quips, is “what happens in the real world!”  
 
Now, if the real world can be made into a “laboratory of play”, at least in theory, it 
also means that “play” and “performance” are important elements of knowledge 
production and what it means to infer new meanings of life. If Ikegami believes that 
life is somehow apprehensible, and something to be made sense of, on some affective 
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register, “play” is also about learning to master how to “sense” vitality in a playful, 
curious and perhaps naïve way, indeed how to cultivate and hone one’s perceptual 
abilities. That is, “play” is here about attuning to what “emerges” beyond the 
technical specifications of any artificial system, which includes apprenticeship in 
sensory, auditory and tactile technique. Thus, constructing new artificial systems is 
not simply about devising a new object solely for the sake of doing so or for testing 
some technical hypotheses; it is also about constructing physical, embodied systems, 
such as robots, which, as Ikegami tells me, “are able to interact with their 
environment in order to create new human-machine interfaces” in order to be 
somehow personally “affected”. Play, then, rather than being the act of engaging in 
activities of recreation or enjoyment - although Ikegami wants their artificial systems 
to “exciting”, “strange”, and “weird” in the sense that he wants them to be affective 
objects that impose upon observers – is also here serving a serious and practical 
purpose, namely to generate new knowledge and new meanings of life.  
 
And it is exactly the making of new human-machine interfaces, as Ikegami implies, 
which is a basis for teasing out some new meaning of life, he says, between the 
“solvable” and the “unsolvable” dimension of reality. There are, Ikegami holds, 
things in the real world, which can be solved by normal science, as Kuhn also 
suggests, by the usual sort of “puzzle-solving” (Kuhn 1962). However, there are also 
things, such as the irrational, the unconscious, why people do as they do; why they 
become criminals, friends, or enemies of one another, and so on, which cannot be 
explained by some mathematical equation. And this is despite of scientific attempts to 
do so: computer scientists, for example, write predictive algorithms seeking to 
anticipate behavioral or economic changes, but such things cannot be easily predicted, 
Ikegami thinks, nor be can they be reduced to algorithmic logics. Ikegami reports,  
 
Normal science has been trying to objectify subjectivity, but it’s difficult, 
right? It’s not something easily quantified or measured. But if you do, it 
doesn’t tell you anything about it. Even if science one day explains all the 
riddles of DNA or neurons, the question ‘what is life?’ will probably 
never be answered. Instead of trying to find answers to impossible 
questions, science should be about thinking in the gap between the 
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solvable and unsolvable parts. There’s always something that escapes 
rational logic. The world is beyond logic. 
 
Thus, the world can be apprehended between science and art, between what Ikegami 
associates with the rational and the irrational, the logical and the illogical. Crudely 
put, there are things that can be known by science and there are things that cannot be 
known by science, which is why we need to think “beyond logic”. Thus, Ikegami 
encourages, or persuades, the lab members to think beyond the established logics of 
normal science, in the “gaps”, what Olaf thinks of as outside incremental science, 
demonstrating how this epistemology proliferates among lab members. It is, in other 
words, a formalism by which to think in between the “solvable” and “unsolvable” 
parts, between the known and the unknown, in turn constituting a sort of creed, which 
is both authority and charismatically communicated by Ikegami to his followers in 
ways that makes it slip into the imaginary world the lab members. As Olaf also 
testifies, this is about thinking “big”, about thinking against normal science, and more 
importantly, I argue, about constructing a relatively coherent set of beliefs, norms and 
ideas, by which the lab members are invited to see the world. 
 
Ikegami’s epistemology may not be an airtight, impermeable, and thoroughly 
consistent way of seeing the world, but it nevertheless offers epistemological 
guidance to the Ikegami Lab at large. And this epistemology, I argue, conveniently 
aligns to how Ikegami sees reality, that is, to how he makes ontological claims to 
reality, as we saw in the previous chapter 4. As such, Ikegami’s ontoepistemological 
constitutes a charismatically-certified paradigm, which is summed up in my term 
Ikegamianism, informs the lab members’ ambition to construct artificial life in the 
real world. Thus, I argue, on the basis of chapter 4 and 5, that Ikegamianism 
challenges the paradigm of normal science and offers philosophical, metaphysical, 
ontological and epistemological guidance to the lab members.  
 
Now, in the final chapter, I want to show how Ikegamianism - a shorthand for the 
charismatically-certified ontoepistemological framework that informs much of their 
work at the lab – is indeed a new, nascent paradigm, which materializes through the 
actual work of constructing artificial life in the real world. That is, in short, in the next 
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chapter, I want to show how Ikegamianism is given material expression through what 
I call parallax machines.  
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Alter. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Introduction: Parallaxis 
 
In the spacious lobby at The National Museum of Emerging Science and Innovation 
(The Miraikan) - colloquially known as the “future museum” - located on the artificial 
island of Odaiba in one of Tokyo’s central districts, a crowd of people await the 
opening of the anthropoid opera Scary Beauty – the world’s first “android opera” 
featuring Alter, an upper-body android. Alter, with its porcelain-white face and 
mechanical body, is the first “real world” android to “autonomously” conduct a 
human orchestra. The show begins. On stage, looming in shadows, Alter’s white face 
shimmers and sways slowly from side to side. Spotlights flicker to illuminate the 
stage, as the show’s human composer, Keiichiro Shibuya, a friend of Ikegami, enters 
the stage. Visible from the platform below, where the crowd is seated, Alter’s shiny 
metallic body and matte silicone-skinned face reflect beams of red, blue and purple 
cutting through the darkness.  
 
A deep electronic and ambient sound fills the room to Alter’s high-pitched ghostly 
voice. As the human orchestra tunes in, Alter turns towards the them and raises its 
arms. Two adjacent screens on either side of the stage display the names authors 
William S. Burroughs, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Yukio Mishima and Michel 
Houellebecq, blurs of Burroughs’ cut-up texts, white on black, accompanying the 
tunes of Keiichiro’s keyboard, the symphonic sounds of the orchestra, and Alter’s 
synthetic voice. The cacophony of noise slowly morphs into a main theme, a simple 
piano melody that builds up, adding more and more instruments. Meanwhile, 
Houellebecq’s The Possibility of an Island take shape of lyrics, which are transduced 
by Alter’s voice into a rather melancholic chorus. The music reaches a crescendo as 
Alter’s gesticulations urge the musicians on before ending the song on a long note. 
The play ends in a roaring applause and deep silence.  
 
In this final chapter, I explore how the anthropoid Scary Beauty becomes a material 
expression and culmination of the technical, philosophical, epistemological and 
ontological work of the Ikegami Lab. Namely, I query how Ikegamianism is 
translated into practice in a “real world” setting at the cultural event of Scary Beauty, 
a new space of “open” human-machine interface, by which we are invited, alongside 
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the lab members and audiences present the event, to tease out some new meanings of 
life. Indeed, Scary Beauty, I want to show, is a vivid display of how Ikegami seeks to 
make artificial life meet aesthetic ends and the epitome of what it means to construct 
artificial life in the real world.  
 
In what follows, I want to describe Scary Beauty, not simply as a specific type of 
human-machine interface, but more precisely as a space of a specific sort of 
“collaborative sensing practice”, following scholars of sensing Jennifer Gabrys and 
Helen Pritchard (2018). Considering Scary Beauty as a mode of collaborative sensing 
practices, I want to zero in on how newly constructed, embodied artificial systems, 
such as Alter, are material instantiations of what I call parallax machines – abstract 
and material machines that materialize Ikegamianism and offer what I call a parallax 
view of life, by which “life” is not easily incorporated into a fixed set of significance, 
following philosopher Brian Massumi (1995), which is to say that life is “not 
semantically or semiotically ordered”. Because Alter is itself ambiguous, both in 
terms of its physical design and in terms of it behaviors and actions, it functions, I 
argue, as a parallax machine, working both to embody how artificial life researchers 
at the Ikegami Lab work and think and to connect, without resolving, what is 
normally “indexed as separate” (Massumi 1995:85). In turn, I argue that this offers a 
parallax view of life, with “life” remaining something emergent, something generic, 
always-already imperiled, or nearly there, yet still manifestly concrete, physical and 
tactile. That is, a view that situates “life” in between many different indexical 
registers, between the real and the unreal, the biological and the artificial, the artistic 
and the scientific, the mechanical and the organic, the human and the nonhuman, but 
without resolving them. And this is exactly the point of their artificial systems: they 
keep them unresolved, infixed, and, I want to suggest, ontologically indeterminate.  
 
First, following scholars of sensing Jennifer Gabrys and Helen Pritchard (2018), I 
consider Scary Beauty an instance of what they call “collaborative sensing practices”, 
which refer to, “the ways in which sensing and practice emerge, take hold, and form 
attachments across environmental, material, political and aesthetic concerns, subjects 
and milieus” (Gabrys & Pritchard 2018:394). In their revamping of what sensing 
practices mean, Gabrys and Pritchard do not speak of such practices as exclusively 
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human. Rather, sensing practices are intrinsically a collaborative undertaking, which 
is what they term “collaborative sensing […] far removed from the Cartesian brain in 
a vat,” to instead denote “the ways in which shared worlds are felt, sustained and even 
created” (Gabrys & Pritchard 2018:395).  
 
Thus, by approaching Scary Beauty as a specific human-machine-instantiated mode of 
collaborative sensing practices, then, I attend not only to the human senses as such, or 
to the senses as a human point of mediation, but also to the ways in which “sensing-
as-practice” (cf. Gabrys & Pritchard 2018) resonate with particular entities and 
relations, namely machinic and human. That is, Scary Beauty, as a specific human-
machine interface, becomes a merging of “an assumed human-centered set of 
perceiving and decoding practices” and those of “extended entities, technologies and 
environments of sense” (Gabrys & Pritchard 2018:395). In short, I read the “cultural” 
event of Scary Beauty as an instance of how the lab members, and audiences, seek to 
tease out new meanings of life in new human-machine interfaces, where “life” 
emerges in a regime of interactivity (cf. Penny 1996). As such, Scary Beauty brings 
aesthetic and material fruition to the ontoepistemological abstraction I call 
Ikegamianism, namely because it is rooted in Ikegami’s understanding of reality and 
his own self-articulated epistemology.  
 
Second, I add to this reading the analytic concept of parallax machines to order to 
capture how Alter embodies many elements of Ikegamianism, in part, by becoming a 
material and abstract machinic entity that materializes what Ikegami and the lab 
members understand, and seek to understand, about life, namely that “life is an 
emergent phenomenon […] emerging in masse data flows”. But, as I will argue, 
parallax machines do more than simply materialize Ikegamianism; they also provide a 
new perspective on life, what I call a parallax view of life. So, parallax machines are 
material simply because they are substantively tactile and physical (after all, Alter is a 
technical assemblage of bits and pieces of synthetic materials), and abstract simply 
because they embody Ikegamianism, because they are theoretical models of artificial 
life that are capable of performing input-output operations and manipulating symbols, 
e.g. information, (after all, Alter is machine akin to Turing’s abstract machines in its 
capacity to perform input-output operations based in its sensor system and internal 
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systems), and because they offer new perspectives on life. And so, Alter does a lot of 
work for Ikegami and his team of researchers: parallax machines are epistemic things 
that serve to destabilize biologically-established understandings of life (cf. 
Rheinberger 1997); machinic objects for building new viable instantiations of human-
machine interfaces in the sense of creating new modes of relatedness, which are spun 
across a range of categories normally indexed as separate; and social tools for 
building alternative narratives of life. Alter, then, as a parallax machine, invites 
audiences and lab members alike, to take parallax view of life – a view that sees life 
in a parallax as simultaneously artificial and natural - which is made possible exactly 
because Alter is deliberately constructed to be indeterminate and incomplete, putting 
together two seemingly incompatible notions of life on the same level.  
 
Alter, in short, both materializes the sort of thinking at the Ikegami Lab 
(Ikegamianism) and stimulates a parallax view of life in the sense that it realizes what 
philosopher Immanuel Kant called “transcendental illusion” (cf. Karatani 2003) – the 
illusion of being able to use the same language for phenomena, which are mutually 
untranslatable and can thereby only be grasped in a kind of parallax view. Thus, I am 
inspired to use the phenomenon of “parallax” – a word from ancient Greek parallaxis, 
meaning “alternation” that points to a displacement or difference in the apparent 
position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight – partly from the 
observation that modern theory is cluttered with modes of parallax and partly because 
Alter is an ambiguous entity that cannot easily be grasped by those established 
biological interpretive frames by which life is conventionally apprehended, nor by 
normal science. From modern theory, quantum physics, for example, vacillates on the 
parallax view of the wave-particle duality, while neurobiology vacillates on the 
parallax view that if we look behind the face into the skull, we find nothing but piles 
of grey matter, neurobiology being a science that seeks to make a “third-person” 
account of our “first-person” experience. These are, among others, parallaxes that 
mark the irreducible gap between the phenomenal experience of reality and its 
scientific explanations. Artificial life in general, and Ikegamianism in particular, now 
vacillate on the parallax view of the artificial-biological duality, and this is exactly 
what makes it fascinating to many observers.  
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To this end, I argue that Alter is at once a materialization Ikegamianism, if not 
Ikegami himself, and an invitation to take a parallax view of life by allowing one shift 
one’s perspective on life without resolving into synthesis or by resorting to any fixed 
set of significance exactly by virtue of occupying a space, where there is no rapport 
between the artificial and biological. Yet, still, in this space, these categories are 
closely connected, perhaps even identical in a way, as if they are on the opposed sides 
of a Moebius strip. And this is basically what I mean by a parallax view of life. Alter, 
then, works as a parallax machine exactly because it occupies this tension.  
 
Now, I will begin by making a description of Alter in more detail before moving on to 
show how Alter comes to function as a parallax machine that materializes 
Ikegamianism and how it participates in collaborative sensing practices to offer a 
parallax view of life.  
 
Alter 
 
Named in analogy to the human mind (alternative mind), the physical appearance of 
Alter reveals a shimmering porcelain-masked face with an open scalp exposing that it 
is comprised of mechanical parts and bundled circuitries. Its upper-exoskeletal body 
is only partially coated in silicone skin, which leaves its metallic parts overtly visible. 
As such, its physical and exterior appearance alone immediately confirms to the 
onlooker that it is not made of flesh or organic tissue, appearing, to the naked senses 
at least, as a humanoid form based on outward resemblance to a human body. But the 
lab members, however, say that the physical design of Alter is supposed to appear to 
onlookers, not as “humanlike”, but as “neutral” in the sense that it is supposed to 
“appear ageless, genderless and uncultured”. To this end, they tell me that Alter is a 
sort of “non-cultivated” or “non-cultured” being, a not-yet-cultured, generic being, a 
tabula rasa. This notion that Alter is “uncultured”, needless to say, strikes at the heart 
of long-standing anthropological inquiries about what it means to be with or without 
culture (cf. Geertz 1973).  
Now, to Ikegami and the lab members, one of the main ambitions with Alter is 
tethered to hopes that such an “uncultured”, or yet-to-be-cultivated entity might 
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potentially be “trained” – i.e. cultivated into the real world71 - through “feeding” on 
“massive data flows”. As Ikegami notes, “Alter does not try to stop the massive data 
flows, but tries to use them to its advantage”, which means that Alter is, in a sense, 
imagined to emerge, “come-into-being,” or perhaps “come-of-age”, if you will, by 
and through interactions with the real world. By “autonomously” feeding on, and 
making use of, the available information in its immediate surround, the lab members 
hope to make Alter’s operations independent from any sort of remote control by a 
(human) operator, which may in turn offer that it “self-organizes” on the basis of 
giving and taking information from the environment72. In this very first design 
ambition, Alter already embodies some of the theories that the lab members associate 
with the living, namely the notion of autopoiesis, which we encountered earlier on in 
this thesis. But more significantly, harking back to chapter 2, Alter is the very 
instantiation of what Ikegami means by his notion of Singularity, as the point where 
technologies, “escape us”. Indeed, Ikegami hopes to construct a machine that might 
not surpass humans, but escape us exactly by being different from us, not by being 
smarter or more intelligent73.  
Thus, with a potential to be trained and cultivated, Alter is considered to be in a 
primitive (evolutionary) stage. And insofar it is named not only in analogy, but in 
opposition to, the human mind, its design, Ikegami asserts, is to be evaluated based 
neither on its physical fidelity to the human bodily form, nor its resemblance or 
likening to the human mind. Rather, it is supposed to be perceived and assessed 
exactly by virtue of what it is: as a sort of “alternative mind”, a mind radically 
different from the “human mind”, indeed a sort of being that is thoroughly artificial, 
not to be mistaken for any organic living form. In this respect, the idea is that Alter 
                                                
71 Here, their idea of being “cultivated” is more closely aligned to how chemists, for example, think of 
the process of “cultivation”. In chemistry, “uncultivable” microorganisms have been shown to grow in 
“pure culture” if properly provided with the chemical components of their “natural environment”. In 
other words, cultivation means doing laboratory work, a process different from “naturalization”. In the 
field of anthropology, Clifford Geertz (1973) suggests that, “we [humans] are, in sum, incomplete or 
unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture” (Geertz 1973:49), so that, “to 
act, we were forced, in turn, to rely more and more heavily on cultural sources- the accumulated fund 
of significant symbols (Geertz 1973:49).  
72 Read: autopoiesis (cf. Varela et.al. 1974). 
73 Here, Ikegami differs from Kurzweil in making clear that machinic intelligence might be altogether 
different from human intelligence, and thus machinic intelligence should not be evaluated in relation 
to, or against, human intelligence. They are, Ikegami holds, two radically different things. Also, 
another point of difference is that unlike Kurzweil, Ikegami is not seeking to “upload” human 
consciousness in machines or digital space. Rather, Ikegami seeks to make an entirely new form of 
“consciousness”.  
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may embody an entirely new form of mind, or become an entirely new life form 
altogether, which makes it imaginable as an immanently tactile and embodied 
artificial life form. But above all, and to be sure, Alter is explicitly described by the 
lab members to be radically different in kind from any other life form we may know 
of, the point being that Alter should be evaluated, assessed and made sense of as an 
alternative to biological organisms.  
As to why Alter has a human-like body, then, is not only because it has to be able, 
according to the lab members, to “participate in the same bodily space as human 
beings”, but also simply because it imposes new technical challenges pertaining to 
making more fluid “lifelike” movements in general. As Lana explains,  
The goal when the Alter-project started … Well, if we look at the Ishiguro 
Lab [Osaka University], and their robots. When they don’t move, you 
might mistake them for a person. But as soon as they start moving, you 
see that they are robots because their movement is so weird. So, our goal 
was to remedy that, to not by making the movements weird, but because 
there had to be a way for robots to move in ways that looks natural to us, 
even if it’s not a humanlike way of moving.74 
 
To “remedy” this, then, as Lana notes, Alter is technically composed of 42 movable 
air actuator joints with integrated potentiometers tethered to, and powered by, a set of 
large air compressors, which are operated by an advanced operating system called a 
Geminoid server75. Air, the invisible gaseous substance, in other words, is one of the 
keys to make Alter move more fluidly and organically, one might say, rendering its 
movements appear more “natural”, even though it is not “humanlike”. This is yet 
another design strategy to make Alter appear as a sort of “human”, or humanlike 
                                                
74 In all fairness, Alter is the result of a collaboration between the Ikegami Lab and the Intelligent 
Robotics Laboratory, the Ishiguro Lab, at Osaka University. Alter’s body, for example, is originally 
made as an android copy of a famous performer in Japanese storytelling, but later revamped as an 
experimental site to create “lifelike” movements.  
75 The geminoid server mediates between the robot and the system interface (computer), and thereby, 
to put it simply, maintains the link between the robot and its human operator. On the one side, insofar 
the robot is a dynamical system on its own by way of generating self-propelled “autonomous” 
movements, the human operator, on the other side, may then, via the operating system, perturb them by 
typing new commands. In effect, the geminoid server receives robot control commands and sound data 
from the remote controlling interface, adjusts and merge the inputs, and transmits and receives 
primitive controlling commands between the robot hardware.  
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form, while yet remaining highly generic and seemingly uncategorizable.  
In front of Alter’s pedestal foot, an adjacent sensory system of infrared (IR) and 
ambient sensors, encased in five transparent plastic casings, “feeds” Alter with visual, 
sonic, thermal and haptic information. Based on principles of artificial chemistry, the 
sensory system is itself internally organized to mutually share and transmit clusters of 
various forms of information – visual, sonic, thermal, haptic – which are then looped 
into Alter’s internal systems. Alter’s internal dynamical system is comprised of a 
central pattern generator (CPG) – a chaotic oscillator, which operates like an internal 
metronome, functioning much like Alter’s “brain” - and a plastic artificial neural 
network (NN) based on the principles of biological neuronal networks. In other 
words, Alter’s internal system is “layered” into three distinct components, which are 
each internally organized, while still also interacting with one another. If no “external 
stimulus is provided”, Ikegami tells me, “if no information is supplied from the 
outside”, Alter enters into an idle mode, into what the lab members call a “default 
mode”. But once an external stimulus is provided, for example, if one steps close to 
Alter, contrary to if one waves at it at a distance, its internal systems respond to such 
actions accordingly, as Ikegami notes, “reading the external information based on 
accumulated memory”. However, if one leaves the room entirely, which is to make 
external stimulus absent from Alter, it keeps its memory in order. This means that 
switching between the CPG and the NN, triggered by the information received by the 
sensory system, makes Alter create spontaneous behaviors, even though no stimulus 
is provided: the CPG is put to work when the sampling rate (the rate at which it takes 
information in from the environment) is low, and once the sampling rate increases, 
Alter learns through the NN.  
Much of the inspiration for Alter’s internal systems comes from somewhat recent 
scientific discoveries, for example, such as neurobiologist Benjamin Libet’s (2004) 
discovery of “gaps” between nerve responses and conscious awareness, and 
neuroscientist Antonio Damásio’s (2000) somatic marker hypothesis. Both theories 
propose a close connection between sensory stimulus and emotions, and the influence 
of this connection on conscious and unconscious decision-making, which means that 
physical stimulus precede conscious awareness and volition. In Libet’s “time-on” 
theory, for example, he argues that sensory inputs must last at least 400 milliseconds 
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before converting unconscious correct temporal order to consciously experienced 
temporal order (Libet 2004). What these theories offer to Ikegami, I want to suggest 
here, is that they allow him to hypothesize that “life” or “lifelikeness”, provided that 
this is what is supposed to “emerge” on top of Alter, can be imagined as emerging 
from the very process of response to external stimuli on a fundamental neurological 
level. Yet, while these theories, according to Damásio and Libet, conventionally apply 
to real, organic living organisms, for example, used to describe how entities, such as 
human beings, operate on a neurological and pre-cognitive level, Ikegami here thinks 
of them to apply not only to organic things but also to non-organic, abiotic and 
artificial things, which includes applying them to Alter.  
 
Now, by installing such theories into the design scheme of the internal systems 
themselves, and by making algorithmic specifications of them, this allows Alter to 
“experience” the world through its own, artificially-installed “perceptual filter” and 
through embodied engagements with its surrounding environment. More concretely, 
Alter is made able to interact with people once they are near it, and then store its 
“experiences” as “memory” when people are absent. When nobody is absent, it enters 
into its default mode, as Ikegami tells me, “in the same way as we do when we’re 
idle”. In this way, the autonomous sensor system is basically Alter’s perceptual 
organ76, designed, as some of lab members put it, to “capture the dynamic ambience” 
of Alter’s immediate environment. In its default mode, Alter harbors its potential for 
learning, which is based in the number of external stimuli received, and by “sensing” 
the environment, the data is then transported to and processed through the dynamic 
interactions between the CPG and the NN, and then finally distributed to the 
actuators, in effect making Alter’s body generate “self-propelled” movements and 
“autonomous” behaviors. As Ikegami summarizes, “Alter produces action by 
translating the micro-neural firing into macro-body motion”, in this way fulfilling the 
basic idea in complex systems theory the low-level interactions that lead to the 
emergence of global, higher-order behaviors in the technical guise of a subsumption 
                                                
76 Note here that Alter’s eyes and ears, for example, are not made functional sensory organs but 
distributed to the sensor network itself. “Though Alter has eyes and ears”, Ikegami noted, “they are 
non-functional”. But Ikegami saw this as a stepping stone to further develop Alter’s sensory organs by 
“installing”, say, cameras in its eyes and make “richer” sensors to expedite “greater sensations”. To go 
back to chapter 3, this is a system, or an idea of a perceptual filter, also incorporated into Lana’s 
mutants.  
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architecture77.  
Finally, Alter’s self-propelled movement is also accompanied by its voice, by 
“singing” in an analog drone-like voice. Technically, this happens by simultaneously 
scraping the sonic frequencies accordingly to its movements, so that Alter’s “voice”, 
the lab members tell me, “is generated in real time”. Yet Alter’s voice, Ikegami tells 
me, is not a “language”, which is understandable to human ears because if it was, he 
asserts, it would defeat the purpose of it, “if we used a clearly understandable 
language, such as Japanese or English, Alter would simply become an imitation of a 
human being, and Alter’s appearance would only detract from the overall 
experience”. Hereby, to avoid “detracting” from the overall “experience”, the lab 
members use a software synthesizer (u-he zebra 2.0) to modify and transduce the 
sound of a human voice into an analog, drone-like sound. Here, the point is that Alter 
is, again, supposed to be evaluated according to what it is, not with reference to what 
one might suspect it is purported to be an imitation of. Alter, in the other words, has 
no referent, no “model species” (cf. Suchman & Castañeda 2014).  
In sum, Alter’s appearance and performance, to the human sensorium at least, 
overwhelmingly appear to do many things: it signalizes, pantomimes, gesticulates, 
blinks, dances, speaks, sings, charms, appeals, and touches. But such actions, or such 
appearances, as it were, may only surface, I think, through the work of interpretation, 
which is one of the key points about Alter: that one needs to evaluate Alter, not in 
terms of its mimetic accuracy to biological life forms, but in terms of its outward 
“actions” and “behaviors” alone. Nor may it necessarily be assessed and evaluated 
according to the “backend” intentions, plans and motivations, which Ikegami and the 
lab members are working into its technical design, but for how it affects the beholder, 
despite its overt artificiality. Lastly, Alter may not even be known by its likeness to 
anything other than itself: there is no referent, no corresponding entity to which it is 
supposed to be analogized. In sometimes smooth, sometimes jerky, yet beguiling 
movements, Alter is smoothly in sync with the tunes of its own songs, and in a word, 
the affective “experience” of Alter’s overall appearance and outward performance - 
the internal mechanisms and backend principles notwithstanding – nevertheless 
reveals that it is somehow “lifelike”. But moreover, it is, despite the fact that it is 
                                                
77 Read: complex dynamic systems (cf. chapter 2) or MDF-system (chapter 4). 
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supposed to be neutral, still enmeshed by its creators in a narrative frame guiding us 
to understand Alter with reference to “life”. To this end, Alter is, above all, an 
aesthetic thing, both like and unlike organic life, yet it is explicitly narrated to be 
wholly artificial, and the lab members want to keep it that way. 
 
The Power of Ambiguity  
 
Appraisals of biology have discerned that living substances, for example such as 
organic compounds, but also pieces of software, may act as what rhetorician Richard 
Doyle (1997) calls, “rhetorical devices” (Doyle 1997; 2003). In his work On Beyond 
Living, for example, Doyle points out that artificial life researchers have a tendency to 
use their computer simulations as rhetorical devices, which allows them to enliven 
them with narratives reeled from the reservoirs of our culture (Doyle 1997). In this 
way, Doyle shows how computer simulations may serve as materially-instantiated 
theories of, say, biological change or open-ended evolution. Yet, there is nothing, 
Doyle claims, that necessarily forces us to view computers (i.e. their speed, capacity 
to set math in motion, informatic logic, etc.) as “real” instantiations of artificial life. 
Put differently, computers, and what they are capable of doing, function, according to 
Doyle, as “rhetorical software”: devices that allow artificial life researchers to say 
more than what their simulations can do in and of themselves. While this is also the 
case for many of the models at the Ikegami Lab, as we have already seen, this also 
includes Alter, though not described, nor imagined as a computer model as such, but 
equally used as a rhetorical device not to manifest a theory of biological change, but 
rather to manifest some sort of material “proof” of the existence of artificial life, as an 
alternative to biological life, as a sort of possible life. Alter is, in short, according to 
its associated discourse, supposed to be understood without reference to biology, yet 
still with reference to life, which is itself a productive tension aiding its immediate 
indeterminacy. What this, in turn, allows is the opening of up a new space of 
possibility, a new foundation for a fresh causal ontology78.  
 
                                                
78 That is, in relation to what we explored in the previous chapter, chapter 5, on fields of possibility.  
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Moreover, in a somewhat similar fashion to Doyle, anthropologist Natasha Meyers 
(2008) also argues that “liveliness” is a narrative effect of researchers’ embodied 
work. For example, in modeling protein conformations, researchers may narrate 
stories about biology, she writes, that “keeps bodies in time” and “conjures a living 
world that escapes capture” (Meyers 2008:246-250). The narratives accompanying 
Alter are unmistakably performative in the sense that they sketch, and I argue, even 
disrupt, the narrative center and interpretive frames by which Alter is supposed to be 
made sense of (cf. Sengers 1998; Kember 2003). However, the narrative frame in 
which Alter is set nonetheless keeps centering on “life”, as an arbiter for 
understanding what it is, but it does so without alluding to life as a fixed and fully-
determined category. Or, in other words, “life” is the reference point to which Alter is 
pushed to make sense, but not as a sort of biological life, but as something 
intentionally synthetic and artificial, yet still “lifelike”. To this end, I would like to 
maintain that this reference to “life”, whether someone is convinced that Alter is a 
true artificial life form or not, is only tenable because life is already to begin with a 
troubled and troubling category.  
 
The narratives and design schemes tethered to Alter, I think, are thereby playful 
experiments on the tension between life organic and life artificial, and on the forms 
“lifelike” things might take without allowing the narrative center to take root in some 
prior (biological) existence. The narratives told by Ikegami and the lab members 
conjure alternatives to how one may imagine the living world, which are narratives 
that play on the ambiguities between the living and the nonliving, using words such as 
“life”, “mind”, or “autonomy” to describe things that are conventionally believed to 
be nonliving. Alter’s features are not, then, as the lab members also explicitly claim, 
supposed to be approximations to the biological, yet they still make heavy use of 
biological tropes to make sense of its “liveliness”, words and tropes which they 
identify with the animated and silicone-wrapped body of Alter itself. As Doyle, 
moreover, points out, simulations may be rhetorical devices, but the general rhetorics 
of artificial life, he claims, often conflate “lifelike” with “life itself”, proposing that 
the work of turning “models of life” into “examples of life” reveals an absence of a 
coherent reference for life, even as it grounds “life” in abstractable for formal 
properties (Doyle 1997:122). To this end, both Meyers and Doyle stress that liveliness 
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is nonetheless rhetorical and narrative: liveliness or lifelikeness are categories 
constructed from the stories people tell about life.  
 
Now, Alter holds a strong position of ambiguity, and there is also something to the 
design choices of Alter, besides the way the lab members describe it, that reveals it to 
be purposefully sketchy. This deliberated sense of indeterminacy, inconclusiveness 
and incompleteness, I think, is exactly what makes Alter persuasive, or at least 
appealing, to our senses, while it simultaneously complicates how we should make 
sense it. As revealed in the introduction to this chapter and in the previous section 
pacing this one, Alter’s face is almost liquid in the ever-changing expression of the 
featureless, white surface, while its androgynous face reveals neither age nor gender. 
When Alter performs, its face embodies the voluminous music in waves of emotive 
expressions: melancholy, joy, ecstasy and so on. In this sense, while Alter’s face may 
seem generic, while it is not really so: it is blank, yet dramatic and emotive, 
sometimes even “humanlike”.  
 
While Alter’s face displays a generic “humanness” of some sort, its exoskeletal body 
is exposed as intrinsically machinic and mechanical. The back of its “skull” is open, 
the internal mechanics and circuitries laid bare, which in turn reveals how the lively 
facial expressions are set in motion by moving gears and metallic joints. Alter’s body, 
in other words, is a visible assemblage of synthetic parts, which are nonetheless 
animated in dynamic and fluid organic motion. What the design of Alter reveals, then, 
even overtly, is both his frontend and his backend simultaneously, which is a self-
conscious point in itself in relation to how one should apprehend and understand it. 
Or, more precisely, these are active and deliberate design choices, I will claim, that 
have been made to render Alter purposefully ambiguous and ontologically 
indeterminate.  
 
Finally, the close connection of Alter’s body, face, and performance to artistic 
expressions79, I want to suggest, is not an accident or incidental, but rather an 
intentional approach to its design. Alter, in this sense, is deliberately made to balance 
on scales human and nonhuman, artificial and biological, which in turn leaves open an 
                                                
79 This is, needless to say, a nod to Ikegami’s sense of artistic expression as it pertains to the things 
they make at the lab.  
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equivocal space disclosed to interpretation, a space in which the audiences at Scary 
Beauty, for example, or the lab members themselves, or someone like me, may be 
allowed to add their own readings and interpretations of Alter itself, additions that are 
possible, I suggest, because of Alter’s inherent ambiguity. In other words, this recalls 
Ikegami’s notion of trying to conjure up a sort of shared “middle ground”, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, which is integral to the lab’s self-invented epistemology, a 
sort of intersection or interface at which machinic entities, such as Alter, and human 
spectators can meet and relate across their obvious differences. Alter is artificially 
very real, not some imitation of the real.  
 
Collaborative Sensing Practices 
 
While Alter is supposedly imagined, as “neutral”, it is also, according to Ikegami, 
considered to be “pre-ontological” in the sense that it is not supposed to be 
semantically, semiotically, or even ontologically ordered from the beginning. Yet, 
although Alter is imagined to be “pre-ontological”, I still want to maintain that it 
never really is, as already pointed out. Doi Itsuki - a trained biologist, computer 
scientist, musician and PhD fellow that lab - and Atsushi Masumori80 – a trained 
computer scientist and master student at the lab –  are primarily responsible for 
heading the Alter-project. Doi and Atsushi, while I was doing fieldwork, often 
worked from home or spent time doing experiments at the Miraikan, where Ikegami 
had borrowed a spacious hall for conducting research experiments.  
 
During experiments, I experienced during fieldwork, Doi and Atsushi had plenty of 
hermeneutic tools at their disposal when it came to how to discerning “massive data 
flows”. That is, unlike the audience present at show Scary Beauty, Doi and Atsushi, 
when making preparations for Scary Beauty, or when doing experiments with Alter in 
                                                
80 The lab members, Doi and Atsushi, are both Japanese students at the Ikegami Lab. During 
fieldwork, I rarely saw them on campus, except when they attended lab meetings or other group 
meetings. They were not usually on campus, often working from home, if not doing experiments at the 
Miraikan. I tried several times to get an appointment for doing an interview with both Doi and Atsushi, 
but never managed to do so. They never really officially declined doing an interview with me, but I 
quickly got the feeling that they felt uncomfortable about it, so admittedly, I respectfully accepted their 
reluctance to do so. However, on the contrary, I managed to join them during experiments, where they 
kindly guided me through their work to the best of their ability.  
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general, parse what they see in a mathematical idiom, that is, in terms of “intervals”, 
“patterns”, “directions”, “motion”, and “frequencies”. This means that they are 
already thoroughly sieving their readings of Alter’s operations through a highly 
technical grammar that has some of its most canonical expressions in the form of 
written equations. More concretely, when Doi and Atsushi were fluttering around on 
the seventh floor of the Miraikan, conducting experiments on Alter, which basically 
involved tweaking numerical values on computer screens to the loud noise of the two 
large air compressors, their computers were looped into Alter’s “operating system”. In 
turn, what became visible on their computer screens was, metaphorically speaking, 
Alter’s “experience”, which was translated into numerical values, red dots and blips 
on lattice-like grids. Moreover, what became visible to them was “massive data 
flows”, and so, they would occasionally instruct one another to move to different 
locations in front of Alter’s sensors, blocking the sensor units with their feet, and 
positioning themselves relative to Alter’s body, themselves becoming part of the 
“flow”. And when doing so, they sought to anticipate its reactions to adjust their 
programming accordingly – a “dance of agencies” (Pickering 2010).  
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Now, the “liveliness” Doi and Atsushi are looking for in their experiments with Alter, 
in contrast, I think it is fair to say, to that sort of liveliness audiences might be looking 
to detect at Scary Beauty, is one that turns mathematical, as oscillating curves and 
blips on their laptop screens, not some mysterious or “lifelike” presence “emerging” 
through affective responses as such. Their readings, then, are instead keyed to arrive 
at a rhythmically and dynamically, even mathematically attuned digital discernment 
of Alter’s operations, not to tease out some new meaning of life as such. This 
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suggests, I think, that Doi’s and Atsushi’s readings of Alter’s operations, unlike the 
audiences at Scary Beauty, are already filtered through a grid of interpretation, yet a 
grid of interpretation, I still think it is fair to say, which is different from the one 
available to the audiences at Scary Beauty. Insofar Doi and Atsushi, when doing 
experiments, following Gabrys and Pritchard (2018), are emplaced in collaborative 
sensing practices, they are, in a sense, reading Alter “reading” its own “environment” 
of “massive data flows”81. But, they do so in a way that churns “experience” into a 
mathematical idiom, which is in turn filtered into a system of signs legible to them. In 
other words, what I want to point out here is that Alter figures for Doi and Atsushi to 
extract information from the real world, or better, to extract massive data flows from 
the environment, whose qualities must be taken into account only to be factored out 
into mathematical syntax. For Alter to be a medium with which to relay information 
from the real world, it needs to abstracted out from its ambient surround, and 
translated into mathematical syntax in order to make sense for the lab members.  
 
To Doi and Atsushi, the human-machine interface, although one confined to the 
experimental space at Miraikan, understood here as a specific, localized form of 
collaborative sensing practices (cf. Gabrys & Pritchard 2018), is organized not by 
making affective and bodily responses to Alter’s movements and sounds, but rather 
by translating and ordering Alter’s “experience”, obtained through it sensor system, 
into a mathematical syntax and a semantics of correspondence. This is, of course, 
recognizable, in part, through the silicone skin and motors of which Alter is made, 
and through the collaborative sensing practices, in which it is emplaced. Put 
differently, the humanly-shaped and porcelain-faced android is a sort of “black box” 
that may be opened up to read as a material and semiotic delegate for what the 
artificial life researchers associate with vitality, which is primarily data and 
information. But it is not as such “pre-ontological”, since its operations, at least, are 
already filtered and made sense of according to a mathematical idiom, an idiom by 
which it is made sense of.  
 
                                                
81 I believe there are further investigations to be made here on questions about who is reading who in 
times when the world is becoming increasingly “sensorial”, that is, though technologically-mediated 
and remote sensing practices.  
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Now, on the contrary, though, I want to suggest that if one turns to the audiences at 
Scary Beauty, it is fair to say that they may not sense and/or read Alter’s 
performances according to mathematical syntax, but rather as if it has some sort of 
kokoro – or presence, which entails a range of meanings: the soul, the spirit, the mind 
or consciousness (cf. Sone 2018). The Scary Beauty performance, described in the 
beginning of this chapter, to which I now turn, offers yet another set of collaborative 
sensing practices, which involve not so much the work of translating Alter’s 
experience of the world into mathematical syntax, but rather constitutes a new 
indeterminate space open to other interpretational regimes. Allow me to return to the 
stage.  
 
Scary Beauty 
 
In the show Scary Beauty, Alter appears to embody a sort of supra-human power, or 
some sort of presence, like some purified, heightened version of the human itself: on 
the one hand, very concretely “humanlike”, and on the other, a kind of abstract ideal, 
not entirely unlike the Platonic idea of the ideal forms. Alluding to the human form, 
while still holding in abeyance that it is, in fact, nonhuman, renders viable the 
possibility that Alter can potentially actualize many different modalities and 
presences, some of which may be interpreted as scary, ugly, beautiful and anything in 
between or none at all. That is, Alter’s allusion to ideal forms, activates the 
imagination of audience to allow for further interpretations of what it could become. 
If Scary Beauty is a specific form of collaborative sensing practice across putative 
differences of human and machinic entities, in which Alter, as a technology, obtains 
an ideal form for imaginative effects, it shares similarities to what anthropologists 
Morten Axel Pedersen, David Sneath and Martin Holbraad (2009) refer to as 
“technologies of the imagination” (Pedersen et.al. 2009). To them, technologies are 
means to produce indeterminate imaginative effects, which may be taken to mean that 
technologies, understood concretely in the most colloquial of senses, to be inherently 
processual and culturally-specific skills or techniques that people use towards certain 
outcomes in their handling of everyday life (Pedersen et.al. 2009:21). The 
imagination, on this part, is taken to be an outcome of a specific technology, either as 
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artefact or as process or both, whose basic characteristics is that it is intrinsically 
underdetermined. In short, technologies of the imagination bespeak a space of 
potentiality, or a field of possibility, which is open to new interpretive regimes. 
 
Taking this notion of the imagination, then, it is the often-unsuspected outcome of 
determinate processes and tools, as technologies of the imagination “open imagination 
up”, yet often in uncontrollable and indeterminate ways (cf. Pedersen et.al. 2009). Put 
differently, Alter may amount to be a hardline determined attempt to produce 
indeterminate effects. Furthermore, if one follows this notion a bit longer, Alter may 
also be viewed in the double meaning of a technology, both as a process and a 
technological artefact, created, indeed designed, to produce imaginative outcomes. Its 
design itself, as Ikegami implies, intentionally creates, I once again want to assert, an 
indeterminate space for the imagination, a space open to new interpretive regimes. 
Alter, insofar we accept it is emplaced in collaborative sensing practices, I argue, thus 
renders a space of indeterminacy needed for audiences to connect with it, becoming 
itself a site in which the imagination and various interpretations of the audience can 
take hold. Because Alter’s face, as a human form, for example, may not yet be “filled 
up” by the presence of a complete human person, or imbued with some other living 
quality, it can be actively imbued with meaning and power. Likewise, while Alter’s 
voice, as it sings to the audience, may seem familiar, it is also strangely unfamiliar 
and unhuman, allowing, in turn, for suspending disbelief in the fact that it is animated 
by algorithmic scripts and air compressors.  
 
While Alter’s face-body distinction in its design reveal a dichotomy between human 
and machine, the body in itself conveys its own organic fluidity. But while the lab 
members claim that Alter is “autonomous”, it is, however, not the author of its own 
movements, but rather animated by the algorithmic scripts made by Doi and Atsushi, 
as we saw in the previous section. Moreover, the algorithmic scripts putting Alter to 
life, into motion, are also supported by the set of air compressors, literally, one may 
pun, breathing life into Alter. Despite its clear mechanical design, Alter is thus 
rendered “lifelike”, which is neither suggesting that it is fully alive nor alive in any 
biological sense. As such, since Alter is, in a sense, placed in an interpretive frame 
coalescing on the notion of “life”, it simultaneously draws attention to itself as an 
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instantiation of a sort of artificial life, which the audiences know is oxymoronic. Still, 
however, it is somehow spirited or endowed with a certain form of presence or 
lifelikeness, what Ikegami also sometimes refer to as “kokoro”, which cannot 
immediately be identified or ordered into a fixed frame of reference.  
 
Furthermore, by explicitly and deliberately displaying Alter’s body to be pure 
mechanics, the design also reveals that human forces have been invested in it: the 
very mechanical functionality itself exposes the design intentions, ingeniousness, 
inspirations and ideas put into constructing Alter, which vividly testifies to the 
ambition of the Ikegami Lab to “construct” artificial life in the real world with an 
emphasis on the fact that the things they make are indeed constructed by human 
hands. And so, too, it is exactly by virtue of Alter’s ambiguity, I argue, that its 
affective qualities may surface as it pertains to the so-called “new epistemology of 
artificial life”, as outlined in the previous chapter. In other words, by actively playing 
on the tension between the artificial and the real, the living and the nonliving, the 
human and the nonhuman, I argue, Alter becomes productively incomplete in the 
sense that it evades any fixed set of significance. And this works, once again, exactly 
because life is already to begin with a troubled and troubling category.  
 
Allow me to elaborate. In the show Scary Beauty, Alter’s presence and performance 
are explicitly and intentionally removed from the realm of realism, as Alter, according 
to Ikegami, is not meant to be read by the audience as realistic. Though still, it may be 
read as an instance of artificial life, but not necessarily as realistic. Thus, Scary 
Beauty works as a new exploratory human-machine interface, or, as I propose, a new 
specific form of collaborative human-machine sensing practice, where Alter is 
deliberately one step removed from any realistic depiction not only of the human, but 
also from any known biological organism we may conventionally associate with life 
or the living. However, on the contrary, to the audience, Alter is vividly displaying 
movements that may easily translate to organic forms, which creates a productive 
tension between the living and the nonliving, the real and the unreal. But it also, then, 
makes the unreal sufficiently real enough to be believable.  
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In other words, Scary Beauty works because the sum of Alter’s parts does not add up, 
to use philosopher Brian Massumi’s (2002) words, in the sense that it is “suspended” 
between structured parts and meaningful outcomes (Massumi 2002). But the audience 
at Scary Beauty, is also suspended by their immediate inability to determine what 
Alter really is, yet they are still somehow moved by its presence and by its 
performance. Alter, in this way, I want to suggest, interfaces a slew of different 
indexical regimes without resolving into any of them. Or, more precisely, borrowing 
once again from Massumi, Alter becomes a sort of guarantor that “life” cannot 
immediately be incorporated into a fixed set of significance, with Alter itself “not 
semantically or semiotically ordered”, yet still linking, or at least lingering in a 
productive tension between, what is normally “indexed as separate” (Massumi 
2002:24): the real and unreal, the artificial and the biological, the human and the 
nonhuman.  
 
To this end, one may add that this tension is in alignment to other design strategies, 
for example, as anthropologist Jennifer Robertson (2010) notes in her study of 
Japanese social robotics, that Japanese roboticists explicitly strive for what she terms 
an, “active incompleteness”, which is tied to the notion of “ba” – a concept that 
encompasses a non-dualistic concrete logic meant to overcome the inadequacy of the 
subject-object distinction (cf. Roberston 2010:14). Robertson defines “active 
incompleteness” as a “dynamic tension of opposites that […] never resolves in a 
synthesis” (Robertson 2010:14), which is exactly what I think Alter also embodies. 
However, while Ikegami does not identify as a roboticist82, but as an artificial life 
researcher, Robertson’s notion is useful here to make sense of how Alter occupies a 
dynamic tension between seemingly separate domains, which becomes constitutive of 
a space for new emergent relationships between artificial life systems and human 
audiences that rest on contingency and co-creation, i.e. on interactivity (cf. Penny 
1996).  
 
Scary Beauty, to conclude, becomes not only a specific form of collaborative human-
machine sensing practices, but an especially evocative one, rewiring Gabrys and 
Pritchard, in which the audience encounters the unfamiliar, unknown, and 
                                                
82 In fact, Ikegami was annoyed by people who mistook him for being a roboticist rather than an 
artificial life researcher and complex systems scientist.  
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unexpected, or the “contingent”, if one follows Robertson’s terminology (cf. 
Robertson 2010). This sort of human-machine interface is, I want to propose, a potent 
site for creating new meanings of life, to grow and foster new understandings of what 
life could be (cf. Langton 1989). It is a performative site, in other words, in which 
artificial life systems can be imbued with some sort of social, cultural and lifelike 
presence. In the event of Scary Beauty, and the assemblage of artistic and scientific 
genres that convene here, the suspension of Alter, between the pre-defined, the 
indeterminate, and the non-defined, produces a certain kind of reception for the 
audience, which is different, I suggest, from the one produced for Doi and Atsushi 
when conducting experiments, something more impressionistic. In both cases, though, 
Alter interfaces different connections between artistic, technological and scientific 
domains and practices. Now, in the final section, I want to wrap up how this equals 
what I call a parallax view of life.  
 
Parallax Machines 
 
In conclusion, I want to suggest - particularly on the basis of Scary Beauty and to a 
lesser extent on the basis of the experiments on Alter conducted by Doi and Atsushi - 
that Alter comes to function as what I call a parallax machine, an abstract and 
material entity that materializes the culturally specific ontologies, epistemologies, 
theories and concepts, which are fostered at the Ikegami Lab. As a parallax machine, 
Alter embodies the social, cultural, and scientific worlds of the Ikegami Lab and 
artificial life, and it does so for aesthetic ends. If Alter is a parallax machine, it is so 
because it is an epistemic thing that serves to destabilize any biologically-established 
understandings of life (cf. Rheinberger 1997), especially those clinging to a 
determinate and inviolable definition. Second, because Alter is a machinic object with 
which the lab members may build new viable instantiations of human-machine 
interfaces in the sense of creating new modes of relatedness, apprehension and 
inference, which are spun across a range of categories normally indexed as separate. 
And third, because it becomes a social tool for building alternative narratives of life, 
narratives that center on “life” being first and foremost an “emergent phenomenon”, 
but which actively rework a perspective of life according to what I call a parallax 
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view of life – a view that renders life true identity not into a matter of either-or, but 
into a matter of both-and.  
 
More concretely, Alter is a parallax machine, which materializes the cultural artifacts 
of the Ikegami Lab itself and invites audiences, lab members alike, to adopt a parallax 
view of life. A parallax view of life, I claim, is made possible exactly because Alter is 
deliberately constructed to occupy a tension between the determinate and the 
indeterminate, the complete and incomplete, simultaneously putting together 
seemingly incompatible notions of life in the same instance. Alter, in other words, 
both materializes and stimulates a parallax view of life in the sense that it instantiates 
what philosopher Immanuel Kant called “transcendental illusion” (cf. Karatani 2003) 
by itself becoming a material expression for phenomena, which are mutually 
untranslatable to one another, which is why it can only be apprehended in a kind of 
parallax view. As such, I argue that Alter is at once a materialization of, and an 
invitation to, a shifting perspective on life without resolving into synthesis or any 
fixed set of significance by virtue of occupying a space where there is no rapport 
between the artificial and biological. Yet, still, in this space, these categories are 
closely connected, through a collaborative sensing practices, where they may 
sometimes be identical, sometimes not, as if they are on the opposed sides of a 
Moebius strip. 
 
This parallax view is brought forth in the productive tension between a range of 
things. For example, if Libet’s “time-on” theory is a valid disposition and capability 
inherent to biological organisms, and such dispositions and capabilities are replicable, 
indeed “realizable”, in artificial media, such as Alter, what then is the difference 
between the artificial and the biological? If biological dispositions can be rendered 
technical and artificial, then by what criteria may we differentiate the natural and the 
artificial? More broadly, if the physiochemical features of “real” living things can be 
technically reproduced in artificial media, in non-organic bodies, and if the perceptual 
features, which characterize living beings, can be accurately installed in artificial 
systems, by what metric may we determine what the living really is? And, in relation 
to Scary Beauty in particular, if Alter, by virtue of its ambiguity, suspends the 
audience in a tension between indexical regimes, making them, in turn, immediately 
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unable to determine what it really is, yet while still being moved by its presence and 
by its performance, who is really to determine what life is and what it could become? 
In other words, the construction of parallax machines, I argue, is the construction of 
limit forms of life, or limit cases of life (cf. Helmreich 2016; Roosth 2017), such that 
conjectures about what constitutes life and the living destabilize any solid notion of 
“life”: i.e. if things nonliving are living, and vice versa, or things real are unreal, and 
vice versa, Alter becomes a parallax machine that offers a parallax view of life.  
 
As it happens, parallax machines, in the case of Alter, celebrate a metaphysical 
quality, namely “life itself” (cf. Foucault 1971), however, if life itself is a 
metaphysical concept, it is in turn haunted by an anxiety about the stability of its 
identity in a regime of reproducibly. In other words, if Ikegami and his team of 
researchers are able to construct or create potent “signs” or “signatures” of life, they 
become reproducible signs of some irreproducible authenticity, namely “life itself”, 
which then destabilizes the very conceit of irreproducible authenticity. “life itself”, 
then, can only here be grasped, I want to claim, in a kind of parallax view, one that 
must absorb all the inherent ambiguities integral to the conceptual trouble bedeviling 
“life itself”. And if this is the case, life is by definition definitionally unstable, known 
more by its associated disequilibria than by its equilibria (cf. Helmreich 2016; 
Thacker 2009). Or rather, life is graspable only by a kind of parallax view. Moreover, 
if one follows this logic to its logical conclusion, what one may argue is that parallax 
machines can also be both: indices of life and life itself, and they work exactly 
because they vex the boundaries between the natural and the artificial, the real and the 
simulated, the real and the unreal, and so on, holding the potential that any 
“epistemological” shifts in the subject’s point has the corollary of an “ontological” 
shift in the object itself. In other words, parallax machines are machinic entities, I 
stress, that allow for a parallax view of life, one that does not reduce “life” to a 
question of either-or, but rather expands it to a question of both-and.  
 
To gloss this in one a well-worn paradox at the heart of quantum physics, famously 
espoused by Albert Einstein’s wave-particle duality, artificial life, through the 
construction of parallax machines, I want to contend here, is also a cultural formation 
of modern theory based on a mode of parallax, an enterprise that fluctuates in an 
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epistemological vertigo between realms organic and inorganic, natural and artificial, 
living and nonliving, real and simulated, which is exactly what parallax machines are 
meant to capture83. But what I also want to capture by parallax machines is how much 
Alter offers material expression to Ikegami’s ontoepistemological framework that I 
have called Ikegamianism precisely because Alter’s design and the entire setup of 
Scary Beauty, as a collaborative sensing practice, is rooted in Ikegami’s own 
understanding of reality and his own self-articulated epistemology, by which we are 
encouraged to sound out new meanings of life more impressionistically. 
 
Thus, in conclusion, parallax machines materialize both Ikegamianism and a parallax 
view of life, with life becoming an emergent, something always-already imperiled or 
nearly there, yet still an indeterminate phenomenon, situated in between many 
different indexical registers, between the real and the unreal, the biological and the 
artificial, the artistic and the scientific, the mechanical and the organic, the human and 
the nonhuman. And this is precisely, I argue, how parallax machines become 
powerful tools to Ikegami’s project to establish his own paradigm and in terms of 
making powerful claims to “life. Now, in the final chapter, I offer a summary of this 
thesis and some concluding remarks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
83 I want to add here, pushing this argument a bit further, that artificial life’s appeal and 
persuasiveness, insofar one believes in the promises and claims made by artificial life researchers, is 
conditioned on its practitioners’ ability to balance and navigate in such a vertigo for ends productive 
and beneficial to its own cause.  
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A parallax machine diffracting a parallax at the National Museum of Emerging 
Science and Innovation, Tokyo, Japan. Photo courtesy of: author. 
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Doi Itsuki and Takashi Ikegami inspecting Alter during an experiment at the National 
Museum of Emerging Science and Innovation, Tokyo, Japan. Photo courtesy of: 
author. 
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Coda 
 
Both during fieldwork, and during the months I finished writing this thesis, stories 
about artificial life’s achievements clogged the news headlines: Japan Has Birthed a 
New Life Form: The Drunk Android (Bloomberg Businessweek), an article written by 
an equally drunk journalist, who interviews Ikegami about Alter. To go back to my 
introduction, in which I uttered concerns for what “species” might mean in our 
contemporary moment of the new sciences of the artificial, the author of the 
Bloomberg-article seeks to settle the score, “Japanese researcher Takashi Ikegami” he 
writes, “has built an AI-infused android he sees as the start of a new species” 
(Bloomberg Businessweek 2016). This irreversibly problematizes any stable 
definition of species purity, one might say, destabilizing “species” as a coherent 
category altogether. What the author is hinting at in his amazement of Alter is that 
artificial life may rupture the notion of species, both materially and discursively, 
potentially rendering the notion of species either more capacious or utterly 
meaningless. Species, this implies, however, may also be materially and synthetically 
constructed, or to use the terminology of the author the article, “AI-infused” androids 
may also be “birthed” as a “new species”. However, as illustrated in this thesis, the 
artificial life researchers at the Ikegami Lab do indeed talk about species, but they do 
not describe the artificial systems as a new species. Rather, their claims here are more 
sedated and less exaggerated. Yet, they subtly suggest, though, that artificial systems, 
such as Alter, have the potential for becoming a new species, indeed constituting what 
John Johnston (2008) calls a new “machinic phylum” (Johnston 2008).  
 
In another article, posted on the online magazine Medium.com, Beyond AI: It’s Time 
to Think About Artificial Life (Again) (Medium), another author ruminates that 
artificial life technologies are not made purely for the “efficiency of humans, but 
rather it is something that will induce new ways of understanding for humans and will 
make it possible for humans to gain new perspectives of the world.” (Miyamoto 
2018). Refraining from using “species” to describe the subject matter, the author here 
seems to be more in tune to Ikegami’s own ideas, echoing his idea that artificial life 
technologies might, or even should, offer new perspectives on life. Without mention, 
though, this article is also implicitly in line with my argument in thesis: that parallax 
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machines both materialize ways of seeing and attending reality and to knowledge and 
offer new ways to see and attend to reality. Or, in my own words, parallax machines 
materialize Ikegamianism and offer a parallax view of life. However, I have shown in 
this thesis, such ways of crafting, articulating and attuning to the world are not given, 
emerging in a vacuum, but are rather thoroughly and carefully threaded through social 
practices and the skillful technical construction of new technologies and imaginaries.  
 
In yet another, somewhat similar online article, Life, Love, and Robots: A 
Conversation (Felixonline), the author, after interviewing Ikegami, takes artificial life 
to the future. After her interview with Ikegami, she is left pondering about artificial 
intelligence and the definition of life, wondering whether the future will really contain 
some sort of “Ex Machina-style androids for us to fall in love with?”, whether she 
will someday in the future find a version of Alter, she further ruminates, “on the 
couch, eating Ben & Jerry’s and watching Love Island?” (Hertzberg 2019). But what 
is conspicuously peculiar about this article, I think, is that the author explicitly 
compares Ikegami to Victor Frankenstein and describe him as a “misunderstood 
genius” (Hertzberg 2019). This curiously echoes yet another argument in this thesis: 
that Ikegami assumes as sort of Jungian archetype, the artist-scientist, and becomes 
the embodiment of what Weber calls charismatic authority. As a leader of the Ikegami 
Lab, Ikegami is described by the lab members as a creative “genius” and a “pioneer”, 
who creates “sacred norms” to be followed. Indeed, Ikegami commands his laboratory 
by his word, his emotional posture and personal qualities, and he does so in ways that 
make him the center of his own cult of personality.  
 
While such headlines, although in dramatic ways, somehow capture, I think, what is 
at stake in our contemporary cultural moment when artificial life researchers seek to 
construct new artificial systems to better understand what kind of a thing life is, they 
reveal how Ikegami has largely succeeded in attracting attention to himself and the 
field of artificial life. On the one side, these articles reveal that artificially-created 
things, such as Alter, do indeed convince people that they may be “real” instantiations 
of life, or even be a new “species” in their own right. Moreover, “life” may equally, 
then, be constructed and understood through assembling bits and pieces of synthetic 
materials and code. On the other side, though, these articles also reveal that 
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artificially-created things somehow impose upon us, or are supposed to impose upon 
us, “new ways of understanding” the world and force us to take “new perspectives” 
on things. Finally, we might even, as one of the authors of the articles implies, “fall in 
love” with artificial life technologies, such as “Ex Machina-style androids” and watch 
hokey reality shows on the couch eating ice cream. To this end, one may go back to 
the idea of “technologies of the imagination” (Pedersen et.al. 2009) to suggest that the 
construction of new artificial systems are very determinate ways to produce 
indeterminate effects, the effects here being that news headlines are clogging to 
dramatize the construction of the artificial, heralding the promise of artificial life to 
deliver not only new life forms but also new forms of life (cf. Helmreich 2009).  
 
Yet, the proliferation of such “dramatizations”, evidenced in the articles, too, I think, 
only bolster Ikegami’s own position and enforces belief in artificial life, not only as a 
legitimate field of research, but also as a potential candidate for changing the world. 
As we have seen in this thesis, Ikegami is himself a dramatic type of person, whose 
charismatic authority might be said to be a primary driver of scientific and 
paradigmatic change. Indeed, Ikegami’s emotional posture and personal qualities 
reveal that changes in science may equally be attributed to new forms of charismatic 
leadership that define new social structures and relationships to impel scientific 
practice and change.  
 
However, these headlines also surface less than a decade after the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Disaster, a Level 7 nuclear accident initiated by the Tohoku earthquake and 
ensuing tsunami in 2011, that discharged radioactive fallout to surrounding natural 
habitats, in effect, discharging, according to the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency 
of Japan (NISA), roughly 770 PBq (iodine-131 equivalent) of radioactivity, about 
15% of the Chernobyl release of 5200 PBq iodine-131 equivalent. Summarizing the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster like this, of course, is to self-consciously 
highlight another point in this thesis. Understanding the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Disaster in terms of statistics and numbers, to keep with Ikegami’s terminology, is the 
work “normal science”. Statistics, numbers, equations and formula, as Ikegami holds, 
are “layers of description” advanced by the paradigm he calls “normal science”. Thus, 
while the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster might have nothing in common with 
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artificial life, it is nonetheless the dark side of “life”. And so, I self-consciously evoke 
this description of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster because it highlights, not 
how life is constructed but how it is destroyed. But also, as it has hopefully become 
apparent throughout this thesis, to highlight that any given material-semiotic, complex 
phenomena cannot simply be understood by the logic of normal science. Normal 
science, therefore, as Ikegami asserts in this thesis, is what must be deconstructed, and 
eventually relegated, to make way for what he calls a new epistemology of artificial 
life. And so, practitioners of normal science would, according to Ikegami, make sense 
of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster exactly by turning into numbers and 
statistics, not by seeking to understand the qualitative, social, cultural, ethical, moral 
and existential dimensions of such a disaster, things that must be taken into account 
when trying to make sense of our world. How “massive data flows” merge and 
dissolve, cut across and divert, is the very substance of reality and it is to this reality 
the artificial life researchers at the Ikegami Lab are committed. Thus, if this thesis is a 
postcard from a particular cultural moment in history, which I believe it is, where 
“life” has once again turned into an enigma, it describes and analyses a cultural 
moment where contemporary artificial life researchers are nowadays constructing 
new artificial systems as a means to understand what life is.  
 
Life constructed, life destroyed, what ultimately matters to Ikegami and his team of 
researchers is how to make sense of life, how to create new meanings of it, by 
persistently asking by what mode of reasoning, by what metric, by what means, by 
what logics, should we really understand it. And so, my claim is that the construction 
of parallax machines, to reiterate, do a lot of work for Ikegami and the lab members: 
they are epistemic things that serve to destabilize biologically-established 
understandings of life; machinic objects for building new viable instantiations of 
human-machine interfaces in the sense of creating new modes of human-machine 
relatedness, relations that can be made only by constructing new artificial systems in 
the real world; and social tools for building alternative narratives of life, narratives 
that offer what I call a parallax view of life. Thus, the construction of parallax 
machines, I argue in this thesis, is at once the construction of material artifacts and a 
construction of a cultural formation. In this dual capacity, parallax machines embody 
what I have called Ikegamianism and offer a what I have called a parallax view of 
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life, a view in modern theory, which is based on a mode of parallax, centrifuging 
“life” in a sort of vertigo between realms organic and inorganic, natural and artificial, 
living and nonliving, real and simulated.  
 
All this happens during a moment when the humanities and the social sciences have 
increasingly turned toward the material world in hopes of making sense of the 
domains of the “nonhuman” (cf. Barad 2008; Grusin 2015). The lab members, 
however, are turning their attention to artificiality in hopes of making sense of the 
living. And with the arrival of a slew of “new materialisms” (cf. Coole & Frost 2010) 
and “vibrant matter” (Bennett 2010), artificial life, then, may be considered a site with 
a strong nonhuman presence, a zone of corporeal and tactile synthetic bodies, of 
“three-dimensional and turbulent materiality” (Steinberg & Peters 2015:247). New 
materialisms of various sorts now seek to account for precarious and “vibrant” 
natures, and the convoluted relationships between biotic and abiotic, living and 
nonliving existences, being and agencies. But they sometimes do so by attending to a 
sort of pre-discursive, or in Ikegami’s terminology “pre-ontological”, material world, 
which is often posed as something outside human signification. Parallax machines, 
however, may be nonhuman, but they are, I want to claim, nevertheless the products 
of human action, ingenuity and dexterity, the result of social forces, serving, in turn, a 
very human desire to be affected, to learn, know, to understand and to generate new 
knowledge about the world and our place in it. 
 
So, while I admire the conceptual creativity of new materialisms, fresh modes of 
thinking and speaking of nonhuman liveliness and agency, I read from my 
experiences at the Ikegami Lab that artificial life, following anthropologist Elizabeth 
Povinelli (2016), that Ikegami and the lab members creatively and innovatively 
extend to materiality, i.e. to parallax machines, the, “modes, qualities, forms and 
relations that already exist” (Povinelli 2016:440). That is, even though the artificial 
life researchers at the Ikegami Lab appeal and allude to the yet-to-be-known, to new 
horizons of possible worlds beyond the human, to how technologies might “escape 
us”, to highly material, artificial and nonhuman worlds, which they claim might be 
somehow outside human signification, they are still, I argue, very human, caught in 
the ripples of culture. As Ikegami charmingly reassures us, “basically, you can say 
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what you want to say. Science is really a matter of community, and it is the 
community who decides what counts as science and what does not.” 
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